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ABSTRACT
SPATIAL ASPECTS OF INFANT MORTALITY AND INFORMAL WORKERS: 
THE CASE OF CEARA STATE -  BRAZIL
by
Ricardo Soares 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2007
High levels of infant mortality and high participation of informal workers in 
the labor market are living conditions faced by many developing countries. In 
Ceara State - Brazil, their trends during the last three decades have followed 
opposite directions. Whereas infant mortality has decreased substantially since 
the 1980s, suggesting that the country is on the right path to development, the 
labor market has presented increasing levels of informality, which challenges 
traditional theories of development. The essays of this thesis aim to investigate 
some aspects of these two phenomena. In particular, the first essay offers an 
approach to analyze if the health care program known as the Community Health 
Worker Program has been an important factor explaining the downward trend in 
infant mortality. Moreover, it provides a framework to identify if the effectiveness
x i
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of this program is under-estimated when traditional methods of evaluation do not 
consider its spatial spillover effect. This effect occurs when improvements in this 
health care program in one municipality affect not only infant mortality in that 
municipality but also the infant mortality of neighboring municipalities. The 
second essay studies heterogeneity among informal workers and investigates 
possibilities of social interactions and spatial segmentation among different types 
of workers. Besides sharing the same study site (Ceara Sate -  Brazil), both 
essays incorporate and empirically verify the hypotheses that neighborhood 
conditions (at city or urban sector levels) play an important role in: i) amplifying 
the benefits of health care programs, and ii) affecting workers’ behavior in the 
labor market.
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INTRODUCTION
High levels of infant mortality and high participation of informal workers in 
the labor market are living conditions faced by many developing countries. In 
Ceara State - Brazil, their trends during the last three decades have followed 
opposite directions. Whereas infant mortality has decreased substantially since 
the 1980s, suggesting that the country is on the right path to development, the 
labor market has presented increasing levels of informality, which challenges 
traditional theories of development. The essays of this thesis aim to investigate 
some aspects of these two phenomena. The common hypothesis included in 
both essays is that externalities in health policies or labor market outcomes can 
be transmitted through neighboring areas (municipalities or neighborhoods). 
These externalities take the form of spillover effects in health policies (Essay I) or 
neighborhood effects in the informal labor market (Essay II).
The first essay of this thesis, therefore, investigates the determinants of 
infant mortality rate (IMR) with a suggestive modeling perspective, which is able 
to capture and empirically verify the significance of spillover effects for an 
important healthcare program (Community Health Worker Program). Spillover 
effects exist when improvements in the program affect not only the IMR of the 
benefited municipality but also the IMR of neighboring municipalities. These 
spillovers may occur because the populations of neighboring municipalities share 
not only (crowded) public health services but also behavioral attitudes related to
1
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the risk of infant death. A health care program providing basic information (water 
filtering, baby formulas, adequate sanitation, breastfeeding incentives, etc) and 
regular follow up for families can improve the health care of these families, and 
can be spontaneously replicated across the border of municipalities by other 
families, also improving the quality of the shared public health services1.
Essay I investigates if the use of traditional reduced form models to 
investigate variations in infant mortality rate among contiguous municipalities can 
underestimate the effectiveness of health policy programs when spillover 
possibilities are not taken into consideration. In this case, the under-valuation of 
the health care program may have a tremendous social cost when under 
investments in the program are measured in fewer infants saved.
The second essay of this thesis aims to provide evidence that: i) formal 
versus informal dichotomies may not be adequate to classify workers in the labor 
market, and ii) workers’ position in the labor market may also be influenced by 
social interactions in urban neighborhoods. These two possibilities have usually 
been neglected in labor market segmentation studies, which have enjoyed 
renewed interest in the literature with the persistence and growth of the informal 
economy worldwide during the 1990s. In the labor market of Fortaleza City -  
Brazil, for example, more than half of the workers are informal as they are either 
self-employed or work in small-firms usually evading labor legislation (absence of 
social security contributions, for example).
1 This improvement in the quality can occur due to reductions in the demand for particular types 
of shared health services or with a better selectivity from illness conditions avoidable by primary 
health care (diarrhea, for example).
2
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Labor market segmentation occurs when there are institutional (minimum 
wage, labor legislation, etc) or social (stigma) barriers to mobility between 
sectors. That is, individuals with the same endowments may find different 
difficulties to acquire formal and informal jobs. Limited social mobility in the labor 
market is a sign of inefficiency in this market which may aggravate the traditional 
problems associated with a large informal economy (the weakening of tax and 
social security bases and the camouflage of usual labor market indicators 
(unemployment rate, for example)2.
Empirically, more recent segmentation studies have tested the possibility 
of segmentation in urban labor markets by analyzing asymmetries in the 
likelihood of transitions between sectors in a dual labor market (formal versus 
informal sectors) and/or without considering the possibility of social interactions 
between workers. This essay argues that neither the duality in the differentiation 
of workers nor the absence of social interaction should be the norm in 
segmentation studies. Informal workers as have been empirically defined by lack 
of social security contributions or by small-size firms may encompass a set of 
differentiated workers (and activities) for which aggregation is inadequate. Some 
informal positions, for example, may not correspond to the segmented view of 
under-employment. The aggregation in this case hides important dynamic 
features of informal workers which should be considered for labor market 
policies.
2 A low level of unemployment rate can associated with a high level of informality rate which not 
necessarily indicates good conditions in the labor market.
3
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It is also interesting to note that the informal literature has devoted little or 
no attention to the influence of social interactions on worker’s sector decision. 
Networking and other forms of spontaneous informational channels (observing or 
hearing about) are responsible for a considerable portion of new jobs acquired 
(Topa, 2001). Neglecting the possibility of neighborhood interactions in the 
(informal) labor market can also compromise the reliability of segmentation 
studies (models).
Essay II, therefore, suggests a sector allocation model which not only 
allows differentiation among informal workers, but also includes the possibility of 
neighborhood interactions among the different types of workers. These two 
modifications may also be included in (future) segmentation studies, which 
require the use of panel data not yet available for the labor market of Fortaleza 
City, Brazil.
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PART 1: SPATIAL EFFECTS IN INFANT MORTALITY 
MODELS: THE CASE OF CEARA STATE -  BRAZIL
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1999 approximately 5 percent of infants died before reaching one year 
of age in Ceara State Brazil. Although this average is considered high by the 
standards of the World Health Organization (WHO), it was much worse at the 
end of the 1980’s, when the level of infant mortality was twice that level. Efforts to 
reduce infant mortality in Ceara State have been recognized not only by other 
States in Brazil but also by international organizations, who have suggested the 
adoption of similar health policies in other developing countries1. The basic 
prescription of the local government involves the combination of investments 
improving socio-economic conditions (mainly education and sanitation) with 
investments in a health care program where the population assisted receive 
primary medical attention at home from trained community health workers2 
(Community Health Work Program - CHWP). Although these are the general 
recommendations for the state as a whole, each municipality3 within the state 
has adopted more or less such prescriptions. As infant mortality rates among 
these municipalities also vary considerably, one should ask if they are
1 The World Bank (WDR, 1998/99 p. 122) and the World Health Organization have cited the 
Ceara State as an example of a poor region that has decreased considerably the levels of infant 
mortality.
2 Community health workers are civilians who are trained by nurses and physicians to provide 
basic health care information to families.
3 Municipalities are the smallest geographical areas with their own local government. It is 
equivalent to counties in the US.
6
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correlated4. The basic objective of this research, therefore, is to provide an 
answer.
Home visiting programs based on community participation are still one of 
the most important flags of the primary health care model of the World Health 
Organization (WHO, (1978) and WHO, (2005)) in combating infant mortality in 
less developed areas. Barnes-Boyd et al (2001) counted at least 14 published 
experiences worldwide with mixed results in significantly improving infant health. 
Differences in methods of analysis were indicated by the authors as the main 
cause of this mixed result in the evaluation of the programs worldwide.
In Ceara State, Brazil, the CHWP has been referred to as a well 
established community program in descriptive analyses such as in Tendler 
(1997) and Svitone (2000)5. Regression analyses based on reduced form models 
derived from health economics frameworks (Corman and Grossman, 1985), 
however, are missing. These empirical strategies are appropriate to identify the 
causal link between health policies and health outcomes (infant mortality rate) at 
the municipal data level. On the other hand, the general use of these frameworks 
so far has neglected the possibility that improvements in health policies in one 
municipality may also affect the infant mortality risk of the families living in 
neighboring municipalities. This spillover effect can be induced by improvements 
in the quality of the public health services shared by the population of
4 The infant mortality rate among the municipalities ranges from 10 deaths for each 1000 live 
births to 120 deaths per 1000 births.
5 These descriptive analyses refer to the operational description of the program and suggestive 
(rather than inferential) associations between reductions in infant mortality rate and the adoption
of the program.
7
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neighboring municipalities6, or even by the sharing of information between 
families in neighbor municipalities (well) covered or otherwise by the program.
This essay proposes modeling perspectives to reduced form models that 
allow spillover effects in health policies at the municipal data level. It uses Ceara 
State’s experience with the CHWP to show how a traditional reduced form model 
can underestimate the efficacy of these programs when the model neglects 
extensive effects in neighboring municipalities. In order to accommodate these 
spatial spillover effects this essay suggests a methodology that combines the 
theoretical scope of reduced form models (Corman and Grossman (1985), 
Rosezweigh and Schultz (1982), Corman et al (1986)) with the statistical 
treatment of spatial analysis (Anselin (1986), Anselin and Hudak (1992)).
The following seven sections of this essay discuss in greater details how 
spatial considerations may improve reduced form models for variations in infant 
mortality rates among municipalities within a state. They provide information 
respectively describing: i) the study site and the health policy under 
consideration; ii) literature review on the evaluation of the health care program, 
reduced form models of infant mortality and spatial analysis; iii) theoretical 
modeling perspectives; iv) empirical models; v) empirical methodology; vi) 
empirical results; and vii) further discussions about the findings of this paper and 
complementary analyses.
6 The preventive health care behavior advised by the programs can reduce the usual
overcrowded demand for health services in public hospitals, for example, which benefit all the 
populations sharing these services.
8
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It is shown here that the exclusion of health spillover effects in traditional 
regional models of infant mortality can lead to incorrect guidance for policy 
design. In the case of Ceara State, it is estimated that under certain conditions 
the productivity of the health care policy program installed can be up to 39% 
greater than the productivity predicted in traditional models when spillover effects 
are ignored. The empirical analysis also confirms the hypothesis that a 
multidisciplinary approach is needed to reduce significantly the level of infant 
mortality rate in Ceara State. Improvements in the health structure have to be 
followed by better socio-economic conditions (and vice-versa) in order to 
decrease considerably the risk of infant death among the municipalities of Ceara 
State.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY SITE AND HEALTH POLICIES
With an area7 of 146,348 Km2 and a population of 7,430,661s individuals 
in 2000, Ceara State (Figure 1) is located in the poorest region of Brazil 
(Northeast). The state illiteracy rate is 40% and the income inequality is one of 
the worst in the country. These signs of underdevelopment across individuals are 
also verified across municipalities. Differences in socio-economic, geographic 
and health structure conditions contribute directly to the great variance in infant 
mortality rates across municipalities.
The concentration of state production in a few municipalities also reflects 
disparities in the provision of adequate health services. In 2000, 6 out of 184 
municipalities produced more than 60% of the gross state product (GSP). Four of 
these municipalities are located in the metropolitan area of Fortaleza (the State’s 
capital) which also contains 80% of the State’s beds for neonatal intensive care 
units. Populations in small underprivileged municipalities usually have to 
commute to receive medical services in the next better-endowed municipality. In 
1998, for example, approximately 26% of the mothers commuted to other 
municipalities for delivery service.
7 Ceara state has approximately the same land area as New York State.
8 Population Census of 2000.
10
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Cyclical outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, dengue and less 
intensively malaria still characterize the epidemiological pattern of the state with 
23% of the causes of death for babies less than a year old in 1998 being related 
to infectious or bacterium diseases. Therefore, the high percentage of infant 
deaths that can be avoided by adequate primary care, the intensive practice of 
commuting for health services, and the persistence of epidemic diseases make 
Ceara state a good study case in analyzing spatial effects in infant mortality 
models. In particular, spillover effects in health policy are of great interest in this 
essay9. These effects occur when the benefits of health policies expand to 
beyond the borders of the jurisdiction (municipality) where they were 
implemented. That is, the health policy affects the risk of infant death not only in 
the municipality where the program was implemented (or improved) but also in 
the neighboring municipalities.
Health spillover effects are usually conditioned by the inter-municipal 
demand for health services or simply by behavioral influences between the 
populations of two regions. Improvements in the health structure10 in one 
municipality can affect the population of all municipalities involved in this inter­
municipal commuting for health services. In addition, health care programs that 
promote habit changes toward a more preventive healthy pattern can also be 
spontaneously replicated through informal channels in neighbor municipalities. 
Therefore, the transmission mechanism of spillover in health policies can be
9 Additional spatial effects are modeled as spatial error or spatial lag effects that are further 
analyzed ahead in this essay.
10 The health structure of the city includes the human and capital resources available for 
prevention and treatment of medical needs.
11
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structural or behavioral. The former reflects the sharing of health infrastructures 
by populations of different municipalities, and the latter is related to the sharing of 
better information on preventive measures against illness conditions.
Home visiting programs are mostly designed to encourage preventive care 
by providing information on how behavioral attitudes can affect the risk of survival 
of infants. Improvements in these programs can produce spillover effects as they 
may improve the quality of the health services shared by populations of different 
municipalities. This may occur if the preventive behavior advised to and adopted 
by the population of one municipality diminishes demand for crowded and 
(municipal) shared health services. That is, if the population of one municipality 
demands less public health services, for example, the population of neighboring 
municipalities has to wait less to get these services or they can receive them with 
better quality. The spillover of home visiting programs can also occur simply 
because the populations of neighboring municipalities share information as well 
as they share behavioral attitudes. Therefore, even if the population of one 
municipality has not received the proper attention of a health care program, they 
may adopt some primary health care measures (water filtering, for example) 
because others (relatives or friends) are adopting them in neighboring 
municipalities.
Since 1989, besides additional investments in sanitation and health 
structure, the government of Ceara State in Brazil has implemented a health care 
program in each municipality known as the Community Health Worker Program 
(CHWP - Programs Agentes Comunitarios de Saude). These investments and
12
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program are the result of the combined efforts of governments at the local 
(municipal), state and federal level. Each municipality uses resources from its 
own budget, and from state and federal transfers, to provide public and universal 
health services to their citizens and municipal neighbors.
The CHWP employs community health workers (CHWs) whose main 
activities consist of visiting families at their homes to provide health and 
nutritional education. They weigh children less than two years old, provide baby 
formulas for oral rehydration, collect information on health indicators, and refer 
care in health units for pregnant women or any other family member in need of 
health treatment. The data collected by the CHWs are pooled at the municipal 
level by their supervisors.
The program initially targeted the 45 poorest municipalities in 1989, when 
CHWs were recruited from individuals with at least 5 years of local residence with 
basic education and proven commitment to social service. The program was 
extended to other municipalities at the demand of unassisted populations 
(Svitone, 2000) and in 1998 all 184 municipalities were receiving the program. 
The CHWP is designed to select one CHW for every 75 homes in rural areas and 
every 225 homes in urban areas. However, this basic prescription is not always 
followed. The number of community health workers per capita in each 
municipality varies because while the state sponsors the salaries of the CHWs 
the municipalities have to hire nurses and physicians as supervisors and 
instructors. Therefore, the distribution of CHW among the municipalities depends 
on the shared responsibility of the municipality, represented by its mayor, and the
13
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State Health Secretariat that directs the entire program. Each municipality, 
however, is allowed to increase the number of CHWs using their own resources, 
which makes the policy “semi-independent” with respect to the each municipal 
jurisdiction of the state.
The program targets not only infant health but also the health of the family 
as a whole, and thus, by extension, the health of the community (as it allows the 
tracking and controlling of contagious diseases). In addition, the policy creates 
new job opportunities for the population, which can alleviate the adverse 
economic conditions of the region. Therefore, the use of the policy in each 
municipality is not restricted to the target of reducing infant mortality. Its cross­
municipal variability with respect to the general prescription is determined by the 
preferences of each mayor regarding priority policies. These conditions suggest 
that reverse causality problems in empirical models are of less concern than the 
immediate perception suggests11. In addition, this essay follows Corman and 
Grossman (1985) in using time lag values of infant mortality rates as an 
additional regressor to control for potential problems of reverse causality12.
The benefits of the CHWP in reducing infant mortality in Ceara State have 
been partially promulgated by expositional (Svitone et al (2000), Tendler (1997), 
World Bank (1998/1999)) and empirical studies (Souza et al (1999), Sourza et al 
(2000), Souza et al (2001), Lindsay et al (2002)). These studies, however, have 
neither considered empirical strategies based on reduced form models to
11 Reverse causality occurs when the intensity of the policy is induced by the level of infant 
mortality. This makes the policy endogenous generating biased estimates for the model.
12 The pros and cons of this strategy are further discussed in section 5.1.3.
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analyze policy efficiency, nor included the possibility of spatial effects of any type. 
The main contribution of this essay is to offer an empirical strategy of estimation 
of infant mortality models that combines the theoretical framework of reduced 
form equations with spatial statistical analysis. Within this framework it is possible 
to fully capture the efficiency of the health care program in reducing infant 
mortality rate locally and statewide.




Infant mortality is a prime example of a challenging issue that welcomes 
multiple methodological approaches to understand its causes. Models explaining 
variations in infant mortality rates have been estimated under distinct 
perspectives motivated by epidemiological concerns, population trends, family 
studies, or economic growth and policy. As the main contribution of this essay is 
to investigate municipal externalities in the CHWP in Ceara State by using spatial 
analysis in reduced form models of infant mortality, this review focuses on three 
types of literature: i) studies examining municipal variations in infant mortality rate 
in Ceara State, ii) references describing the framework for estimating reduced 
form models of infant mortality, and iii) studies exemplifying the growing use of 
spatial analysis.
3.1. Ecological Models of Infant Mortality in Ceara State
Ceara State in the northeast part of Brazil was a pioneer in implementing 
the CHWP in the country. As the program developed through the 1990’s, 
covering more municipalities and generating a reliable data source, some 
scholars began to use its informational data to investigate variations in infant 
mortality rate. Souza et al (1999) and Lindsay (2002), for example, examine
16
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variations in the infant mortality rate and the diarrhea specific infant mortality rate 
among the municipalities of Ceara state during the 1994-96 period13.
Both studies used multivariate ecological models, where predictors of 
infant mortality are differentiated as proximate determinants (prevalence of low 
birthweight, breastfeeding and infant weight gain), health-related behavioral 
variables (participation in growth monitoring programs, immunizations, and 
prenatal care) and socio-economic conditions (sanitation, illiteracy rate and 
income). The community health worker program is the source of the data for the 
calculations of the first two types of predictors (proximate and health behavioral 
variables), but it is not included as an additional predictor in the empirical 
models14. The ecological models also fail to identify and treat the proximate 
determinants and the health behavioral variables as endogenous predictors in 
the regression models. In addition, they disregard any possibility of spatial effect 
such as the spillover effect of any health care program. These ecological models, 
therefore, present empirical limitations as they (i) lack theoretical identification of 
exogenous and endogenous determinants of infant mortality rates and (ii) neglect 
to account any form of spatial effect.
In general, empirical models based on the theory of demand for health 
(Grossman, 1972) respond precisely to the first critique but fail to adjust to the 
second one; in contrast, the “social-medical” spatial literature produces models
13 In both studies 140 out of 184 municipalities were used in the sample. The selection of the
municipalities was based on availability of monthly information of the set of information provided
bv the CHWP.
The only variable possibly directly linked to the CHW P is the percentage of infants participating 
in growth monitoring program. The authors however do not specify if this monitoring program is in 
fact the CHWP. Even in this case this variable should not be included in reduced form models as 
the behavioral demand for health services is endogenous.
17
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that are just the opposite15. This essay merges these approaches and shows in 
the next sections the missing and the favorable parts of some representative 
studies.
3.2. Reduced Form Models of Infant Mortality in Health Economics
Grossman’s 1972 paper on demand for health provide the reference- 
framework in Health Economics to understanding variations in health conditions 
and health behaviors. One important feature of this framework is the distinction 
between intermediate inputs in production of health conditions and exogenously 
given inputs that shape and move demand functions for such intermediate inputs. 
The modeling consequences of this distinction are the differentiations between 
reduced form and structural models of infant mortality rate. The first include only 
exogenous variables and are attractive as they provide straightforward estimates 
for the total impact of health policies on the risk of infant death. The second 
usually divide the total impact of health policies in direct and indirect effects as 
they affect infant mortality rate directly or through endogenous intermediate 
inputs16.
Proximate determinants of infant mortality like low birth weight or 
inadequate weight gain are actually outcome variables and therefore should not 
be included in reduced form equations. Behavioral variables indicating demand
15 For expositional purposes the social-medical spatial literature in this essay refers to those 
studies using spatial analysis in infant mortality models without necessarily identify the distinction 
between reduced form and structural form models.
16 For a more complete discussion on the differentiation between reduced form and structural
models in health economics see Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982).
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for health services like prenatal or neonatal care are also considered 
endogenous intermediate inputs, as they are also induced by exogenously given 
health policies or socio-economic conditions. Regarding health service policy 
variables, Corman and Grossman (1985) emphasize the differences between 
variables expressing their availability and their use. The first are exogenous 
because they express the instruments of health policies, while the second are 
endogenous because they are the results of the policies. In general, this seems 
to be the basic difference between social-medical studies and health economic 
studies. Whereas the distinction between outcome and policy variables or 
exogenous and endogenous variables is a major concern for the latter, the 
former makes less effort to draw this distinction.
Corman and Grossman (1985) and Corman et al (1988) estimate reduced 
form models for infant mortality rates among counties of the US, where policy 
availability of health services such as abortion or family planning programs were 
some of the policy variables of interest.
When reduced form models are estimated with macro level data including 
bordering municipalities, the relationship between availability and use of health 
services and their impact on infant mortality requires additional spatial 
considerations. In many circumstances, the population affected by the health 
policy is not restricted to the population of the municipality sponsoring the policy. 
In addition to this spatial spillover in health policies, other spatial effects such as 
spatially defined ecological problems (river contamination, for example) or even 
the mismatch between the municipal geographical space and the risk of infant
19
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death may generate spatial correlation problems that bias the model’s estimates. 
The modeling and identification of these spatial effects though, have been 
increasingly considered by the literature on spatial analysis.
3.3. Spatial Effects in Economics and Socio-Medical Studies
In their 1985 empirical model of infant mortality Corman and Grossman 
used non-bordering US counties with population size greater than 50,000 as the 
unit of analysis. The sample selection was justified by two reasons. The first, 
more statistically based, was that infant mortality rate estimates can be 
miscalculated for small regions as the ratio of infant deaths per live births are 
subjected to small number irregularities. That is, one additional infant death for a 
small population, for example, may produce a variation in the measurement of 
infant mortality rate that is much higher than the true variation in the probability of 
infant death. The second, more theoretically based, was that small regions are 
not self-sufficient in producing and consuming their own level of health services, 
and therefore they lack, to a certain extent, control over their health production 
possibilities. If the first issue is attenuated in small regions of less developed 
countries by the unfortunate reality that the number of infant deaths is much 
higher than in developed countries, the second issue can find a solution in the 
use of spatial analysis.
Since the work of Moran (1948) and more recently Cliff and Ord (1981) 
and Anselin et al (1986), spatial analysis has been used in many different studies 
to capture the importance of the geographical position of the unit of analysis in
20
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the hypothesis being investigated17. Externalities in economic growth (Fingleton, 
2001; Ford, 2002), in tax policies (Case et al, 1993; Conway and Rork, 2004), in 
regional prices (Case, 1991) or in disease incidence (Cliff and Ord, 1981) are 
examples of situations where spatial effects are important.
With respect to health indicators, epidemiological studies have made great 
progress in using spatial analysis to estimate distributional maps for infant 
mortality rates (Assuncao et al (1998), Shimakura et al (2001) and Clayton et al 
(1993)). Few exceptions however have made use of spatial econometric 
methodology to estimate mortality rate models18. Andrade and Szwarcwald 
(2001) use Moran’s I index to observe if there is spatial correlation in neonatal 
infant mortality rates among the barrios of the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil. They observe how the spatial correlation disappears as explanatory 
variables are added to the regression model. Lorant et al (2001) compared a 
traditional weighted least square (WLS) regression model with a spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR) for standard mortality rate among the municipalities 
of Belgium. Also testing for spatial correlation with a modified Moran’s I index, 
they find that the estimates of the SAR model are more reliable than those of the 
WLS.
Both previous studies (Andrade and Szwarcwald (2001) and Lorant et al 
(2001)) follow the spatial econometric methodology of testing and adjusting
17 This geographical position can be understood as the physical location of the region, or even its 
economic position (weight) with respect to different partners in trade.
18 The spatial econometric methodology is referenced here by Anselin (1992) where diagnostic
tests for spatial correlation are conducted in traditional regression models. In cases where spatial
correlation is significant spatial models are suggested.
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regressive models when spatial correlation is present. These studies, however, 
do not present any specific health care policy as explanatory variables, 
concentrating efforts in measuring associations between demographic 
characteristics and mortality rates. Consequently, they also do not consider the 
possibility that spatial spillovers in health policy variables may be driving the 
significant presence of spatial correlation.
This essay proposes a modeling perspective that not only adds spatial 
analysis to reduced form models but also allows spillover possibilities in health 
policies. This combination of a theoretical framework for health policy analysis 
and a statistical spatial methodology is an important contribution to the literature. 
The application for a specific case study (CHWP) reveals how traditional models 
without spatial effects may undervalue the effectiveness of policy programs when 
compared to the spillover models proposed here. A better exposition of how this 
modeling perspective is accomplished is found in the next section.
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CHAPTER 4
SPATIAL MODELING AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
This section provides the modeling perspectives of reduced form models 
with spatial effects together with some contextualization for the case of infant 
mortality rate in Ceara State. In addition, it also identifies the main explanatory 
variables used in this essay.
4.1. Reduced Form Models with Spatial Effects
In general, reduced form equations for infant mortality are expressed as:
(1) IMR = X$+H\(+z
where IMR is the vector of infant mortality rates (or its algebraic transformation 
such as square root or log) for n different regions, X is an n x k matrix of 
covariates indicating socio-economic conditions, H is an n x s matrix expressing 
the availability of health services (health structure and health policies), and e is a 
vector of random shocks assumed to be independent of each other. In this 
model, spatial effects caused by contagion possibilities, regional spillover effects 
of health policies, or even by the practice of commuting for health services are 
ignored. Any of these effects can violate the assumption of independence of the 
residuals. The presence of spatial correlation implies that the lack of
23
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independence of the residuals follows a geographical pattern given by some 
weighting matrix (W )19. The result is that the Efe.Sj) *  0, which compromises the 
estimates of equation 1.
The presence of spatial correlation implies biased and/or inefficient 
estimates depending on the form of the spatial effect. This correlation can 
capture uncontrolled possibilities of spatial effects (in isolation or jointly) such as: 
i) spatial health spillover; ii) unobserved shocks or variables that affect jointly 
neighbors’ infant mortality level; and/or iii) spatial mismatch between the 
phenomenon being investigated and the unit of analysis. In these cases, 
modifications in the reduced form model are necessary and the following section 
specifies how each of these spatial effects may be modeled.
4.1.1. Policy spillover models
When spillovers in health services are present, the correct specification for 
the infant mortality model is given by equation 2.
(2) I MR = Xp + /-/y + V^HS + e
where Wh is an n x n weighting matrix averaging the availability of health services 
in the neighboring municipalities, and 5 is a vector of parameters which captures 
the general spillover effect of health services20 in neighboring municipalities. The 
presence of spatial correlation when equation 1 is estimated could be significant
19 The covariance matrix is such that the Cov (eh IjWySj) *  0. IjWyEj is the weighted average of the 
residuals of municipality i’s neighbors.
20 The estimation of this equation can be carried out by OLS (or WLS) given that only additional 
explanatory variables are added to the model.
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due to the omission of the health spillover variables (WhH). In this case, equation 
2 can be carried out by traditional OLS (or WLS) given only additional 
explanatory variables are added to the model21.
The survival probability of infants in one particular region is not exclusively 
affected by the availability of health services only in that particular region. 
Commuting for health services is a common practice for a population living in 
small and/or underprivileged municipalities. In this case, it is very likely that any 
improvement in these services also affects the infant mortality rates of 
neighboring regions. Simply, a public hospital serves not only the population of 
the municipality where it is located, but also others. Even if a health policy is 
exclusive for the population in one particular region (as in the case of the 
CHWP), information spillover effects of the policy can also contribute to reduce 
infant mortality in the surrounding areas.
In neighboring regions equally characterized by high susceptibility of the 
population to acquiring infectious disease due to the lack of adequate information 
on preventive behavior, the effects of informational health policies will probably 
be extended to those regions where the policy was not implemented. Failing to 
account for this possibility may make the health policy look less effective. In a
21 Two additional assumptions are however necessary to use these traditional methods. The first 
refers to the exogenous character of the policy and the second to the absence of interaction in
the distribution of the health services. The interaction occurs when the health policy decisions of
one municipality affect and is affected by the health policy decisions of the neighbors. Whereas it 
is assumed that this second assumption holds in our case, additional empirical adjustments can 
be made when the first assumption does not hold. These adjustments are explained in the next
section.
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cost/benefit analysis this distortion can result in a less than efficient distribution of 
health care programs.
Model 2 assumes that only the neighbors’ availability of health services 
has a direct impact on the levels of infant mortality rates. That is, the socio­
economic conditions of neighboring municipalities are not included directly as an 
additional variable in the model. These conditions may also affect the risk of 
infant death. This possibility however, requires additional assumptions regarding 
the transmission mechanism that goes beyond the main objective of this essay. 
This essay, however, argues that if neighbors’ socio-economic conditions are 
important, model 2 would still present spatial correlation, and their effect can also 
be captured with the spatial lag or the spatial error models suggested ahead.
4.1.2. Spatial error models
The level of infant mortality in neighboring regions can be correlated 
because these regions are susceptible to the same risk of temporary and 
unpredicted epidemic diseases, ecological disturbance, or any other unobserved 
factor that crosses municipal borders. In this case, the spatial effect operates via 
the error term. This last term in equation 1 or 2 is given by:
(3) e = A,Whs + n
where X is the parameter detecting the unobservable spatial effect, and ft is a 
well-behaved disturbance with mean 0 and variance matrix a2l. The correct 
specification for the model in this case should be:
26
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(4) I MR = X|3 + /-/y + l/^H5 + (I - M V h) 'V
Equation 4 suggests that additional unobserved factors are important to 
explain the distribution of infant mortality22. That is, it is possible that not all 
important socio-economic and health conditions have been included as 
predictors for infant mortality in the model, or that unmeasured environmental or 
epidemiological factors are also playing a role in explaining infant mortality 
variation. These unobserved spatial externalities in infant mortality models can 
be interpreted as any risk factor of infant death that would be given by 
unmeasured regional behavioral variables (cultural aspects of the population for 
example), by disease incidence, and/or by ecological problems (river 
contamination or other pollution problems).
The distinction between purely random spatial shocks and unobserved 
variables with spatial effects is difficult to address. However, in the spatial context 
it is possible at least to identify if potential “unobservable” variables are a spatial 
combination of the observable (measurable) phenomena at hand. That is, what is 
really missing in equation 2 is not an additional (possibly non-measurable) 
spatially determined explanatory variable (a lake contamination affecting the 
adequate supply of water to neighboring municipalities, for example) but the 
spatial externality of the available explanatory variables. This possibility is 
explored in the next model specification.
22 Equation 4 can be estimated by maximum likelihood as in Anselin (1992).
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4.1.3. Spatial lag models
In infant mortality models, spatial lag specifications work as spatial filters 
necessary for model specification. The spatial lag model is defined as:
(5) IMR = Xp + Hy+ WH6 +pWhIMR + e
where the parameter p is the spatial autoregressive coefficient. Spatial lag 
models have been more recently used in geography economics to express the 
presence of externalities in economic conditions (Fingleton, 2001) and to underlie 
regional competition in prices and taxes (Case et al, 1993; Conway and Rork, 
2004). Following Anselin (1992), spatial lag models can be interpreted in two 
ways. In the first, the spatial lag variable (W'IMR) works as an additional 
(endogenous) explanatory variable. That is, the model expresses spatial 
dependence where the value of the dependent variable in one region is a 
function of their values in the surrounding areas. The spatial lag factor captures 
the interactivity of the phenomenon itself, which is usually modeled theoretically 
(Brueckner, 1998). In this case, the focus of analysis is the possibility of 
significant interaction while controlling for the effect of other variables. The main 
interest is the endogenous spatial effect itself and its meaning. This interpretation 
however is not taken in this essay which primarily investigates efficiencies in 
health policies.
This essay gives another interpretation to the spatial lag term in equation 
5. It is only a statistical modeling requirement to control the misspecification of 
the model. It is the filtering factor that corrects the difference between the area of
28
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jurisdiction (municipality) and the dimensionality of the phenomenon (risk of 
infant mortality). In this case, the main interest of the analysis is the unbiased 
marginal effect of the explanatory variables (health policy indicators) once the 
spatial correlation problem is controlled for. Although contagion possibilities 
would be a theoretical explanation for spatial lag models of infant mortality rates, 
this essay only assumes a controlling role for the spatial lag variable.
Equation 5 can be estimated with the use of an instrumental variable for 
the spatial lag23. In a first step, the predicted value for WIMR is estimated from 
the spatial lag structure of the exogenous explanatory variables {WX). This 
predicted value is included afterwards as an explanatory variable in equation 5 to 
provide consistent estimators for the parameters of the model (Kelejian and 
Prucha (1998)). The use of instrumental variable (IV) for this model specification 
has some advantages. First, it does not rely on parametric assumptions (normal 
distribution of residuals, for example) to provide consistent estimators as the 
maximum likelihood estimation does (Anselin, 1992). Especially for small 
samples, this propriety can be translated into efficiency advantages over 
parametric estimation methods.
Second, the spatial lag model with IV estimation is less sensitive to the 
presence of spatial correlation in the error term. That is, this estimation method is 
still adequate for the spatial lag structure when the spatial error specification is 
also important. The instrumental variable reduces the potential correlation 
problem between unobservables and the spatial lag variable (WIMR) determined
23 Equation 5 can also be estimated by maximum likelihood as in Anselin (1992).
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by other reasons (outbreak of a contagious diseases like dengue, for example) 
not captured by the spatial lag.
Finally, the IV approach not only corrects the endogeneity problem of the 
spatial lag but also gives it a controlling interpretation which accounts for the 
possible spatial effects of observed socio-economic conditions. This way, the 
health spillover effect, if significant, will capture only the direct effect that 
neighbor’s policy has on infant mortality rates. It is a net effect for the policy that 
goes beyond improvements in the socio-economic conditions in neighboring 
municipalities, for which potential effect is captured by the spatial filter (spatial 
lag)24.
It is important to mention that the spatial effects suggested in this paper 
and their modeling structure are complementary explanations for the variation of 
infant mortality. The main predictors are socio-economic conditions and health 
services, the definitions of which are the theme of the next section.
4.2. Determinants of Infant Mortality Rate
In reduced form models of infant mortality the explanatory variables 
usually refer to socio-economic and geographic conditions, health structure, and 
health policies. Socio-economic conditions are related to the characteristics of 
the population and to the physical structure of each municipality that can affect
24 Another advantage of the IV approach over the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation refers to 
the computational procedure. The ML estimation is interaction based and for large sample size it 
becomes very time consuming.
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the risk of infant mortality. Income, education, sanitation and urbanization may 
affect the probability of infant survival in different ways.
Higher income is usually associated with better living conditions, general 
hygiene, and nutrition intake. Children in low income families are more likely to 
receive less than the necessary amount of nutrients to gain adequate weight 
during the first year of life. At the municipality level however, it is the increase in 
the proportion of children at risk of being underfed that can make the index of 
infant mortality increase. Therefore, the relationship between income and infant 
mortality can be misrepresented by the average income of the region when 
income distribution is very unequal. This research uses the level of 
unemployment rate in each municipality as the variable that represents income 
disparities and (health) productive capacity of the families. This variable is 
usually included in social deprivation indexes that are normally used as the main 
determinant of infant mortality25.
Education is considered one of the most important socioeconomic 
determinants of infant mortality because it represents the technology of the 
health production function in families26. It expresses the reaction capacity of the 
families with respect to their socio-economic constraints. In addition, it can also 
be a proxy for cultural beliefs or preferences which stimulate demographic
25 The Towsand deprivation index, for example, is composed of the standardized sum of 
unemployment rate, percentage of households owning no car, percentage of households not 
owner occupied, and the percentage of households with more than one person per room (Bithell 
et al, 1995).
26 See Grossman, 1972.
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transition of regions27. The educational variable in this research is represented by 
the illiteracy rate for woman between 15 and 49 years of age.
In less developed regions sanitation conditions are epidemiologically 
associated with infant mortality. Outbreak of diseases, water contamination, and 
pollution are problems induced by low quality sanitation. However, at the 
aggregate level of municipality the relationship between sanitation conditions and 
infant mortality has been dubious. Souza et al (1999), for example, find low 
explanatory power in sanitation conditions28 when analyzing variations in infant 
mortality among the municipalities of Ceara State. On the other hand, Alves and 
Belluzo (2004) also working with municipality level data for the whole country and 
Simoes (1996), working with a broader geographic data for Brazil, show that 
regional differences in infant mortality can be explained mostly by differences in 
water and sanitation quality. This is currently the general view, although 
differences in measuring sanitation quality may affect this result.
In this research, sanitation conditions are represented by the percentage 
of households with adequate waste removal. In Ceara State, waste removal 
services are provided by each municipality. This variable, therefore, represents 
the efforts of each municipality in improving sanitation conditions. On average, 
less than 40% of the population of the municipalities has adequate garbage
27 The demographic transition begins with the reduction in the level of population growth 
motivated by the realization that the capacity of survival of infants in a family is more correlated to 
the nourishment condition of the infants than to the number of infants in the family. That is, the 
chances of infant survival come with quality investments rather than quantity investments in the 
children.
28 Souza et al (1999) used percentage of households without sewage connection or septic tanks
as a measure for sanitation conditions. In a univariate ecological model better sanitation is a
significant inhibitor of infant mortality. But, in multivariate models, the sanitation indicator
becomes statistically insignificant.
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removal services. The accumulation of garbage affects environmental quality and 
induces the proliferation of infectious diseases.
Demographic conditions for each municipality can also affect the risk of 
infant death. Living conditions in urban and rural areas are usually different. 
Infant mortality in rural areas is usually higher following harsher conditions 
related to deprivation of health facilities and economic development. The 
empirical evidence for Ceara State in Souza et al (1999), however, has shown 
that after controlling for health structure and socio-economic conditions, urban 
residence has no significant impact on infant mortality rate, with the sign of the 
coefficients shifting between positive and negative. A positive correlation 
between infant mortality and urbanization can be hypothesized by 
epidemiological concerns. In urban areas, the transmission of contagious 
diseases may spread faster, exposing proportionally more infants to the risk of 
contagion. In this case, it is possible that the degree of urbanization in the 
municipalities can elevate the level of infant mortality.
The health structure conditions are represented in this paper by the 
number of physicians and hospital beds per ten thousand individuals in each 
municipality. These variables capture variation in human and physical capital 
which together can provide adequate health services for the population of the 
municipalities. The health structure is complemented with the health policy 
variable that accounts for the number of community health workers per each 
group of ten thousand individuals. This variable represents therefore the quality 
and not the presence of the community health worker program in each
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municipality given that all municipalities were engaged in the program by 1994. It 
is therefore a measure of intensity rather than simple availability of the health 
policy in each municipality. However, as community health workers are 
responsible for the coverage of different and pre-determined areas within the 
municipalities, more CHWs also represent expansive coverage for families not 
covered before. Therefore, they also represent availability for the additional 
(marginal) covered families/areas.
Besides socio-economic conditions and the availability of health services, 
geographical location is also a potential predictor of the risk of infant death. 
Currie and Gruber (1997) for example, verified that distance is an important 
variable affecting the utilization of health services. In addition, distance is a key 
variable defining the probability of survival of the individuals in situations of 
emergency. The distance from the municipality of reference to the capital of 
Ceara State (the municipality of Fortaleza) was added to the models because 
Fortaleza contains most of the neonatal emergency services. It can also capture 
climate variation since more arid conditions are found in the countryside29. 
Another geographical variable is a dummy variable for municipalities that are 
bordered by municipalities in another state. The inclusion of this variable aims to 
adjust the spatial mismatch of the sample selection. That is, the borders of the 
State are not closed with respect to the distribution of infant mortality, and
29 Fortaleza is located on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean with more amenable conditions than the
countryside of the State which is mostly characterized by semi-arid conditions with shortage of
water for some regions. Figure 2 shows the location of Fortaleza in Ceara State. Whereas
Fortaleza presents an average rain precipitation level of 1,378mm/year, the average for all
municipalities is 927mm/year.
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bordering municipalities can also be affected by spatial effects coming from 
municipalities in different states.
The descriptive statistics of all variables included in the empirical analysis 
together with their data sources and definitions are shown in Table 1. The socio­
economic characteristics show the usual regularities associated with less 
developed regions such as precarious sanitation (only 38% of families with 
adequate waste removal), high unemployment rate (15% average), and high 
illiteracy rate among women (28%). The CHWP presents a municipal average of 
1 community health worker for each group of 500 individuals which is below the 
recommendation of 1 for each 225 individuals.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND SPATIAL MATRIX
This section describes the procedures used to estimate empirical 
ecological models. Two analyses are important at this point: the choice of model 
specification form and choice of the spatial arrangements (spatial matrices) used 
to define neighborhoods.
5.1. Model Specification
Ecological models of infant mortality vary considerably, not only with 
respect to their functional form but also to their time frame. In this regard, it is not 
unprecedented that data limitations for small regions may be an important factor 
in choosing the best strategy of analysis. The following discussion clarifies how 
data constraints played a role in this process and what strategies are used in this 
essay to adequately estimate marginal effects for health policy variables.
5.1.1. Functional form
The source of data to calculate infant mortality rate is the community 
health worker program. Compared to the official statistics given by death and 
birth certificates, the data collected by the program is less subject to 
undercounting problems because it is directly collected by community health
36
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workers (Svitone, 2000)30. This personal identification of cases also gives more 
credibility to the data as historical information is attached to each case.
At the municipal level, the index of infant mortality is calculated using a 
three year accumulation of live births (denominator) and infant deaths under 1 
year of age (numerator). This procedure has been used in the literature because 
one additional death or live birth in small communities may cause the index to 
vary considerably, given that the ratio of deaths per live births is multiplied by 
1000 to produce the index31. This type of data generates heteroskedastic 
problems where small municipalities tend to present higher variance than more 
populated municipalities.
Using three consecutive years, only a few municipalities (26 out of 184) 
presented a number of live births less than 500, which is a bottom limit 
suggested by local government32 to calculate the index of infant mortality for 
small regions. In this paper, however, these municipalities are not excluded given 
that their exclusion would compromise the overall spillover effect that involves all 
contiguous locations (municipalities) of a determined region (state).
After accumulating three consecutive years of live births and infant deaths, 
the municipal index of infant mortality rate is then converted to its square root
30 In very poor regions the undercounting of deaths and live births can distort the real risk of infant 
death when proportionally more deaths than live births are counted in the infant mortality index. If 
these uncounted cases were added, the index of infant mortality would change considerably. 
Given the community health worker program also counts non-hospital registered live births and 
deaths, the miscounting cases are only those not covered by the program and not registered. The 
use of the CHW P data information to calculate infant mortality rate is also present in Souza et al 
(1999).
See Corman and Grossman (1985), for example.
32 The Health Secretariat of Ceara cites the World Health Organization in prescribing carefulness 
when calculating infant mortality rate for small municipalities.
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value. This conversion serves mostly two purposes: it suggests a non-linear 
functional form where the marginal effect of the covariates increases with the 
level of infant mortality, and it usually produces a distribution for equation 
residuals that is closer to the Gaussian distribution than when the level or other 
transformations are used (log values, for example)33. Given that the spatial 
correlation diagnostic tests in this essay rely on the assumption of normal 
distribution of residuals, square root transformation provides more robustness to 
these tests.
The nonlinear functional form for infant mortality rate suggests that 
municipalities with high levels of infant mortality have more room for 
improvement and consequently have comparatively higher marginal effects34. 
Although this functional form may alter productivity levels per municipality it does 
not compromise the hypothesis raised in this essay that health policy productivity 
can be undervalued in traditional reduced form models if policy spillover effects 
are neglected. This is because the contrasting models (with and without spillover 
effects) have to be compared under the same model specification (at level or 
square root transformation). This essay follows Leal and Szcwarcwald (1997) 
who also tests spatial correlation for infant mortality rate with the square root 
transformation. Therefore, although it is not common in the literature, this
33 Level and log models will also be estimated to check the robustness of the results.
34 With square roots conversion, the marginal effect for the index of infant mortality is given by:
= IM r / 2 , where p is the coefficient of the covariate X, and IMR is the index of
infant mortality in one particular municipality. It is assumed, therefore that the higher the infant 
mortality rate higher will be the marginal effect. This assumption says that municipalities in worse
situations have more room for improvement and consequently can reduce faster their levels of 
infant mortality.
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transformation brings spatial modeling benefits (more robust diagnostic tests for 
spatial correlation) and does not conflict with any reasonable assumption for 
infant mortality models35.
5.1.2. Patterns of time modeling
The choice of the period of analysis was driven by data availability and 
quality. The cross section analysis regresses infant mortality rate for the 
1998/2000 period against health related variables of the same period and socio­
economic variables collected from the Brazilian Census of 2000. This 
contemporaneous regression is the only available alternative to substitute 
models with lagged values for the explanatory variables. In the latter, the 
marginal effect of policy variables in health outcomes is felt with a time lag in 
which the population adapts to and acknowledges the new policy. However, 
lagged values for the endogenous (IMR) and policy variables are not available as 
the CHWP only became more effective in data management after 1994, and as 5 
new municipalities had no prior information because they were created (became 
independent jurisdictions) during the 1990s. Although lagged values for the 
explanatory variables could be extracted from the Brazilian Census of 1991 and 
extrapolated for the newly created municipalities, the dependent variable (IMR), 
the policy variable of interest (CHW) and the other health related variables 
(Physicians and Hospital Beds) could not be calculated consistently for earlier 
years36. This data limitation therefore inhibited the use of difference or fixed effect
35 Models in levels and logs are also estimated for robustness check.
36 In estimating the IMR for the municipalities of Ceara state for the 1994-1996 period, Souza et al 
(1999) included in the sample only those municipalities (140) which provided complete
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model specifications which could also provide consistent marginal effects for the 
policy variables.
Despite this modeling constraint imposed by data limitation, the 
contemporaneous regression proposed here serves well the purpose of 
analyzing how ignoring spatial externalities in traditional reduced form models 
may undervalue the efficacy of health policies. This efficiency effect, however, 
may also be biased in contemporaneous equations if reverse causality problems 
exist.
5.1.3. Policy Endogeneity
Policy endogeneity occurs when the intensity of the health policy is 
induced by poor health outcomes causing a downward or upward bias on the 
estimates of policy variables. If there is a positive correlation between 
contemporary policy variables and the lagged value of infant mortality rate there 
is a downward bias on the estimates of marginal effects. This is because more 
community health workers would be hired in municipalities with high levels of 
infant mortality, and one would therefore find more CHWs where the situation is 
worse. On the other hand, when there is a significant negative correlation 
between the lagged infant mortality rate and the actual policy intensity (maybe 
due to municipal administration negligence or over-concern with respect to health 
policy) there should be an upward bias in the estimation of policy effects. The
information at that time. The inconsistency in the provision of the data for this earlier period 
occurs when some municipalities do not report any information regarding live births or infant 
deaths, or report information inconsistent with their history for one particular year. These 
problems were not observed for the 1998-2000 period.
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traditional solution in this case is to include the lagged value of infant mortality 
rates as an additional explanatory variable.
On the other hand, this solution may also generate a serial correlation bias 
when the lagged variable is correlated to the (actual) error term. The sources of 
this correlation can be unmeasured health endowments at the municipal level not 
fully captured by explanatory variables. As these unmeasured resources also 
affect infant mortality in the early years it will also affect indirectly the actual level 
of infant mortality and could bias other coefficients.
Instrument variables for the time lagged infant mortality rate, however, are 
difficult to be estimated. This is especially due to the unavailability of suitable 
lagged values for explanatory variables. As a solution to the policy endogeneity 
problem this essay follows Corman and Grossman (1985) who report both 
models with and without time lagged variables for the infant mortality rate and 
interpret their marginal effects as bounded values. That is, these models present 
upper and lower values for marginal effects, and any policy simulation 
perspective can be analyzed at the average of these two. Although not very 
precise, this solution does not compromise the investigation of how traditional 
reduced form models may understate health policies and spillovers. These 
spillovers, however, depend on the spatial distribution of the policy.
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5.2. Spatial Matrices
The distribution of infant mortality rates among the municipalities of Ceara 
State can be observed in Figure 3. It can be seen at first sight that neighbor 
municipalities are usually in the same distribution interval of infant mortality 
levels, which suggests that spatial correlation may be an issue for empirical 
models. The issue at hand, therefore, is to identify what type of spatial patterns 
for the definition of neighbors better fits the actual distribution.
In this paper four types of spatial patterns are used not only to identify 
spatial correlation possibilities (lag or error) but also to test the hypothesis of 
spatial spillover in health related variables: the simple contiguity weighting matrix 
(W1), the population-contiguity matrix (W2), the inverse distance matrix (W3), 
and population-inverse distance matrix (W4). Whereas matrices W1 and W3 are 
purely based on traditional geographic definitions of neighborhood, the matrices 
W2 and W4 add an economic content to these weighting matrices as more 
populated municipalities have a higher weight in calculating neighbor’s average 
infant mortality rate and policy.
The first matrix (W1) identifies related municipalities only by the sharing of 
common borders. Before row standardization, W1y = 1 if municipalities j and i 
share a common border, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, spatial correlation occurs 
between infant mortality in one municipality and the weighted sum of infant 
mortality in its contiguous (immediate) neighbors. Among the neighboring 
municipalities, their weights are equal in calculating the neighbor’s infant 
mortality rate or availability of health services.
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In the second matrix (W2), neighbors are also defined by common 
borders, but the weights for each neighbor municipality are given by their 
proportional size (population). Before row standardization, W2y = population of j if 
municipalities j and i share a common border, and 0 otherwise. The assumption 
here is that more populous (neighboring) municipalities have stronger impact on 
neighboring conditions, and should therefore receive a higher weight when 
counted as a neighbor. As spillovers in health policies can be driven by 
behavioral influence between municipalities, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
direction of this influence is more prominent from large to small municipalities.
The third weighting matrix (W3) assumes that all municipalities of the state 
are directly correlated. But the extension of this correlation depends on the 
proximity of the municipalities. Before row standardization W3y = 1/distance 
between municipalities j and i. The decay distance matrix is used in spatial 
econometrics under the assumption that the shorter the distance the higher the 
influence of one municipality on another.
The fourth matrix (W4) is the combination of the distance decay effect and 
the population size effect. That is, before row standardization, W4y = (population 
size of municipality j/distance between municipalities j and i)37. In this case more 
importance is given to large municipalities which receive a regular inflow of 
patients from other municipalities located all around the state. Municipalities such 
as Fortaleza or Juazeiro do Norte provide specialized services (neonatal units,
37 Two other spatial matrices were also tested in earlier stages of this essay, with their weights 
based on the number of delivery services provided for non-resident mothers. The undesirable 
endogeneity of the weights in this case, however, were essential for their displacement in this 
essay.
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for example) not found in other municipalities. Therefore, they should have a 
higher weight even for municipalities located relatively distant from them.
The evidence that policy spillover effects depend on spatial patterns 
defined by the spatial weight matrices is by itself a source of information that can 
be used to analyze state distributional policies among the municipalities. If the 
health spillover variable (l/l^H) is significant it is possible to infer a per- 
municipality marginal effect that will depend directly on the participation (the 
weights) that the availability of health services in one municipality will have in 
reducing infant mortality rate on all its neighbors (Ij<5Wjj).
The hypothesis of simple spatial correlation in infant mortality can be 
tested using the Moran’s I index which is a correlation coefficient between infant 
mortality in the municipalities (IMRj) and in their neighbors (WylMRj). For all 
weighting matrices specified above, infant mortality presents significant spatial 
correlation as shown in Table 2. However, this significant correlation (or spatial 
auto-correlation) tends to disappear when we add the predictors of infant 
mortality to the model. This is especially true if the socio-economic and health 
related variables are also spatially correlated as shown in Table 2. That is, the 
simple spatial correlation is detected because the neighboring municipalities 
present similar socio-economic, health or geographic conditions. Once we control 
for these factors, the spatial correlation tends to be insignificant. When the spatial 
correlation is still present in infant mortality models, some (spatial) adjustments 
must be made to the model in order to avoid imprecision and/or the bias of the 
estimated coefficients.
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CHAPTER 6
SPATIAL METHODOLOGY
This essay follows traditional spatial econometrics methodology, where 
first reduced form models without spatial effects are estimated by ordinary least 
square (OLS) in order to test for significant presence of spatial correlation (Florax 
et al, 2003). That is, theoretical model 1 is estimated and diagnostic tests for 
spatial correlation are used to verify the presence and type of spatial 
correlation38. There are many diagnostic tests used in the literature for different 
types of spatial models.
This essay uses four diagnostic tests based on the Lagrange Multiplier 
principle, which, combined, provide a decision rule for alternative spatial models. 
This guidance to alternative modeling is an advantage of the Lagrange Multiplier 
tests over the Moran’s I index, for example, which is very powerful in capturing 
spatial error models but is comparatively less powerful at detecting spatial lag 
specifications (Anselin and Florax, (1995)). Two of the tests are designed to 
capture spatial error models as alternatives to the null-hypothesis of no-spatial 
correlation (LM-ERR and LM-EL), and two are directed to spatial lag models (LM-
38 The models are estimated with and without the time lagged value (1994-1996 period) for infant 
mortality rates as an additional explanatory variable. These are the traditional reduced form 
models for which comparative analysis will be made with respect to models including spatial 
effects.
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LAG and LM-LE)39. These statistics have good asymptotic properties and have 
also proven to perform well in small samples. Based on a robustness check from 
monte-carlo simulations Anselin and Florax (1995) observed that:
“The robust LM-EL and LM-LE tests performed remarkably well against 
one-directional alternative, which suggests that they may be usefully 
combined with the LM-ERR and LM-LAG tests to indicate which of the two 
forms of dependence (lag or error) is the proper alternative. In other 
words, this may result in an augmented decision rule,(...): when LM-LAG 
is more significant than LM-ERR and LM-LE is significant while LM-EL is 
not, a lag dependence is the likely alternative; and when LM-ERR is more 
significant than LM-LAG and LM-EL is significant while LM-LE is not, an 
error dependence is the likely alternative” (Anselin and Florax 1995, p. 
48).
In addition to this rule (which is not always the case for all data sets), two 
additional criteria may be used. The first is simply to verify the significance of the 
spatial correlation coefficients for lag or error (p -  in spatial lag model or A -  in 
spatial error model) in their respective models, and the second is to also test 
them but using the other spatial model specification (p -  in spatial error model or 
A -  in spatial lag model). That is, the second test analyzes if there are any 
additional form of spatial correlation (lag or error) when spatial lag or spatial error 
models are estimated (Bruckner, 1998). The better specified spatial model is that 
with insignificant spatial correlation.
39 See Appendix B for more information on the statistics and their distributions and sources.
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Different from the traditional spatial methodology, however, the first spatial 
adjustment to be made in this essay in case of significant spatial correlation is 
the estimation of health policy spillover models (model 2). These models are 
estimated by traditional methods (OLS) as only exogenous variables are present 
on the right hand side. The objective is to verify if the spillover variables can 
explain and control most (if not all) of the spatial correlation found. If spatial 
correlation still persists, however, spatial lag or spatial error models are 
estimated following the suggestion provided by the Lagrange Multiplier diagnostic 
tests and the other two complementary rules.
The estimation of spatial models, however, requires different methods of 
estimation. Instrumental variable (IV) estimations are used as they provide more 
robust estimation especially for spatial lag models (Kelejian and Prucha, 1997). 
As was said before, when compared to maximum likelihood estimation, the IV 
procedure has comparative advantages with respect to non-parametric 
assumptions and robustness to model specification with spatial correlated errors.
All types of spatial patterns are used in order to diminish the possibility of 
spatial model misspecification while searching for the models with the best 
adjustments. The Akaike Information Criterion40 (AIC) indicator will be the 
reference guide for cross model comparison in terms of adjustment41. Additional 
criteria for model selection are the absence of spatial correlation in health 
spillover models, and in case of spatial lag models (model 5), their spatial
40 AIC = -2L + 2K, where L is the maximized log likelihood function and K is the number of 
variables. See Anselin (1992).
41 Different from traditional measures of fit such as R2 (or adjusted R2) the AIC measure allows 
comparing models with different number of explanatory variables and spatial effects.
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correlation coefficients (p) needs to be less than one. When spatial lag models 
are estimated through 2sls it is possible to find p greater than one, which is a 
clear indicator of model misspecification. This is because the spatial effect 
captured by this coefficient does not diminish when transmitted successively from 
municipality to municipality and the model becomes unstable42. That is, any 
marginal effect of policies tends to infinity. A p less then one is a required 
assumption to produce consistent estimative based on 2sls procedure (Kelejian 
and Prucha, 1997).
Once the models fit the criteria suggested above their estimates can be 
used for inferences and policy simulations. In order to make measurement 
comparisons, however, this essay follows Corman and Grossman (1985) in 
estimating average marginal effects for models with and without initial conditions 
(time lagged infant mortality rates). This is because they have higher and lower 
bounds estimates for marginal effects as they represent a trade-off between 
policy endogeneity problems (models without time lag) and serial correlation 
problems (models with time lag).
42 It is the spatial version of an explosive time series model.
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CHAPTER 7
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section follows the methodology suggested above, ordering the 
empirical analysis sequentially by: i) searching for model specifications with and 
without spatial effects (model 1 versus model 2 versus model 4 or 5), ii) 
interpretation of marginal effects found for the models of reference, iii) sensitivity 
analysis, and iv) policy simulations.
7.1. Model Specification
Traditional reduced form models of infant mortality rate (without spatial 
effects) are the starting point to search for models of reference, which should 
present the best fit (lowest AIC) and no spatial correlation. Table 3 shows 
traditional models without spatial effects but with (3.1) and without (3.2) time lag 
for infant mortality rates. In both models the presence of spatial correlation is 
significant for all types of spatial matrices, especially when the alternative model 
specifications are spatial lag models. In this case any inference from socio­
economic or health related variables from these traditional models would be 
biased.
The next step is to identify if health spillover possibilities are significant 
and what general type of spatial pattern would describe these cross-bordering
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benefits from health services. Table 4 presents spillover models for all types of 
spatial matrices. The inclusion of spillover possibilities from health related 
variables seems to be adequate considering the spatial patterns defined by W1 
(model 4.1) and W2 (model 4.2). This is because not only the models are 
comparatively more adjusted (lower AIC value) but also a jointly significant test 
for the coefficients of the spillover variables rejects the null hypothesis that they 
are all equal to zero. More interestingly, after controlling for spillover possibilities 
spatial correlation becomes insignificant for these two types of spatial patterns. In 
addition, a jointly significant test for the variables related to the policy program 
(CHW and W*CHW) and to the availability of physicians (Physicians and 
W*Physicians) attested the significance of the spillover effect for these variables. 
This is to say that improvements in the policy in one municipality will affect infant 
mortality rate not only in this municipality but also in neighboring municipalities.
In order to test alternative model specifications spatial lag models were 
also estimated with (Table 5) and without (Table 6) policy spillover variables43. 
The results form Table 5 suggest robustness for the health spillover models 
when spatial patterns defined by W1 (model 5.1) and W2 (model 5.2) are the 
reference. Neither the spatial lag variables for these models were significant nor 
were the adjustment (AIC) of the models improved44. Models 5.3 and 5.4 show 
significant spatial lag variables, but their correlation coefficients (p) were too high,
43 The spatial lag specification was used as their diagnostic spatial correlation tests were more 
significant.
44 The same also occurred for spatial error models estimated through maximum likelihood 
procedure.
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indicating misspecification problems for these types of spatial patterns (W3 and 
W4).
The robustness of the spillover models for W1 and W2 are evident when 
other forms of spatial models are also estimated and when the time lag is 
included in the model. Table 6 brings spatial lag models without possibilities of 
spillovers. Again, the spatial correlation coefficients for spatial lag variables 
based on distance (W3 and W4) are inconsistent with modeling selection 
requirements, and the absence of spillover effects reduced expressively the 
adjustment of the models with spatial patterns based on simple contiguity (model 
6.1 and model 6.2). When time lag variables are included in the analysis (Tables 
7 and 8) spillover models (models 7.1 and 7.2) based on spatial patterns W1 and 
W2 are still the models attending the selection criteria. Following Corman and 
Grossman (1985), therefore, this essay uses averages of marginal effects for 
model specifications with and without time lag to generate quantitative 
predictions. There are, however, two spatial patterns of references in spillover 
models presenting similar levels of adjustments (AIC). In this case, marginal 
effects are computed not only as average effects for models with and without 
time lag for the same spatial pattern, but also as a range of values between each 
different type of spatial matrix.
Table 9, therefore, presents the models for which the average marginal 
effects are calculated for each spatial pattern of reference: models 9.1 and 9.2 
(W1), and models 9.3 and 9.4 (W2). These average marginal effects form the 
range of possible values to infer predictions for changes in policy variables.
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7.2. Marginal effects
This section identifies the main predictors of infant mortality by quantifying 
their marginal effects as shown in Table 9. It is evident that socio-economic 
variables are significant predictors of infant mortality rates. With exception of 
illiteracy rate, this qualitative evidence seems to be robust with respect to model 
specification regarding spatial effects or initial conditions (lagged infant mortality 
rates). Significant marginal effects remain across the models of Table 9 for 
unemployment, sanitation, and urbanization variables.
As expected, unemployment rate has a positive correlation with infant 
mortality rate. For an average municipality initially experiencing an infant 
mortality rate equal to 36 deaths per 1000 births45, the effect of a 10% point 
reduction in unemployment rate would produce a predicted change ranging from 
4.22 (average of models 9.3 and 9.4) to 4.47 (average of models 9.1 and 9.2) of 
avoided deaths per 1000 live births. It is interesting to note that in traditional 
models without spatial spillover (models 3.1 and 3.2), the average marginal effect 
is comparatively lower (3.75 infant deaths avoided per group of 1000 live births).
Improvements in sanitation conditions can also be an effective policy to 
reduce infant mortality. For the same average municipality suggested above, a 
10 percent increase in proportion of homes with adequate waste removal would 
reduce the mortality probability from 2.24 to 2.36 infants per groups of 1000 live
45 This is the approximate municipal average value for infant mortality rate. As stated before, 
marginal effects in square root models are positively related the actual level of infant mortality 
rates in each municipality.
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births. As sanitation conditions are still very poor among the municipalities, there 
is much room for improvement. With respect to unemployment rate, policies 
targeting full employment would be comparatively more limited at reducing infant 
mortality rates. This is because average levels of unemployment rates for the 
municipalities are not very far away from zero. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a limit for reduction in the level of infant mortality rates 
when only economic, social or health policies are triggered.
Although the illiteracy rate had a significant impact on the infant mortality 
rate in traditional models (3.1 and 3.2) it was not significant for the spillover 
models of reference (Table 9). Misspecifications in the educational variable could 
be playing a role in explaining the result above. Formal education may not be the 
best reference for analyzing the capacity of families to understand the behavioral 
risks that lead to changes in the survival probability of their infants. That is, 
formal education is not necessarily the mechanism that induces the 
acknowledgement that water filtering and breast-feeding are important behavioral 
conditions to reduce the chance of infant death. In this case, the health policy 
spillover of the CHWP can already capture a great part of this learning behavior 
(health productive booster) given it is primarily an educational health care 
program46.
The positive relationship between urbanization and infant mortality is to 
some extent puzzling given that urbanization represents for most cases a sign of 
development. However, once we control for other socio-economic conditions that
46 The Pearson correlation coefficient between neighbor’s illiteracy rate and neighbor’s 
community health workers availability is 0.59.
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also characterize development, the urban effect can be ambiguous. It may 
represent stress conditions or even potential facilities for in-municipal diffusion of 
contagious diseases as well as better informational access for health programs 
(immunization programs, for example). Whereas the first two effects cited above 
assume a positive correlation with infant mortality, the latter suggests a negative 
one. According to the estimations provided in Table 9, the rationale of the first 
effects seems to be dominant. In addition, the beneficial side of urban effects 
may also be controlled by the municipal location variable.
The empirical results show that location is important to define the survival 
probability of infants. The state capital (Fortaleza) provides most of the 
specialized health services for infants, including exclusive emergency services. 
Travel time in these cases can directly affect the probability of survival of infants. 
Following the estimates (Table 9) the risk of infant death is expected to increase 
from 3.36 to 3.42 deaths per thousand live births for each 100 km (62.5 miles) 
from the capital47. This result suggests policies improving accessibility to the 
capital of the state (transportation facilities) and the decentralization of 
specialized health services as additional measures to reduce the risk of infant 
death.
If socio-economic and geographic conditions prove to be robust enough to 
model specifications, as they allow a straightforward cross-model comparison of 
their marginal effects, the same can not be said with respect to variables related 
to health structure and police. This is however expected as the availability of
47 This simulation is also made for an average municipality previously experiencing a level of 
infant mortality rate equal to 36.
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physicians and community health workers within the municipality and in 
neighboring regions are significantly correlated, as the Moran’s I index in Table 2 
indicates. Thus, bearing in mind that there is spatial correlation among health 
related variables, some interesting results appear when comparing models with 
and without spatial effects.
It seems that in traditional models (3.1 and 3.2) the health structure 
variables (hospital beds and physicians per 10,000 individuals) have no effect on 
infant mortality rate. Once the models allow for health spillover (Table 9), 
neighbors’ availability of physicians (W*Physicians) becomes very significant, 
although the in-municipal availability (Physicians) continues to be insignificant. A 
joint significance test for these variables (Table 9) suggests that it is regional 
rather than local availability of physicians that can affect the risk of infant 
mortality. That is, it takes a group of physicians providing services in the 
surrounding municipalities to affect significantly the level of infant mortality rates. 
In this case, there is a policy mismatch between regional availability measures 
and local (municipal) risk of infant death. When this mismatch is accounted for 
with the introduction of spillover variables, the relationship between physician 
services availability and infant mortality is properly modeled. Therefore, the 
modeling of spillover effects in this case makes a significant difference in 
evaluating the effectiveness of municipal health structures for reducing infant 
mortality.
The spillover effect of physicians is consistent with both types of spatial 
patterns (W1 and W2) and time modeling. In order to analyze the total
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effectiveness of increasing the availability of physicians for one average 
municipality, however, it is necessary to consider the average weights (spatial 
weights) for neighboring municipalities and the average number of neighbors 
benefiting from more physicians around. As these two are respectively 0.195 and 
5, an additional physician per group of ten thousand individuals in one 
municipality is expected to reduce infant mortality rate from 0.54 to 0.62 infant 
deaths per thousand live births. This effect is very substantial, especially when 
compared to traditional models without spatial effects, which indicated 
ineffectiveness for the availability of physicians. For policy purposes, therefore, 
this empirical result suggests that physicians are more productive where regional 
(pool of municipalities) rather than municipal level of infant mortality is higher.
Regarding the effectiveness of the CHWP, spillover effects are also 
significant, suggesting again a mismatch between where the policy makes itself 
locally available and the geographical dimension of the phenomenon being 
explained (municipal infant mortality rate). The joint significance test for. related 
variables (CHW and W*CHW) in Table 9 shows that the benefits of improving the 
program in one municipality spread to neighboring municipalities especially when 
W2 is the spatial pattern defining neighbor’s weights. In this case, for each CHW 
added per group of 10,000 individuals, there is an expected reduction ranging 
from 0.38 to 0.65 in the number of infant deaths per thousand live births. Without 
spillover possibilities (Table 3) the average marginal effect of the policy program 
reduces to 0.27 infant deaths per thousand live births for an average 
municipality.
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Another advantage of models with spillover effects is the possibility of a 
case by case estimation of marginal effects for each municipality48. These 
municipal marginal effects depend on the spatial matrix of the spillover policy 
variables, which assigns the weights that each municipality exerts on others. It is 
evident from Table 9 that W2 is the spatial pattern that describes more precisely 
the general conditions for the spillover of the CHWP. In this case, the spillover of 
the policy occurs more effectively from larger to smaller neighbor municipalities. 
This is consistent with the idea that informational spillovers inducing behavioral 
changes are more likely to flow from large to small municipalities as the former 
are more populated and usually represent role models to be followed. It is also 
possible that the preventive character of the health care program (CHWP) 
reduces more effectively the overcrowded demand for health services in public 
hospitals of larger municipalities. This improves the quality of these services and 
benefits all the populations from the neighboring municipalities. This form of 
spatial pattern for policy spillover therefore brings additional conjectures for 
distributional policies.
As larger municipalities (in size and population) have higher weights in
defining neighborhood average availability of health services, they tend to
present higher productivity levels for the policy program. This productivity,
however, also depends directly on other factors such as the prevailing level of
infant mortality rate for the municipality of reference and for its neighbors. In
general, therefore, allocation policies would be more effective, in the case of
48 This case by case estimation of marginal effects is independent of the functional form assumed 
for the infant mortality rate model. Even in linear models municipal specific marginal effects can 
be differentiated given municipalities have different weights on regional averages.
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Ceara state, if more CHWs were added to clusters of relatively larger (size and 
population) municipalities presenting high levels of infant mortality. Without 
entering into the fairness issues, as health policies are not always guided by 
efficiency, this essay shows that traditional reduced form models can undervalue 
the effectiveness of health policies when they ignore significant policy spillover 
effects. This evidence is also illustrated by the policy simulations in the section 
ahead. However, as the simulations depend on model specifications, the next 
section investigates if the results found stand for different functional forms.
7.3. Sensitivity Analysis
As the square root transformation of infant mortality is not in common use, 
the spatial effects found could be unique to that model specification. The spatial 
methodology described above was also followed for level models of infant 
mortality (Tables 10 and 11). As in the case for square root transformation, 
spatial spillover models with spatial patterns defined by W1 and W2 are the 
models of reference fitting all the criteria of selection for inferences. Table 11 is 
the level version of the reference models of Table 9. With respect to the policy 
variable (CHW), spillover effects are significant when the spatial pattern W2 is 
used (models 11.3 and 11.4). This finding reinforces the idea that the 
effectiveness of the program is comparatively higher in regions more populous 
than others. This conclusion therefore applies independently of the functional 
forms of the infant mortality models49.
49 Log models were also estimated with similar results.
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The level version models, however, present residuals for which the 
Jarque-Bera statistical test clearly rejects the assumption of a normal distribution 
(Table 10). As this assumption is important for spatial correlation diagnostic 
tests50 and for efficiency in inferences with finite samples, the square root model 
of infant mortality is preferred therefore for policy simulation exercises. This is 
because the assumption of normal distribution for the residuals was not rejected 
for this type of functional form (Table 3).
7.4. Policy Simulations with Spatial Effects
This essay proposes a spatial modeling approach to estimate reduced 
form models for small contiguous bordering areas. When spillover effects are 
significant, policy prescriptions may change when compared to what would be 
prescribed if traditional models without spatial effects were the reference. Health 
care programs may look less effective and allocation policies could be distorted if 
the policy guide were from models without spillover possibilities. This section 
provides a policy simulation to illustrate these points.
The simulation compares effectiveness in predicted reductions of infant 
deaths or risk of infant deaths (IMR) when each municipality receives one 
additional community health worker for each group of 10,000 individuals. This 
hypothesized policy follows the general prescription of the program where each 
community health worker covers a certain number of families living next to 
him/her. Although each municipality receives a different number of additional
50 Anselin (1992).
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community health workers - as they have different population sizes51 - the 
municipal productivities can be compared as they count child deaths avoided (or 
IMR reduced) per community health worker added. These policies are evaluated 
in models with (Table 9) and without (Table 3) the spillover of the health care 
program52. The objective is to estimate how average state and municipal policy 
effectiveness changes once spillovers are considered. It is important to 
emphasize that the measure of policy effectiveness suggested here (infant life 
saved per CHW added) values infant life saved equally across municipalities. 
That is, all municipalities have the same weight when the average level of policy 
effectiveness for the whole state is calculated53.
Table 12 provides the predicted effectiveness of the program54. For the 
state as a whole, the simulated policy involves distributing approximately 743 
more community health workers across all the municipalities, and this will result 
in 1858 predicted child deaths avoided in models without spillover (effectiveness 
rate of 2.502). In models with spillover the range of predicted child deaths 
avoided goes from 1790 (W1) to 2594 (W2) which generates effectiveness rates 
ranging from 2.410 to 3.485. This result shows that neglecting possibilities of
51 The number of additional community health workers is equal to the population size divided by 
10,000. A municipality such as Fortaleza with 2,140 thousand individuals, for example, will 
receive approximately 214 community health workers.
52 The predicted productivity without spillover is based on the average of the estimated 
effectiveness of models 3.1 and 3.2. In models with spillover the averages of models 9.1 and 9.2 
and models 9.3 and 9.4 are calculated. This averaging strategy follows Corman and Grossman 
(1985) where marginal effects from models with and without initial conditions are averaged for 
prediction purposes. The marginal effects for the spillover models with different spatial patterns 
are presented as a range of values.
53 This means that no (political) relative preference is given to life saved in any particular 
municipalities.
54 The process to calculate the predicted productivity is addressed in the Appendix A of this 
essay.
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spillovers in traditional models may compromise the effectiveness of the program 
by up to 39%. This difference in the valuation of the program can be considered 
crucial for the whole society as this extra benefit of the program is measured in 
fewer infant deaths. There is therefore an immense social cost to be paid when 
policy makers are misguided by traditional reduced form models neglecting the 
possibility of policy spillover.
The municipal comparison in models with (9.3 and 9.4) and without (3.1 
and 3.2) spillovers is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 4 the municipal 
productivity intervals are based on the quintiles of the productivity distribution 
when spillover effects are ignored. Figure 5 uses the same distribution intervals 
as in Figure 4 but they are applied for the municipal productivity in models with 
significant policy spillover. It is evident that the municipal productivity increased 
considerably for most of the municipalities as many of them are now in the 
highest quintile of the earlier (no spillover) distribution (the darkest areas)55.
When productivity is measured in unit reductions in the risk of infant 
deaths (IMR) per community health worker the comparative analysis represents 
even a higher difference in models with and without policy spillover56. Two 
interesting study cases refer to the municipalities of Fortaleza and Salitre. 
Without spillover these two would represent the municipalities with the lowest 
and highest productivity respectively, in terms of IMR reduction per community
55 Similar effectiveness measures are found for models in levels of infant mortality. Without 
spillover the state average effectiveness of the policy is 2.77 infant deaths avoided per 
community health worker added. In models with spillover the range goes from 2.45 to 3.78 infant 
deaths avoided per community health worker added.
56 Differences in productivity results are due to the weight that the number of live births has on 
each of the productivity measures. More details are shown in the Appendix A.
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health worker added (Panel B of Table 12). This is because they would have the 
highest and the lowest predicted level of infant mortality before the policy is 
introduced. In models without spillover the relationship between productivity and 
IMR is directly linked to the functional form of the model and is illustrated in 
Graph 1. The higher the infant mortality, the higher the effectiveness of the 
program in reducing the risk of infant death.
Once the spillover effects are considered, effectiveness in the municipality 
of Fortaleza increases by up to 8.8 times (becoming the 4th highest) whereas the 
productivity for the municipality of Salitre increases comparatively much less 
(79%), becoming only the 73rd highest among all municipalities. This is because 
effectiveness when spillovers are significant depends not only on the previous 
infant mortality rate but also on other factors such as infant mortality in 
neighboring municipalities and the weights the municipalities have on their 
neighbors. Graph 2 illustrates how the relationship between policy effectiveness 
and IMR changes once the spillovers are significant.
The huge increase in effectiveness of the policy in Fortaleza is basically . 
due to the high spillover effect, which is a function of the population size modeled 
through the spatial spillover matrix (W2). As Fortaleza is the most populated 
municipality, its total spillover effect57 is expected to be high, which more than 
compensates for its low in-municipality productivity. Its mechanism of 
transmission can be related to cross-border reinforcement in the health 
educational purpose of the program, or to improvements in the quality of the
57 Total spillover effect means the sum of the reductions in IMR in the neighbors of Fortaleza 
once the program increases by 1 additional agent per group of 10000 people.
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shared public health services. The latter may be induced by the preventive 
character of the program, which may reduce the crowding of the intra and inter 
municipal demand for those services. Given that the municipality of Salitre has a 
relatively small population size, its spillover effect is lower and consequently, its 
statewide effectiveness will not be boosted considerably.
Another important factor contributing to increased productivity once 
spillovers are allowed is the average level of infant mortality in neighboring 
regions. Municipalities with the same population share in their neighborhood 
regions present different policy productivities as their neighboring municipalities 
present higher levels of infant mortality. In this case, productivity is higher where 
neighboring municipalities present the highest level of infant mortality. This result 
however is conditioned by the model specification used here. In models at the 
level value for infant mortality rate the marginal effect is independent of the 
previous municipal values of infant mortality rate. In this case (level model), it is 
only the spatial spillover pattern (W2) that defines comparatively higher 
effectiveness measures for the policy. As this essay focuses more on 
comparisons between models with and without spillover effects rather than 
comparisons for different functional forms, it remains cautious with respect to 
possible policy prescriptions conditioned on the functional form of the IMR model.
Therefore, the relative size of the population affects the policy productivity 
of the community health worker program (CHWP) because the spillover effects 
are significant and determined by W2. This interesting finding suggests a 
distributional policy for Ceara State where more populated municipalities would
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be relatively more efficient (statewide) than their neighbors in reducing the 
regional risk of infant mortality. That is, among neighboring municipalities, 
improvements in the CHW program are expected to reduce relatively more the 
(statewide) level of infant mortality rate if implemented in large rather than small 
municipalities. This is because these larger municipalities have greater spillover 
effects which can be induced by preventive behavioral change or improvements 
in the quality of shared health services.
Another important conclusion from the simulation above is that if the policy 
program is more efficient than suggested by traditional reduced form models of 
infant mortality, then a simple benefit/cost analysis may lead to an inefficient (and 
reduced) distribution of available resources toward this policy program. In (level) 
models without spillover effects (10.1 and 10.2) the effect of increasing the 
program by one CHW per 10,000 individuals has the same effect in reducing the 
risk of infant mortality as an increase of 0.89 percent point in the number of 
families with adequate waste removal58. In models with spillover effects (11.3 and 
11.4) this equivalence increases to 2.71 percent point, which could represent a 
very significant difference when associated costs are attached to each policy 
alternative59. On the other hand, when compared to physicians, the relative 
effectiveness of the CHW goes from 2.06 to 0.978 in models without and with
58 In models with spillover the marginal effect for the spillover variable (W 2*CHW ) is computed for 
a municipality with 5 neighbors and spatial weights equal to 0.195. These are respectively the 
average number of neighbors per municipality and the average weight per neighbor.
59 This huge difference occurs due to the joint effect of gains in the effectiveness of the policy and
reduction in the marginal effect of the sanitation indicator. The assumption of 5 neighbors with
equal weights of 0.195 also contributes to this difference. Assuming only 2 neighbors (with the
same weights), for example, the equivalence in the reduction of IMR from sanitation would be
equal to 1.15 point reduction in models with spillover.
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spillovers respectively. This is because the physician indicator also has a very 
strong spillover effect60. Therefore, under-investments (or over-investments) in 
this program can be induced by erroneous traditional models without spillover 
possibilities. The direct consequences of insufficient (or inefficient) investments 
may represent differences in infant lives saved which are invaluable for the 
suffering families.
In addition, the program may also have similar effects on other health 
indicators as it targets the family as a whole. In this case, a number of health 
outcomes and especially those considered avoidable with primary care 
(incidence of infant diarrhea, for example), may also be misrepresented by 
models ignoring spillover possibilities. This methodological error can also lead to 
under investments in this effective program.
60 When the spillover model is estimated with spatial matrix W 1 , the spillover effect for physicians 
is even higher.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
This paper analyzes how spatial effects may be included in reduced form 
infant mortality models when contiguous regions are included in the data set. In 
particular this paper shows that health spillover effects may be very important in 
evaluating the effectiveness of health policies. Their exclusion in traditional 
reduced form models can underestimate considerably the effectiveness of health 
policies and, consequently, diminish additional life-saved-benefits when under­
investments in these policies are made.
The empirical analysis investigating variations in infant mortality rate 
among the municipalities of Ceara State also shows that unemployment, 
sanitation conditions, urbanization, municipal location and health services 
availability play an important role in explaining these variations. The relatively low 
marginal effect of each factor separately suggests that significant reductions in 
the level of infant mortality rate require multi-sector policies improving jointly 
socio-economic and health service conditions.
Although this general conclusion is robust with respect to important 
sensitivity analyses, data limitations and restricted modeling perspectives leave 
opportunities for complementary future research. First, the timing of the spillover 
effects may not be contemporaneous with respect to reductions in infant mortality
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rate. That is, the behavioral change induced by the primary health policy may 
take a while to also be adopted (or reinforced) in neighboring municipalities. 
Therefore, different timing patterns (time lagged, for example) for the spillover 
effect may also be tested in future studies when the program will be more 
developed, and the data set will be available.
Second, the presence and magnitude of health spillover effects, for 
example, are shown to vary with respect to the specification of the spatial 
weighting matrix. Additional patterns of spatial neighborhoods can be used to 
capture other general transmissions of health service benefits across 
municipalities. Spatial patterns of special interest are those pre-established 
micro-regions (set of municipalities) defined by (similar) geographic conditions, or 
those defined by inter-municipal migration for health services. The same can be 
attempted for the identification of spatial lag models. In fact, the value for the 
coefficient greater than one for the spatial pattern based on distance reinforces 
the necessity to hypothesize different specifications for the spatial structure.
Finally, other health outcomes may also be similarly affected by the 
community health worker program. As this is a preventive care program for the 
family as a whole, many other traditional health indicators may also change with 
the intensity of the program. In particular, one could analyze variations in health 
outcomes considered avoidable with primary health care (infant mortality by 
diarrhea, for example).
In sum, this essay shows that the efficacy of health care programs may be 
understated in traditional reduced form models of infant mortality because they
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ignore policy spillover possibilities. In this case, a benefit/cost analysis of 
combating the risk of infant mortality would pay less than necessary attention to 
these programs. As community participation programs have been advocated 
extensively by development agencies (World Bank and World Health 
Organization especially) this essay offers modeling perspectives to give full credit 
to these programs.
In Ceara State, the community health worker program constitutes good 
example of development policy combining policy decentralization and local 
participation. Enthusiastic researchers such as Tendler (1997) and Svitore (2000) 
provide expositional details on management conditions of the program without a 
formal framework of analysis. This essay, therefore, complements and reinforces 
their views by showing how the effectiveness of these programs may be fully 
appreciated. Otherwise, the possible side effects of under-investments in this 
program are fewer infant survivors, which is a tremendous burden borne by 
suffering families and by society as a whole.




(Ceara State in dark)
Figure 2 
Ceara State -  Municipalities
(Fortaleza City in dark)
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Figure 3
Square Root of Infant Mortality Rate - Municipalities of Ceara State -  Brazil 1998/00
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Figure 4
Municipal Policy Effectiveness -  Deaths Avoided per Additional CHW 
_________________ Predictions Without Spillover_________________
Figure 5
Municipal Policy Effectiveness -  Deaths Avoided per Additional CHW 
__________________ Predictions With Spillover__________________
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Table 1 
Explanatory Variables
Variable name Definition Mean Stdev
IMR9800 The square root of the infant mortality index. 
This last is calculated by multiplying 1000 to the 
ratio of infant deaths from 1998 to 2000 to the 
number of live births during the same period. 
Source: Annual Statistics of Ceara (IPLANCE)
5.89 0.97
Unemployment The unemployment rate. Source: Brazilian 
Census 2000 (IBGE)
14.78 5.68
Sanitation Percentage of families with adequate garbage 
removal. Source: Brazilian Census 2000 (IBGE)
38.09 16.40
Illiteracy Rate Illiteracy rate for women aged 15-49. 
Source: Brazilian Census 2000 (IBGE)
27.86 5.75
Urban Percentage of households living in urban areas 
(2000). Source -  2000 Census (IBGE)
53.35 16.39
Physicians Number of physicians per group of 10000 
individuals in 1999. Source: Annual Statistics of 
Ceara (IPLANCE)
11.84 6.70
Hospital Beds Number of hospital beds per group of 10000 
individuals in 1999. Source: Annual Statistics of 
Ceara (IPLANCE)
18.30 14.13
CHW Number of community health workers per 10000 
individuals during 1998/ 2000 period. Source: 
Annual Statistics of Ceara (IPLANCE)
20.44 35.44
Distance to Capital Line distance in kilometers from the centroids of 
the municipalities to the centroid of the Capital of 
the State. Source: Annual Statistics of Ceara 
(IPLANCE).
270.51 158.64
Frontier 1 if the municipality has common border with 
municipalities of other states; 0 otherwise.
0.24 0.43
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Table 2
Moran’s I -  Spatial Correlation Test
Variable W1 W2 W 3 W4
IM R99"'1 0.2988 0.2778 0.1109 0.0841
(6.44) (5.58) (12.63) (7.20)
Unemployment 0.2954 0.3033 0.0967 0.0322
(6.37) (6.08) (11.08) (3.02)
Sanitation 0.3326 0.4081 0.0913 0.1900
(7.16) (8.15) (10.50) (15.72)
Illiteracy Rate 0.4797 0.5780 0.1441 0.2597
(10.28) (11.49) (16.23) (21.32)
Urban 0.2702 0.3056 0.0820 0.1471
(5.85) (6.13) (9.49) (12.26)
Physicians 0.2240 0.1346 0.1122 0.0735
(4.86) (2.76) (12.77) (6.34)
Hospital Beds 0.0655 0.0778 0.0247 0.0385
(1.50) (1.64) (3.27) (3.53)
CHW 0.2479 0.2749 0.0714 0.1216
(5.36) (5.52) (8.34) (10.21)
(z value) * ,  ** and *** - Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
1- Level of significance across matrix specifications unless individually specified.
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Table 3
IMR1 Models Without Spatial Effects
________ (OLS estimation)________







Sanitation -0 .0 2 2 2 *** -0.0208***
(-3.22) (-3.14)






Hospital Beds -0.0016 -0.0005
(-0.31) (-0 .1 0 )
CHW -0.0276** -0.0168
(-2.19) (-1.35)




IMR 94-96 (square root) “ 0.2069***
(3.85)
AIC 460.16 448.38
Jarque-Bera normality test 3.74 4.34
(p -v a lu e ) (0.154) (0 .1 1 )
Spatial lag tests
W1 -  Contiguity LM-LAG 6.37** 3.82*
W1 -  Contiguity LM-EL 9.61*** 12.57***
W2 - Pop/contiguity LM-LAG 6 .2 1 ** 5.09**
W 2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-EL 8.07*** 1 0 .0 2 ***
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-LAG 7.09*** 4.61**
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-EL 13.60*** 12.79***
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-LAG 1.35 1.14
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-EL 8.32*** 8.60***
Spatial error tests
W1 - Contiguity LM-ERR 1.94 0.17
W1 - Contiguity LM-LE 5.18** 8.91***
W 2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-ERR 1.90 0.82
W 2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-LE 3.76* 5.75**
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-ERR 1 .0 1 0.05
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-LE 7.54*** 8 .2 2 ***
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-ERR 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-LE 6.98*** 7.46***
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 4
IMR1 Spillover Models



















Constant 5.4767*** 5.6944*** 6.2347*** 4.7792***
(7.06) (7.27) (3.14) (6 .0 1 )
Unemployment 0.0360*** 0.0339*** 0.0343*** 0.0290“
(3.25) (3.05) (3.03) (2.55)
Sanitation -0.0191*** -0 .0 2 0 2 *** -0.0185*** -0.0213***
(-2.87) (-3.02) (-2.67) (-3.01)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0264 0.0284* 0.0290* 0.0368“
(1.64) (1.77) (1.74) (2.27)
Urban 0.0150** 0.0159*** 0.0149** 0.0204***
(2.51) (2 .6 6 ) (2.35) (3.40)
Physicians 0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.0075 0.0024 -0.0046
(0 .0 1 ) (-0.64) (0 .2 0 ) (-0.38)
Hospital Beds -0.0044 -0.0026 -0.0051 -0.0041
(-0.83) (-0.50) (-0.90) (-0.75)
CHW -0 .0 2 2 0 * -0.0189 -0.0264** -0.0277“
(-1.76) (-1.52) (-2.08) (-2.15)
Distance to capital (km) 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0026***
(5.67) (5.53) (3.82) (4.02)
Frontier -0.0959 -0.1638 -0.0655 -0.1261
(-0.61) (-1.05) ' (-0.40) (-0.77)
W*Physicians -0.0550*** -0.0483** -0.0991 -0.0310*
(-2.64) (-2.54) (-1.25) (-1.80)
W *CHW -0.0172 -0.0445** 0.0025 -0 . 0 1 0 0
(-0.85) (-2.36) (0 .0 2 ) (-0.50)
W*Hospital Beds -0 .0 1 0 1 -0.0013 -0.0458 0.0025
(-0.83) (-0.14) (-0.57) (0.36)
AIC 447.01 448.38 456.98 460.35
R2 -  Adjust. 0.3494 0.3371 0.3132 0.3005
Heteroskedasticity (BP) 18.61' 17.32 16.12 21.96“
(p-value) (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.03)
Spatial correlation tests 
LM - LAG 1 .0 1 1.62 0.49 0.97
L M - L E 0.94 2.97* 3.84“ 7.92***
LM -  ERR 0.50 0.48 0 . 0 2 0.003
L M - E L 0.44 1.80 2.99* 6.95***
F -  tests (F-statistics)
HO: 5w*Physic. =  8w*CHW =  5w*Bed =  0 6.25*** 5.82*** 2.91* 1.83
HO: 5 c h w  =  5w *ch w  =  0 2.36* 4.85*** 2.23 2.77*
HO. Sphysic — 5w*physic — 0 3.61** 3.57** 0.78 1.96
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 5
IMR1 Spillover Models With Spatial Lag
(IV Estimation -  W*IMR = W*Xp)
Spatial Patterns Simple Population Inverse Population
Contiguity Contiguity Distance Distance
(W1) (W2) (W3) (W4)
Models 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
Constant 5.4083*** 5.9212*** -2.4928 1.8594
(4.39) (4.82) (-0.45) (1.50)
Unemployment 0.0359*** 0.0339*** 0.0335“ * 0.0287“
(3.23) (3.05) (2.98) (2.59)
Sanitation -0.0191*** -0 .0 2 0 2 *** -0.0185*** -0.0189***
(-2 .8 6 ) (-3.02) (-2.69) (-2.80)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0259 0.0299* 0.0290* 0.0247
(1.51) (1.74) (1.75) (1.51)
Urban 0.0149** 0.0162*** 0.0142“ 0.0173***
(2.43) (2.65) (2.24) (2 .8 6 )
Physicians 0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.0074 0.0030 -0 . 0 0 1 1
(0 .0 2 ) (-0.64) (0.25) (-0 .1 0 )
Hospital Beds -0.0044 -0.0026 -0.0046 -0.0039
(-0.83) (-0.50) (-0.82) (-0.73)
CHW -0.0219* -0.0189 -0.0261“ -0.0254“
(-1.76) (-1.52) (-2.07) (-2 .0 2 )
Distance to capital (km) 0.0029*** 0.0031*** 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0017“
(4.01) (4.51) (0.90) (2.45)
Frontier -0.0946 -0.1691 0.0057 -0.0125
(-0.60) (-1.07) (0.03) (-0.08)
W*Physicians -0.0546** -0.0493“ 0.0092 -0.0273
(-2.57) (-2.53) (0.09) (-1.62)
W *CHW -0.0173 -0.0452“ -0.0193 -0.0198
(-0.85) (-2.37) (-0 .2 0 ) (-1 .0 1 )
W*Hospital Beds -0.0099 -0.0015 -0.0501 0.0044
(-0.80) (-0.17) (-0.64) (0.65)
W*IMR (p) 0.0146 -0.0476 1.4470* 0.6124*“
(0.03) (-0.24) (1.67) (3.01)
AIC 449.00 450.32 456.00 452.79
Heteroskedasticity (BP) 19.03 18.11 2 0 .6 8 * 17.47
(p -v a lu e ) (0 .1 2 ) (0.15) (0.08) (0.17)
F -  tests (F-statistics)
HO: 5 q h w =  5w *ch w  =  0 2.43* 5.36*** 2.34* 3.74“
H O . Sphvsic — • 5w*phvsic — 0 3.50“ 4.02“ 0.04 2.19
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10% , 5%  and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 6
IMR1 Spatial Lag Models
(IV Estimation -  W*IMR = W*XP)
Spatial Patterns Simple Population Inverse Population
Contiguity Contiguity Distance Distance
(W1) (W2) (W3) (W4)
Models 6 .1 6 . 2 6.3 6.4
Constant 2.8062*** 3.1759*** -5.1279* 1 .1 1 1 1
(2.70) (3.06) (-1.77) (0.96)
Unemployment 0.0295*** 0.0302*** 0.0329*** 0.0296“ *
(2.62) (2.67) (2.97) (2.69)
Sanitation -0.0209*** ' -0 .0 2 2 0 *** -0.0192*** -0.0192***
(-3.04) (-3.20) (-2.84) (-2.84)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0287 0.0323* 0.0311* 0.0278*
(1.63) (1.83) (1.94) (1.72)
Urban 0.0160** 0.0171*** 0.0155“ 0.0165***
(2.54) (2.75) (2.57) (2.76)
Physicians -0.0076 -0.0089 0.0016 -0.0041
(-0.64) (-0.74) (0.14) (-0.35)
Hospital Beds -0 . 0 0 2 1 -0.0018 -0.0036 -0 . 0 0 2 1
(-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.69) (-0.41)
CHW -0.0259** -0.0268“ -0.0265“ -0.0275“
(-2.06) (-2 .1 2 ) (-2.16) (-2.24)
Distance to capital (km) 0.0014“ 0.0017*** 0.0003 0.0013“
(2.42) (3.06) (0.53) (2.53)
Frontier -0.0276 -0.0423 0.0226 0.0317
(-0.17) (-0.27) (0.14) (0 .2 0 )
W*IMR (p) 0.3504* 0.2588 1.7162*** 0.6483***
( 1 .8 6 ) (1.38) (3.32) (3.37)
AIC 458.53 460.14 450.78 450.48
Heteroskedasticity (BP) 14.34 13.23 16.01* 10.60
(p-value) (0.16) (0 .2 1 ) (0.09) (0.38)
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 7
IMR1 Spatial Spillover Models With Time lag
___________ (OLS Estimation)___________
Spatial Patterns Simple Population Inverse Population
Contiguity Contiguity Distance Distance
(W1) (W2) (W3) (W4)
Models 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
Constant 4.3189*** 4.5103*** 4 .1924** 3.5871***
(5.19) (5.35) (2.09) (4.35)
Unemployment 0.0385*** 0.0365*** 0.0368*** 0.0331***
(3.56) (3.37) (3.36) (3.01)
Sanitation -0.0183*** -0.0192*** -0.0180*** -0.0198***
(-2.82) (-2.97) (-2.69) (-2.99)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0145 0.0163 0.0161 0.0214
(0.91) (1 .0 2 ) (0.98) (1.33)
Urban 0.0119** 0.0128** 0 .0 1 2 2 * 0.0161***
(2.04) (2.18) (1.97) (2.69)
Physicians -0.0003 -0.0074 0 . 0 0 1 0 -0.0041
(-0.03) (-0.660 (0.09) (-0.35)
Hospital Beds -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0036 -0.0030
(-0.63) (-0.32) (-0.67) (-0.57)
CHW -0.0140 -0.0113 -0.0175 -0.0164
(-1.14) (-0.92) (-1.39) (-1.29)
Distance to capital (km) 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0 .0 0 2 1 ***
(5.07) (5.01) (3.18) (3.37)
Frontier -0.1451 -0.2060 -0.1162 -0.1817
(-0.95) (-1.35) (-0.74) (-1.16)
W*Physicians -0.0512** -0.0417** -0.0922 -0.0356**
(-2.53) (-2.25) (-1 .2 1 ) (-2.14)
W *CHW -0.0114 -0.0350* 0.0360 -0.0082
(-0.57) (-1.89) (0.38) (-0.43)
W*Hospital Beds -0.0072 -0.0016 -0.0304 0.0062
(-0.61) (-0.19) (-0.40) (0.93)
IMR 94-96 (square root) 0.1737*** 0.1737*** 0.1896*** 0.2081***
(3.28) (3.26) (3.50) (3.85)
AIC 437.72 439.21 446.19 446.96
Heteroskedasticity (BP) 14.79 1 2 . 6 8 12.91 22.08*
(p -v a lu e ) (0.32) (0.47) (0.45) (0.05)
F -  tests (F-statistics)
HO: 5 c h w =  5w *ch w  = 0 0.98 2.58* 0.98 1.06
HO. 5phvsic ~ • 5w*Phvsic — 0 3.35** 2.87* 0.72 2.53*
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 8
IMR1 Spillover Models With Time lag and Spatial Lag
_________ (IV Estimation -  W*IMR = W*Xp)________
Spatial Patterns Simple Population Inverse Population
Contiguity Contiguity Distance Distance
(W1) (W2) (W3) (W4)
Models 8 .1 8 . 2 8.3 8.4
Constant 4.1902*** 4.8002*** -4.2581 1.2116
(3.34) (3.86) (-0.78) (1 .0 0 )
Unemployment 0.0384*** 0.0364*** 0.0360*** 0.0325***
(3.53) (3.36) (3.30) (3.01)
Sanitation -0.0182*** -0.0192*** -0.0180*** -0.0179***
(-2.80) (-2.96) (-2.71) (-2.74)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0137 0.0181 0.0161 0.0124
(0.80) (1.06) (0.99) (0.77)
Urban 0.0117* 0.0132** 0.0115* 0.0139**
(1.95) (2.19) ( 1 .8 6 ) (2.33)
Physicians -0.0004 -0.0074 0.0016 -0 . 0 0 1 1
(-0.04) (-0.65) (0.14) (-0 .1 0 )
Hospital Beds -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0029
(-0.63) (-0.32) (-0.58) (-0.56)
CHW -0.0139 -0.0113 -0.0172 -0.0155
(-1 .1 2 ) (-0.92) (-1.38) (-1.24)
Distance to capital (km) 0.0025*** 0.0028*** 0.0007 0.0014**
(3.56) (4.17) (0.55) (2.09)
Frontier -0.1428 -0.2129 -0.0467 -0.0803
(-0.93) (-1.38) (-0.29) (-0.50)
W*Physicians -0.0506** -0.0431** 0.0128 -0.0319*
(-2.44) (-2.26) (0.13) (-1.95)
W *CHW -0.0114 -0.0360* 0.0146 -0.0167
(-0.57) (-1.91) (0.16) (-0 .8 8 )
W*Hospital Beds -0.0068 -0.0019 -0.0346 0.0075
(-0.56) (-0 .2 2 ) (-0.45) (1.14)
W *IMR (p) 0.0274 -0.0614 1.4035* 0.5203***
(0.14) (-0.32) (1.67) (2.62)
IMR 94-96 (square root) 0.1738*** 0.1740*** 0.1883*** 0.1897***
(3.27) (3.26) (3.49) (3.54)
AIC 439.70 441.10 445.18 441.64
Heteroskedasticity (BP) 15.74 14.84 17.30 17.00
(p -v a lu e ) (0.32) (0.39) (0.24) (0.25)
F -  tests (F-statistics)
HO: 5 c h w =  S w c h w  =  0 0.95 2.64* 0.97 4.86***
HO. Sphvsic =  • 5w*Phvsic =  0 3.12** 2.92* 0 . 0 2 1.99
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 9
IMR1 Spillover Models With and Without Time lag



















Constant 5.4767*** 4.3189*** 5.6944*** 4.5103***
(-7.06) (5.19) (-7.27) (5.35)
Unemployment 0.0360*** 0.0385*** 0.0339*** 0.0365***
(-3.25) (3.56) (-3.05) (3.37)
Sanitation -0.0191*** -0.0183*** -0 .0 2 0 2 *** -0.0192***
(-2.87) (-2.82) (-3.02) (-2.97)
Illiteracy Rate 0.0264 0.0145 0.0284* 0.0163
(-1.64) (0.91) (-1.77) (1 .0 2 )
Urban 0.0150** 0.0119** 0.0159*** 0.0128**
(-2.51) (2.04) (-2 .6 6 ) (2.18)
Physicians 0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.0003 -0.0075 -0.0074
(-0 .0 1 ) (-0.03) (-0.64) (-0 .6 6 )
Hospital Beds -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0016
(-0.83) (-0.63) (-0.50) (-0.32)
CHW -0 .0 2 2 0 * -0.0140 -0.0189 -0.0113
(-1.76) (-1.14) (-1.52) (-0.92)
Distance to capital (km) 0.0030*** 0.0026*** 0.0030*** 0.0027***
(-5.67) (5.07) (-5.53) (5.01)
Frontier -0.0959 -0.1451 -0.1638 -0.2060
(-0.61) (-0.95) (-1.05) (-1.35)
W*Physicians -0.0550*** -0.0512** -0.0483** -0.0417**
(-2.64) (-2.53) (-2.54) (-2.25)
W *CHW -0.0172 -0.0114 -0.0445** -0.0350*
(-0.85) (-0.57) (-2.36) (-1.89)
W*Hospital Beds -0 . 0 1 0 1 -0.0072 -0.0013 -0.0016
(-0.83) (-0.61) (-0.14) (-0.19)
IMR 94-96 (square root) - 0.1737*** - 0.1737***
(3.28) (3.26)
AIC 447.01 437.72 448.38 439.21
F -  tests (F-statistics)
HO: 5 c h w =  5w *c h w  =  0 2.36* 0.98 4.85*** 2.58*
HO. Sphvsic — • ^w'Phvsic — 0 3.61** 3.35** 3.57** 2.87*
1 -  Square Root of Infant mortality Rate, (t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance 
respectively.
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Table 10




Without Spatial Effects 
1 0 .1
Without Spatial Effects but 
with time lag 







Illiteracy Rate 0.5050*** 0.2923
(2.65) (1.54)
















Jarque-Bera normality test 13.61*** 13.12***
(p -  value) (0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 1 )
W1 -  Contiguity LM-LAG 6.38** 3.63*
W1 -  Contiguity LM-EL 10.54*** 12.63***
W 2 - Pop/contiguity LM-LAG 5.89** 4.62**
W 2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-EL 8.87*** 9.94***
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-LAG 6.03** 3.65*
W 3 -  Inverse dist. LM-EL 11.19*** 9.80***
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-LAG 1 .2 0 0.96
W 4 -  Pop/distance LM-EL 6.92*** 6.79***
Spatial error tests 
W1 - Contiguity LM-ERR 1.76 0 .1 1
W1 - Contiguity LM-LE 5.92** 9.11***
W 2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-ERR 1.45 0.55
W2 -  Pop/contiguity LM-LE 4  4 4 ** 5.87**
W3 -  Inverse dist. LM-ERR 0 . 8 8 0.03
W3 -  Inverse dist. LM-LE 6.04** 6.18**
W4 -  Pop/distance LM-ERR 0 .0 1 0 .0 1
W4 -  Pop/distance LM-LE 5.72** 5.84**
(t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance respectively.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 11
IMR Level Spillover Models With and Without Time Lag



















Constant 31.178*** 24.965*** 34.238*** 27.696***
(3.41) (2.75) (3.71) (3.02)
Unemployment 0.4193*** 0.4503*** 0.3954*** 0.4278***
(3.20) (3.53) (3.02) (3.36)
Sanitation -0.2259*** -0.2170*** -0.2379*** -0.2279***
(-2.87) (-2.84) (-3.03) (-2.98)
Illiteracy Rate 0.3122 0.1565 0.3325* 0.1732
(1.65) (0.83) (1.76) (0.91)
Urban 0.1726** 0.1328* 0.1822** 0.1418**
(2.45) (1.92) (2.59) (2.04)
Physicians -0.0093 -0.0107 -0.1026 -0.0960
(-0.07) (-0.08) (-0.75) (-0.72)
Hospital Beds -0.0539 -0.0402 -0.0331 -0.0219
(-0 .8 6 ) (-0 .6 6 ) (-0.53) (-0.36)
CHW -0.2183 -0.1305 -0.1799 -0.0983
(-1.49) (-0.90) (-1.23) (-0 .6 8 )
Distance to capital (km) 0.0347*** 0.0306*** 0.0358*** 0.0319***
(5.55) (4.93) (5.48) (4.96)
Frontier -1.0434 -1.7837 -1.8676 -2.5050
(-0.57) (-0.99) (-1 .0 2 ) (-1.40)
W*Physicians -0.6741*** -0.6252*** -0.6013*** -0.5188**
(-2.75) (-2.62) (-2.69) (-2.37)
W *CHW -0.2272 -0.1588 -0.5645** -0.4459**
(-0.95) (-0 .6 8 ) (-2.54) (-2.04)
W*Hospital Beds -0.1109 -0.0708 -0.0130 -0.0162
(-0.77) (-0.51) (-0 .1 2 ) (-0.16)







(p -v a lu e )
F -  tests (F-statistics) 
HO: 5 c h w =  5w *c h w  = 0 1.95 0.79 4.79 *** 2.61*
HO. Sphvsic — 5w*Phvsic — 0 3.93** 3.60** 4.04** 3.19**
(t-value). *, ** and *** Significant at 10%, 5%  and 1% level of significance respectively
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Table 12
Policy Simulation - Program Effectiveness
Policy: 1 additional community health worker for each group of 10,000 people for each 
_________________ municipality___________________________________
Place







State Average 2.505 2.410 3.485
Place







State Average 0.240 0.380 1.230
Municipalities
Fortaleza 0.202 (184,n) 0.347 (109,n) CD OO A 'S
3
Salitre 0.335 (1SI) 0.408 (60in) 0.599 (73ra)
State Average Productivity =  £  Adeaths (or A IM R y iA C H W ,) Municipal Productivity = Adeaths (or A IM R )/A C H W
* Municipal ranking of productivity value according to model specification.
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APPENDIX A -  POLICY PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS
Health spillover effects in this paper refer to the possibility that the benefits 
of health service (health structure or health policies) improvements in one region 
spillover to its neighbors. The magnification of this effect is captured by the 
weighted average of health service availability in neighbor regions which appear 
as additional explanatory variables in the reduced form models. Among the three 
theoretical possibilities of incorporating spatial effects in reduced form models, 
the data at hand fits better a health spillover models (theoretical model 2). 
Rewriting this model for each observation and assuming for simplification that 
there is only one health service variable (H) we have:
i = 1..... 184
(2.1) Yj = X/p + y Hi + 5 IjWjjHj + Ej
j = 1, ...,184
Where w,j refers to the weight that municipality j has on the municipality i that is 
given by the standardized version of the corresponding weighting matrix (W) and 
Yi is the square root of infant mortality rate in each municipality (Yi = IMRj1/2). The 
spillover effect refers to the estimated marginal effect that improvements in 
health service availability in one municipality has on the infant mortality rate of its 
neighbors. That is, the spillover effect of a municipality j in a neighbor 
municipality i is given by:
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Since Y, is the square root transformation of infant mortality rate, the 
marginal effect in terms of infant mortality rate becomes:
dIMR. 8IMR, 8Y,
( 2  3 )  --------------- =  x  =  2IMR dvv, =  2YSw
K ' dH j -8Y, dHj ' v ' y
It can be seen that the efficacy and extension of the spillover effect 
provided by improving policy in municipality j depends on the square root of 
infant mortality rate of the neighbor i (Yi), the estimated general marginal effect of 
the neighbors (5), and the spatial weights designated for this municipality by its 
neighbors (wij). As each municipality has usually more than one neighbor, the 
aggregated spillover effect has to add the impact effect on each of these:
(2.4) =
The estimated total spillover effect is an important reference for regional 
health policies because it gives an estimation case-by-case of the distributional 
benefits of improving health conditions in one particular place. The total effect of 
health service improvements in one municipality therefore is given by its in­
municipality marginal effect plus its spillover effect:
Total Effect
10 dIMR , 8IMR wo i / 9(4.5)  J_ y  l  =  2yIMR. + 2SZ,wuIMR n = 2yYi + 2SZ,wT
dHj  ' dHj ' J J J
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In order to facilitate the understanding of the productivity effect calculated 
in the policy simulation section, however, the empirical models of reference can 
be written in their matrix form. To facilitate even more the analysis it is possible to 
isolate the health variable of interest for which spillover effect is significant. The 
empirical version of model 2 is given by:
(2.6) Y = [yI + 8W]H
With Y representing a n x 1 column matrix where each element 
corresponds to the predicted value of the square root of the infant mortality rate 
in each municipality, I is a n x n identity matrix, W is a n x n spatial matrix (spatial 
matrix W2), H is a n x 1 column matrix with the number of community health 
workers per group of 10,000 people in each cell, and y and 5 are the estimated 
parameter (scalar) coefficients. The sum of the elements of the columns of the 
matrix [yl + SW] corresponds to the total effect (2.5) of one additional unit of the 
health policy variable in a particular municipality. That is, it tell us how this 
additional unit implemented in this municipality reduces the square root of infant 
mortality rate in the own municipality and in its neighbors. In a 3 x 3 specification 
for example these elements are:
r <5^12 dwu
(2.7) Sw2l r Sw2i
_<5vv3i dwn r
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This is because the spatial matrix W has diagonal elements (wn) equal to 
zero. The first column of this matrix shows the marginal effect that the change in 
the health policy in municipality 1 has in itself (y), in municipality 2 (5w2i), and in 
municipality 3 (5w3i ). The sum of these marginal effects is the total effect of 
municipality 1 in the square root of infant mortality rate statewide. If we want to 
know the effect in the level of infant mortality rate instead of square root we may 
differentiate 2.6 with respect to IMR and obtain:
A IMR A IMR A  Y ,
(2.8) = 2  IMRm[yI + SW] =  27 V  +  SW]
where Yd is a n x n diagonal matrix having the square root of infant mortality in 
each municipality (Yi) as diagonal elements. In a 3 x 3 specification the marginal 
effect for one municipality in terms of reduction in infant mortality rate statewide 
is given by the sum of elements of the columns of the following matrix:
m dwuy x
(2.9) 2 Sw2ly 2 yy2 Sw23y 2
_Sw3iy 3 dw32y3 yy 3
where yi is the square root of infant mortality rate in municipality i.
In the policy simulation section the productivity of the health care program 
(CHWP) is compared in models with and without spillovers when the government 
designates one additional community health worker per group of ten thousand 
individuals for each municipality. In models without spillover 5 is equal to zero 
and equation 2.8 becomes:
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For empirical purpose the discrete difference in the health policy is 
consider for each model specification assuming that one unit increase in H is 
equal to the population size (pi) divided by 10.00061. Therefore, when the 
productivity is measured in terms of reduction in the level of infant mortality per 




A IMR = 2yYd AH 
AIMR = 2Yd [y i + SW)AH
Without Spillover 
Empirical models of Table 3 
With Spillover 
Empirical models of Table 9
Where AIMR is a n x n matrix with the total predicted changes in the risk 
of infant death for each municipality given by the sum of row elements, and AH is 
a n x n diagonal matrix where each non-zero element is given by the population 
size of each municipality divided by 10,000. Using the 3 x 3 example, we have 
that AIMR will be equal to:
>,(/>,/10,000) 0 0
(2.12a) 2 o yy2(p2 / 10,000) 0
0  0  yy3(p3/ 10,000)
yy1(p1 /10000) Sw\2y\{p2 /10,000) <5vv13^ i(p3 /10,000)
(2.12b) 2 Sw21y2(p1 /10,000) yy2{p2! 10,000) Sw23y2(p2/10,000)





61 H is actually measured as the number of community health workers divided by population size 
and multiplied by 10,000. Therefore, if we divide the population size by 10,000 we have an 
approximation on how many additional community health workers should be added in each 
municipality to increase H (proportion of CHW  per 10,000 habitants) by one unity.
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Each column element of these matrices represents the marginal effect of 
the policy improvements in one particular municipality in reducing its own infant 
mortality rate and the infant mortality rate of its neighbors. It is easy to identify 
that in models without spillover only the in-municipal marginal effect is 
considered. The empirical estimates, however, showed that y is greater for 
models without spillover which could compensate for the absence of spillover 
effects in estimating total productivity which for the state as a whole is given by:
(2.13) State Average Productivity = ZyAIMR/IyAH
For each municipality the productivity measure is given by:
(2.14) Municipal Average Productivity = IjA IM R j/EjAHj
where AIMRj and AHj are the column elements of each respective matrices.
When the productivity is measured in infant deaths avoided by community 
health workers we are assuming that the number of live births remains constant 
with the policy affecting only the numerator (infant deaths) of the infant mortality 
index. Although this assumption may be appealing at first sigh it does not 
compromise the comparative simulations for productivity effects in models with 
and without spillover given it applies to both.
As only the numerator (child deaths) of the IMR index is assumed to 
change, equations 2.11a and 2.11b are modified to:
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(2.15a) ADeaths = 2yYdLBd AH
(2.15b) ADeaths = 2 Yd LBd [yi + 5W]AH
Without Spillover 
Empirical models of Table 3 
With Spillover 
Empirical models of Table 9
Where LBd is a n x n diagonal matrix with its elements equal to number of live 
births62 in each municipality divided by 1000. This additional term transforms the 
changes in the risk measure of infant deaths to the actual number of predicted 
infant deaths avoided per municipality after the policy. ADeaths is therefore a n x 
n matrix of predicted changes in the number of infant deaths, and the productivity 
measure for the whole state and for each municipality is calculated as:
(2.16a) State Average Productivity = XyADeaths/IyAH
(2.16b) Municipal Average Productivity = ZjADeathsj/IjAHj
It was calculated from the empirical estimates that in order to increase one 
additional community health worker for each group of 10,000 individuals in each 
municipalities (policy) it was necessary to add a total of approximately 743 
community health workers for the whole state (lyAH = 743). The policy resulted 
in a predicted reduction of 1858 infant deaths (IjjADeaths=1858) in models 
without spillover, and 1790 (IyADeaths=1790) or 2594 (IjjADeaths=2594) in 
models with significant spillovers defined by W1 and W2 respectively.
6 2  The average actual number of life births between 1998 and 2000 for each municipality is 
applied to both models.
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APPENDIX B -  SPATAIL CORRELATION DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
Test
LM  -  ERR = r e'We^2 Xl)
Source 
Burridge (1980)
LM  -  EL =
eWe/ _ T\ R J
f ( - A






T + ( IWXp)'M(WXp),
-1
Anselin et al (1996)









Anselin et al (1996)
e = R by 1 vector of regression residuals from OLS regression (model 1). 
s2 = e’e/R
T = tr(W’W + W2), where tr is the matrix trace operator and W is the spatial 
weighting matrix.
WX|3 = Spatial lag of the predicted value from an OLS regression.
M = I -  X(X’X)'1X is the projection matrix._________________________________
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PART 2: NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS AND 
INFORMALIZATION OF THE LABOR MARKET -  THE 
CASE OF FORTALEZA, BRAZIL
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, a large fraction of the working-age population is 
employed as informal workers. For the last three decades, this fraction has been 
growing progressively, reaching more than 50% in many Latin American 
countries and including mostly the self-employed and employees working in 
small firms without formal labor contract1. The growth of informal workers causes 
many concerns for policy makers. Three main reasons among others have 
stimulated the study of the so-called informal economy. First, a growing informal 
sector compromises the reliability of traditional qualitative indicators of the labor 
market. Low levels of unemployment rate, for example, may be compensated by 
the accommodation of workers in low quality informal jobs which can induce 
erroneous diagnostics about labor market conditions. Second, a high informality 
rate may contribute to the weakening of the tax and social security bases if a 
vicious cycle of high taxes and consequent escape to informality drives 
governments and workers respectively. Finally, a large informal sector may be an 
indication of failures in the labor market usually attested to by the existence of 
worker segmentation.
1 The definition of informal worker varies considerably in the literature and more details on this 
issue will be provided later in this essay. See Table 1 for an overview.
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The challenging task of neglecting (or otherwise) labor market 
segmentation between formal and informal workers has dominated the literature 
on the informal economy for three decades and persists to this day (Ulyssea, 
2005). The traditional view of segmentation is that informality is an involuntary 
under-employment condition, more associated with the survival of workers than 
to the accumulation of earnings2. Above market clearing wages sustained mostly 
by institutional constraints (labor legislations, unions and/or wage productivity 
premiums, for example) induce an excess of supply of workers for which 
informality is the only alternative left. This involuntary allocation of workers 
makes them less productive than if they were in the formal sector, which 
characterizes allocation failures in the labor market.
This residual and marginal character of the informal sector, stated by the 
segmentation theory, has been contested theoretically and empirically. 
Conceptually, some authors prefer to understand the informal sector as an 
unregulated small firm sector for which benefits of informality “...could be linked 
to the misalignment of implicit and explicit labor taxes with perceived benefits or 
the desire of workers to retain a degree of independence in their work (Maloney 
and Cunningham, 2002 p. 5)”. In this case, informality is desirable, and informal 
workers should be seen as an integrated rather than segmented part of the labor 
market.
2 The term under-employment identifies those last resort types of jobs. That is, informal workers 
are unsuccessful formal job seekers. The term, therefore, has a broader definition than working 
less (part-time, for example) than desirable, and it is difficult to be measured or determined 
empirically.
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Empirically, segmentation tests have been mostly based on wage 
differences between formal and informal workers. Three main concerns apply to 
these tests of segmentation. First, it is not unusual to find significant error 
measurements in the reported earnings of informal workers in labor market 
surveys. Self-employed workers, for example, commonly do not differentiate 
human from capital returns from their working services. The worker may report 
revenues (or losses) rather than estimated wages of his/her one man firm. In 
addition, in-kind payments and fringe benefits may also be excluded from 
reported earnings for informal and formal workers respectively. In this case, the 
(reported) wages of formal and informal workers are not directly comparable.
Another criticism in testing segmentation refers to the aggregation of 
different types of workers under the same label of informal workers. Within 
traditional empirical definitions based on firm size or social security contribution it 
is possible to find informal workers who do not fit the segmentation description of 
an under-employed involuntary worker. Labor market surveys in Latin America, 
for example, have shown that many self-employed workers prefer their current 
situations than working as a formal employee (Maloney and Cunningham, 2002). 
The dichotomy of formal versus informal workers in investigating segmentation, 
therefore, may be inadequate as segmentation may exist within each category of 
worker (Funkenhouser, 1996).
The third concern in testing segmentation with wage differences is that 
unobserved characteristics of the workers which affect sector choice and 
earnings are difficult to identify. Traditional remedies for self-selection bias based
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on two-stage estimation3 may also be inadequate if the first stage of sector 
choice is not properly modeled. Maloney (1999) cites Heckman stating that: “...A 
poor first-stage selection specification may actually induce an unknown bias 
rather than improve the ordinary least square estimates”. In the context of 
informality this seems to be the case since we don’t know a priori the conditions 
under which workers engage in informal activities. Misspecifications in the sector 
choice model may include a restrictive modeling approach such as ordered probit 
(Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995) or the exclusion of important determinants of 
sector choice.
It is interesting to note, for example, that the informal literature has 
devoted little or no attention to the influence of social interactions on worker’s 
sector decision. Networking and other forms of spontaneous informational 
channels (observing or hearing about) are responsible for a large portion of new 
jobs acquired (Topa, 2001). Interactions may occur for formal or informal 
positions. With respect to the latter, individuals may receive an extra incentive to 
be informal workers, for example, if they know that others around him/her are 
doing the same. Scheider and Enste (2000) states that informality represents 
discredit of one social norm (formal or regulated employment) and the 
acceptance of another (informal employment). This discredit may increase with 
the level of informality perceived, which may represent an additional motivation 
or a breaking stigma factor to leave unemployment in favor of informal activities. 
Therefore, social interactions may play an important role in workers’ labor market
3 This estimation method is known in the literature as Heckman procedure. See Greene (2000) 
for further details on this method.
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decisions, and their neglect in segmentation analyses may compromise their 
reliability as misspecification issues arise.
This essay serves as an intermediary input to the analysis of labor market 
segmentation by investigating if the concerns suggested above apply to the study 
case of Fortaleza City in Brazil. That is, this essay investigates: i) whether 
dualisms in the practical definitions of workers (formal versus informal) are 
appropriate modeling perspectives for the labor market, and ii) whether social 
interactions are important determinants of worker’s sector choice. In order to 
perform these analyses, this essay modifies traditional multinomial logit models 
(Gallaway and Bernasek (2002), Pradhan and Van Soest (1995)) in two ways: i) 
expansion from three to five types of workers by crossing empirical definitions of 
informal workers based on firm size and social security contributions, and ii) 
introduction of interaction possibilities in the model.
The analysis is facilitated by a unique pool of cross-sectional data sets 
which not only allows multiple definition criteria for informal workers, but also 
permits the confrontation of individual and aggregated data at the neighborhood 
level. This possibility of neighborhood identification for the workers, together with 
an emblematic growth of the informal economy during the 1990s - absorbing 
more than half of the active workers in the labor market -  makes the study case 
of Fortaleza city in Brazil very interesting and exclusive so far.
In sum, this essay connects the informal economy literature and the 
literature on neighborhood effects in order to investigate informal workers’ 
differentiations and interactions in the labor market. An overview of both types of
1 0 4
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studies with their main issues and methods is offered in the next section. The 
third section introduces contextual perspectives and institutions related to the 
labor market of Fortaleza, Brazil. The fourth section brings the methodology 
proposed to investigate interactions among different types of workers. Finally, 
sections five and six respectively discuss the empirical findings supporting 
heterogeneity among informal workers and the existence of interaction effects in 
neighborhoods, and present the main conclusions extracted from these general 
findings.




This essay links ideas and methods of two branches of the economics 
literature: the informal economy literature and the literature on neighborhood 
effects. The next two subsections discuss the hypotheses and approaches used 
in the literature to explain (i) the role of the informal economy, and (ii) the 
investigation of neighborhood effects in other contexts.
2.1. Informal Economy Literature
Widespread use of the informal sector concept as a way to describe small- 
scale urban activities in labor markets of developing countries arose in the 
beginning of the 1970s with the works of Hart (1973) and the International Labor 
Organization (ILO, 1972). The conceptualization of a unique sector for different 
types of workers was well accepted by the literature, as it fitted well the 
description of the disadvantaged sector of segmentation theories.
In general, segmentation theories assert that labor markets are divided 
into two contrasting sectors. The primary sector contains the most desirable 
(high-paid) jobs in the labor market as they follow and appropriate the 
technological progress available. Workers in this sector are fully rewarded 
according to their productive capacity. Access to this sector is restricted,
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however, either by efficient wage measures for those already in the sector, by 
institutional constraints (minimum wages, unions, and labor market regulations, 
for example) or even by discrimination. The excess of unsuccessful primary 
sector job seekers is then employed in the secondary sector which develops 
marginally with a limited productivity capacity of their workers (Deoringer and 
Piori, 1971). The informal sector, as a synonym for the secondary sector, is 
therefore considered the main indicator of an inefficient labor market.
With the worldwide persistence and growth of the informal sector during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, especially in Latin American countries, the under­
employed (or segmented) character of informal workers began to be more 
intensively re-examined. Multiple methods and practical definitions are employed 
to test whether informal workers are segmented. The most traditional 
methodology involves earning comparisons in a dual labor market where workers 
are either formal or informal. Differences in wages, in this case, should reflect 
differences in productivity.
Table 1 shows many studies using comparative earnings equations to 
state positions with respect to the segmentation hypothesis. It is interesting to 
note that mixed results are found, but they vary with respect to methodology, 
definitions, and market places. Gingdling (1991), after controlling for possibilities 
of self-selection in Costa Rica’s labor market and using the Chow test to 
compare wage structures, favors the segmented view by observing significant 
and positive differences in earnings for formal workers due to discrimination. 
Tennen (1991), on the other hand, contradicts segmentation, by verifying that the
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dummy variable for informal workers becomes insignificant in the wage equation 
after using Hackman procedure for self-selection in the labor market of Brazil.
The use of wage equations to test segmentation, however, has some 
caveats. First, reported earnings of the informal workers are not usually 
comparable to the earnings of formal workers as returns to capital and labor are 
usually mixed for the former. Second, the dual definition of workers (formal 
versus informal) can be inadequate. Depending on the practical definition of 
informal and formal workers, it is possible to find differentiations within each of 
these categories. The most traditional distinction criteria are based either on 
social security contributions or on the size and type of the firms. These two 
criteria may represent different but related types of segmentation sources. It is 
possible, for example, that within small or large firms, social security 
contributions may represent an additional differentiator for worker types. The 
aggregation of different types of workers in this case may induce erroneous 
generalizations about the role of informal workers in the labor market.
Some authors have recognized these difficulties in testing segmentation 
with wage equation comparisons and have proposed the use of sector choice 
models with mobility indicators between sectors as an alternative methodology. 
That is, segmentation is verified when there are mobility differences between 
formal and informal positions. In the presence of segmentation, and specially in 
economic downturns, it is easier for a formal worker to become an informal 
worker than the reverse. Gong and Van Soest (2002) use panel data to check on 
how previous working conditions affect the likelihood of switching sectors in
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Mexico. They find that “...men’s sector choice is not affected by their labor 
market state in the previous quarter, implying that there is no genuine state of 
dependence”. This finding is consistent with an integrated rather than segmented 
labor market with no significant barriers to mobility. This study however also uses 
dual definitions (formal versus informal) without accounting for possible 
heterogeneity within sectors.
Maloney (1999) also uses panel data to construct transition tables for 
different types of workers in Mexico. He argues against segmentations by finding 
that transition probabilities across types of workers are not asymmetric, which 
suggests that there are no significant barriers to mobility into the formal or 
informal sector. Maloney (1999) recognizes heterogeneity in the informal sector 
by differentiating three types of informal workers: self-employed, informal salaried 
workers, and contract workers. In order to differentiate formal from informal 
workers he uses alternatively the most traditional definition criteria based on firm 
size or social security contributions. These two strategies for empirical definitions 
can also be combined to differentiate informal workers. The advantage in this 
case is the possibility to identify heterogeneity among self-employed workers and 
small firm employees who are the core of the informal sector, and whose great 
range of activities implies qualitative differences among themselves as evidenced 
in the following section.
2.1.1. Formal versus informal workers: empirical definitions
Mostly influenced by dualistic theories (Lewis, 1954), the informal sector 
during the 1970’s was classified broadly by characteristics such as no barriers to
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entry, firms with small scale operation, family ownership, and unregulated 
activities. This broad definition allowed different adaptations for empirical 
investigation according to what information is available from each country’s labor 
market surveys. Although consensus is still difficult to reach, as shown in Table 
1, two main empirical perspectives can be identified: the legalist and the 
entrepreneurial.
According to the legalist identification, informal activities are those 
occurring at the margin of the country’s working legislation. Social security 
payments are usually the main mark separating formal from informal workers 
because additional information on tax evasion or firm’s registration is usually not 
available at the individual level. This type of classification follows Portes et al 
(1989) which views informal activities as those “...unregulated by the institutions 
of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
regulated” (Portes et al, 1989 p.12).
This definition is usually employed by those who further investigate 
regulatory issues in the labor market (Neri, 2002) or those who simply aim to 
have a qualification identifier based on common social rights (Telles, 1992). 
Informal workers are those who have no protection against impediments to work 
provoked by unemployment, injuries or aging, and therefore, are more vulnerable 
than formal workers to these conditions4.
4 The protections here refer to the usual rights provided by the social security or unemployment 
systems, for example.
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The focus on labor market legislation however obscures the differentiation 
between traditional and non-traditional working arrangements that would be 
related to the scale and type of the business under consideration. In this regard, 
the entrepreneurial definition of informal workers uses the size of the firm as the 
point of differentiation. Small firm employees and employers, self-employed and 
domestic workers are those considered informal5. Marcoullier et al (1997) points 
out that those analysts using entrepreneurial definition of informality usually 
devote much attention to the capacity of labor markets to generate traditional 
(formal) working positions.
Table 2 shows a generalization of these two definitions. It is structured for 
a labor market survey with information on workers’ position in their occupation, 
the size of the worker’s firm, and their contribution to social security programs.
Workers can be classified as employees (salaried or wage workers who 
have a formal or informal contract to work regularly for a particular firm), self- 
employed (those who work for their own account offering services to one or more 
firms without formal contract, or to consumers directly -  taxi drivers, hairdressers, 
regular street vendors, computer programmers, dressmakers, etc), liberal 
professionals (self-employed workers with college degree and registered as a 
professional in their respective council - lawyers, physicians, accountant, etc)6,
5 The self-employed and domestic workers are considered a one-man firm and therefore enter 
under the definition of small firm, for which the maximum size varies according to the 
characteristics of the labor market and the survey questionnaire.
6 Those who have a college degree but have unrelated working activities (a lawyer whose main 
activity is to be the manager of his own restaurant, for example) are classified as self-employed. 
Liberal professionals are not usually considered informal workers according to the firm size 
definition because they represent traditional and recognized positions in the labor market. This 
essay also follows this interpretation.
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employer (those who have their own firm and hire employees), family workers 
(those who work in family business without receive income), and domestic 
workers (maids or car drivers working for families rather than firms).
The classification of workers according to their position in occupation 
rather than according to the type of occupation itself is used mostly to identify 
self-employed workers. These are the core of the informal sector as they 
represent alternative employment solutions to traditional working contracts and in 
many cases exemplify the entrepreneurial spirit of the workers. The same taxi 
driver, for example, can be an employee or a self-employed worker if he works 
for a specialized urban transportation firm or if he decides to use his own car to 
work alone respectively. The process of outsourcing production used by the firms 
more intensively during the 1990s contributed to the rise of small and/or 
individual (self-employment) firms. The (renewed) question that arises from the 
segmentation theory is whether the choice of being his/her own boss in small 
firms is really a voluntary choice for the worker or if it is the last resource in a 
labor market with constrained entry into traditional (big) firms.
Under this perspective of segmentation, the use of the entrepreneurial 
definition of informal workers would be more adequate to the analysis. There are, 
indeed, many intersections between the two definitions criteria presented above 
as it is shown in Table 2. Some authors use both definitions separately in their 
analyses to compare results. Marcoullier et al (1997), for example, finds that the 
share of informal workers when calculated using the legalist perspective is higher 
than when the firm size criterion is chosen for the labor markets of Mexico, El
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Salvador and Peru. Maloney (1999) and Gong and Van Soest (2002) also 
compare results using one or the other criterion in a panel data analysis of 
segmentation for the labor market of Mexico. None of these studies, however, 
have combined both definitions to differentiate workers according to size of the 
firm and the contribution to the social security system.
The broad classification of informal workers in one category (small firm 
workers, for example) may hide an important heterogeneity that appears exactly 
where the definitions do not coincide. The differentiation between those self- 
employed who contribute or not to the social security system may reflect a 
significant quality difference between these two types of workers. Telles (1993) 
shows, for example, that self-employed workers contributing to the social security 
system receive earnings comparable to those of regular employees. In addition, 
the choice to be a small firm worker and contribute to the social security system 
can be correlated by unobservable characteristics of the workers. In this case, an 
analysis based on either one or other definition becomes inconsistent.
This essay proposes to study differences among workers by combining 
these two types of definitions. That is, this essay differentiates those who work in 
small firm or not (entrepreneurial criterion), who are further divided between 
those who contribute to the social security system or not (legalist criterion). There 
are, therefore, four types of workers to be compared in their main characteristics: 
small-firm workers uncovered by the social security program (SF-UCOV), small- 
firm workers covered by the social-security program (SF-COV), firm workers 
uncovered by the social security program (F-UCOV) and firm workers covered by
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the social security programs (F-COV). Small firm workers include: self-employed 
workers, employees and employers working for a firm with less than three 
workers7, and domestic workers8. Consequently, firm workers include those 
liberal professionals and those employees and employers who work for a firm 
with three or more workers (Table 3).
The classification of a small firm based on a very few number of workers 
aims to identify those positions where the worker is his/her own boss or an 
associate. Flexibility in working schedule and self-management are usually 
pointed out as advantages by surveyed self-employed workers when they report 
their motives for engaging in this type of employment (Maloney, 1999). On the 
other hand, self-employed workers are more subjected to considerable variability 
in earnings when compared to traditional wages (or salaries) received by regular 
employees.
Segmentation perspectives would be suggested if transition probabilities 
across the four types of workers (SF-COV, SF-UCOV, F-COV and F-UCOV) 
were asymmetric after controlling for worker’s characteristics (Maloney (1999) or 
Gong and Van Soest (2002)). As panel data is not available for the labor market 
of Fortaleza in Brazil yet, this specific analysis of labor market segmentation is 
left for future research. Alternatively, this essay concentrates efforts to 
differentiate and qualify those workers with respect to the under-employed
7 It is assumed that differences between employees or employers in firms with one or two 
individuals and self-employed workers are due to a taxonomic imprecision from the surveyed 
worker with respect to his/her own classification. A definition based only on self-employed 
workers will also be used for comparative purpose in the robustness section.
8 Family workers are excluded from the analysis as their usual apprentice motivation is not 
comparable to those of working-for-pay workers.
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character of each working position. This under-employed characteristic of each 
position is investigated in a multinomial logit model by analyzing how education 
affects their allocation chances when compared to the chances of unemployed 
workers.
The use of unemployed workers as a comparative group and the 
expansion from two to four types of workers are modifications of the labor supply 
model of Gallaway and Bernasek (2002)9. It is suggested in segmentation 
models that informal survival workers cannot afford job search. In this case 
unemployment arises as a “privileged” position when compared to those 
employed in the informal sector (Fields, 1975). The last-resort character of one 
position with virtually no entry cost is symptomatic when those more endowed 
with human capital prefer to keep looking for other opportunities than to take a 
lesser position. In order to identify undesirability perspectives for informal 
workers, this essay compares how educational levels affect the likelihood of 
working in different positions with the likelihood of being unemployed. The log- 
odds and marginal effects derived from a multinomial logit model for an average 
individual are used for this purpose. Although this analysis does not provide a 
final position about segmentation perspectives in the labor market it serves as an 
intermediate input to qualify workers according to the assumptions of the 
segmentation theory.
9 Gallaway and Bersanek (2002) compare informality likelihoods to either formal activities or not 
working in general. This last position includes not only unemployed workers but also those out of 
the labor force.
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Finally, the main innovation proposed here is the inclusion of
neighborhood effects into the sector choice model. These effects have been 
generally theorized10 as the result of interactions (networking or imitation), 
contextualization (sorting into neighborhoods of individuals with similar
characteristics), or local constraints (local determinants of labor demand). In the 
context of labor supply, neighborhood effects represent additional facility
mediators (or constraints) between the potential worker and the different
positions in the labor market. Although neighborhood effects have not been 
included yet in labor supply models with sector choice, a long list of studies 
analyze these in different contexts as the following section illustrates.
2.2. Neighborhood Effects Literature
The idea that non-market interactions also affect individual decisions has 
been emphasized in many different aspects of economic theories and is a 
primary assumption in most sociological models. Interactions in neighborhoods 
may take the form of peer effects (Powell et al, 2002; Case and Katz, 1991), 
epidemic theories of ghettos (Crane, 1991), group effects (Grodner, 2002) or 
local spillovers (Topa, 2001). These theories have been used in many study 
cases such as smoking, school drop out, negligent behavior of youth, public 
insurance take-up and unemployment.
The primary assumption in the field is that individual behavior is mostly 
influenced by one’s own characteristics and by one’s susceptibility to affecting
10 See Dietz (2002) for an overview about the general theorization of neighborhood effects in 
social science studies.
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and being affected by social interactions. Aizner and Currie (2002), for example, 
investigate how neighbors and/or ethnic networks can affect the probability of 
public health insurance take-up. Case and Katz (1991) show that many youths’ 
negligent behavior (crime and idleness among others) is induced by peer effects 
in neighborhoods. Crane (1991) evidences that social problems such as teenage 
childbearing and school drop out may be epidemic, as the likelihood of individual 
incidence increases exponentially in the poorest neighborhoods. It is interesting 
to emphasize that the quality of the neighborhoods in this study is defined by the 
percentage of professional or managerial workers in the neighborhood. The 
author justifies the option by saying that these types of workers can be role 
models for the youth, and therefore can affect their behavior.
Interactions in the labor market have been mostly understood as 
informational channels which improve the chances of unemployed individuals 
finding a job. Topa (2001) emphasizes, for example, that some evidence 
suggests that: “...more than 50% of all new jobs are found through friends, 
relatives, neighbors, or occupational contacts rather than through formal means. 
This is especially true for low-skill jobs, for less educated workers and for black 
workers (Topa, 2001 p. 262)”11.
In observing spatial correlation in unemployment rate at the census track 
level, Topa (2001) argues that local informational spillovers indeed help 
individuals to leave unemployment and find a job. The author, however, does not 
specify what types of workers (formal or informal) are more susceptible to these
11 Topa (2001) cites Corcoran et al (1980) and Granovetter (1995).
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interactions. This essay addresses this question. In addition, if interactions are 
important factors influencing worker’s chances in the labor market they may also 
affect transitions across worker types. Consequently, segmentation models 
based on these transitions become missspedfied if they exclude the possibility of 
interactions in the labor market.
Although the interaction idea may sound intuitive, it is much more difficult 
to test empirically. The three main issues discussed by the literature are the 
neighborhood sorting, simultaneity, and contextual problems. In trying to assess 
social interactions in a labor supply model with multiple choices, one could 
estimate the following multinomial logit model according to Brock and Durlauf 
(2002):
exp(K Z)  
Pr(Cin= j )  = - '
(1) *  2 > x p ( < Z )
with K'Z = 5 ’Xin + Zsa sC9n
Where 5 is a parameter vector associated with the characteristics of an individual 
i (Xin) who lives in neighborhood n, and Csn is the percentage of workers in the 
labor force state s in the neighborhood n. Rejecting the null hypothesis that as is 
equal to zero can be indicative of a social interaction effect. It is very likely, 
however, that the parameter as rather than capturing the interaction among 
neighbors is rather reflecting their similarities in choosing residential location. 
This is the so-called sorting (or reflection) problem as analyzed by Manski 
(1993). Non-randomness in the formation of neighborhoods compromises the 
inference of as as a “pure” social interaction effect (networking or imitation, for
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example), and identification problems may arise if the workers’ characteristics 
defining labor supply and sector choice coincide with those defining 
neighborhood sorting.
The other issues in the estimation of social interaction effects refer to 
simultaneity and contextual problems. The first problem states that social 
interaction variables (Csn) are potentially endogenous in contemporaneous 
regressions when individuals are at the same time affecting and being affected 
by others’ decisions. The second problem occurs when there are local conditions 
important in defining workers’ choices in the labor market which are not captured 
by any of the explanatory variables. In this case we have an omitted variable bias 
(Grodner, 2002). The use of instrumental variables (Grodner, 2002 or Case and 
Katz, 1991) and fixed effects (Carman (2004)) are usual solutions for these two 
types of problems respectively.
On the other hand, the social interaction literature is in general very 
skeptical about accepting exogenous solutions to the sorting problem when the 
interacting group (neighborhoods in this case) is not randomly created (Mansky, 
1993). Empirical studies evolve attempting to overcome this issue, and some 
palliative solutions are offered by the literature. Grodner (2002), investigating 
social interaction on labor supply (number of hours worked), proposes factorial 
analysis to estimate average characteristics for groups of references as a way to 
capture the sorting effect and therefore isolate the social interaction effect 
(captured by the mean working hours in the reference group). Aizer and Currie 
(2002), on the other hand, interact time and neighborhood fixed effect variables
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to differentiate network and neighborhood effects on the take-up of health public 
programs.
Neighborhood sorting and social interactions of workers in neighborhoods 
are social phenomena for which possibilities depend on their contextualization in 
time and space. Consequently, in order to differentiate these two possible 
effects, one must understand the context in which they are more likely to occur. 
The next section, therefore, identifies some peculiarities of the labor market of 
Fortaleza City, in Brazil. The empirical methodology section shows how the main 
issues stated above are addressed in this essay. Advancing a little on this 
subject, this essay uses a combination of the proposals of Grodner (2002) and 
Aizer and Currie (2002) to address the issue of endogenous sorting. That is, the 
sorting effect is aimed to be captured by neighborhood quality indicators and 
regional fixed effects. This solution was greatly influenced by the specifications of 
the study site and by the data set available.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY SITE AND DATA SET
With a population of 2.2 million, Fortaleza is the 5th largest urban area in 
Brazil. The labor market is characterized by a high level of informality for which a 
local definition is given by the addition of those small-firm uncovered, small-firm 
covered, and firm-uncovered types of workers according to the definition 
suggested in this essay12. Graphs 1 and 2 show the participation of each type of 
worker in the labor force during the 1990’s and earlier 2000’s.
For male workers there is a smooth downward trend to the only category 
of worker assigned as formal by the local definition (firm covered workers). There 
is also a downward trend for-females that goes from 1993 to 1999, followed by a 
small increase in the participation of formal workers afterwards. It is interesting to 
note that this downward trend occurred especially at times of economic growth. 
This evidence contradicts the traditional segmented view that informality is 
countercyclical.
It is possible, however, that even in periods of economic growth the labor 
market has not created enough formal positions to absorb the growing labor
12 At this point forward in this essay the concept of informal sector will be applied to the 
aggregation of these three types of workers (small firm uncovered, small firm covered and firm 
uncovered workers). That is, the general concept of informal sector is based on the Brazilian’s 
definition.
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force. On the other hand, it is possible that informal workers (or at least part of 
them) are adapting themselves to general trends in the labor market such as the 
growth of the service industry. In this scenario, social interactions may also have 
contributed to explain this informalization of the labor market by working as a 
breaking stigma factor or even by the simple replication of activities. The 
perception that others around (neighbors) are becoming independent workers (a 
taxi driver, hairdresser, door-to-door sales person, or a small retailer, for 
example) may represent, therefore, an extra incentive to someone unemployed 
or even with formal positions to do the same. Social interactions in this case can 
be driven only by observing (or hearing) and developing what other workers 
around are doing.
Scheider and Enste (2000) also argue that the informalization of the labor 
market can also be a sign of decreasing tax morale, where the population 
becomes less averse to the risk of being caught by fiscal authorities. Together 
with the already high cost of being a formal worker, this avoidance of 
contributions to the fiscal system is of great concern to policy makers. As the 
differentiation of workers is also given by contributions to the social security 
system, the next section clarifies the costs and the benefits related to this 
contribution in Brazil.
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3.1. Contributions to the Social Security System
Enrollment and contributions to the social security system are mandatory 
to all types of workers (self-employed or employees) receiving more than a 
minimum wage13. The advantages of contributing to the social security system in 
Brazil during the 1990s are social protection against impediments to working 
while the worker is in the labor force (wage compensations for sickness, 
accidents, or imprisonment; and maternity wages for women), and pensions 
when the worker is retired by age, disability, or time of contributions14. Until 1989 
access to public health services in general was limited to workers (and their 
families) who were enrolled and contributed to the social security system. After 
1989, however, with the creation of the Unified System of Health (Sistema Unico 
de Saude -  SUS), the government made public health services available not only 
to those contributing regularly to the social security system but to all individuals 
(universality principle). This resolution contributed to an adverse incentive for 
social security contributions during the 1990’s as analyzed by Dart et al (2002).
Contributions are, on average, 20% of the declared contribution wage (for 
all types of workers). As self-employed workers do not have a regular wage, they 
have to declare one to the social security system and contribute (20% incidence) 
accordingly. Contributions of employees are also based on the average of 20% 
incidence. However, half (10%) are discounted from employees’ wage and the 
other half (10%) is paid by their employer’s, who are responsible for transferring
13 Even if the worker receives less than a minimum wage he/she has to be enrolled in the social 
security system.
14 Pensions are also provided to the family of the worker when he/she dies. Time of contributions 
is usually 35 years for men and 30 for woman.
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contributions directly to the system. Contributions to the social security system 
are only a proxy for legal conditions, as it is the only available information 
qualifying the labor contract for all types of workers.
Excessive taxation on formal enterprises has often been pointed out as a 
very important factor inducing informality. Carneiro (1997) estimates payroll taxes 
costing around 43% of the base salary for an average employee15 in Brazil. 
Outsourcing unregistered employees or self-employed workers, therefore, 
reduces substantially the cost of the labor force for formal firms. Induced also by 
some discredit toward fiscal authorities, the informality of the labor force became 
a regular hiring process adopted by firms of all sizes in Fortaleza city in Brazil 
during the 1990s. Thus, given their high opportunity costs, especially for small 
firms, social security contributions can be considered an additional and universal 
qualifier for different types of workers.
The possibility of differentiating workers by type and by social security 
contributions, as well as the possibility of identifying workers’ neighborhoods, is a 
rare advantage of the data set used in this essay.
3.2. Data Set
The data set used was extracted from the Survey on Unemployment and 
Under-employment (“Pesquisa Desemprego e Subemprego”), which is a 
household-based survey conducted monthly by the National Employment System
15 Social security contributions cost 20% of workers’ base salary. The other 23%  are related to 
many other different workers’ benefits such as one additional monthly wage per year, 
unemployment security, and others.
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with an office located in Fortaleza city Brazil (SINE/CE). The survey provides 
specialized labor market information at the individual and household levels, and it 
also allows aggregation measurements at the neighborhood level, as 101 
different surveyed areas (called sectors) can be identified for each family. This 
spatial sub-division was derived from cluster analysis conducted during the 
1980’s which involved a set of demographic characteristics in contiguous areas. 
The survey does not cover all neighborhoods during each month of the year due 
to the limited amount of questionnaires distributed randomly to the families. Each 
month, 25% of the neighborhoods are substituted by others, in a way that each 
neighborhood is surveyed during the same months each consecutive year.
The full data set is composed by pulling all but two monthly cross-section 
surveys from 1993 to 200216. The surveys from 1991 and 1992 were used only to 
estimate interaction effect variables for individuals surveyed in 1993 and 1994. 
The data set includes those 16-64 years old, who at the time of the survey were 
actively working for pay17 or looking for a job, and did not have missing 
information for any variable included in the models. This results in 162,760 males 
and 117,554 females in the sample.
The available data set, therefore, allows the analysis of differentiation and 
qualification of workers, as well as the investigation of whether social interactions 
in neighborhoods are relevant conditionings in the labor market. These analyses
16 The surveys of July of 1993 and June of 1994 were not included. The former presented 
different monetary values for the income of different families. This occurred because the whole 
country was switching the official currency at that time. The second survey was not available from 
the National System of Employment.
17 This leaves out family workers who do not receive wages.
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and investigations have been excluded from studies of labor market 
segmentation, which may compromise their reliability in offering policy guidance. 
If interactions affect labor force positions for workers, for example, they should 
also affect transitions across them. Consequently segmentation models based on 
transition rates (Maloney (1999), Neri (2002) or Gong and Van Soest (2002)) 
should also include the possibility of interactions at the risk of becoming 
misspecified.
The next section explains the ways in which the main issues of the 
informal and social interaction literature are addressed in this essay.




This essay uses a sector choice model to provide evidence that: i) there 
are significant differences among the same types of workers such as the usual 
formal versus informal classification should be avoided, ii) not all types of 
informal workers can be considered under-employed, and iii) interactions in 
neighborhoods and spatial segmentation can be important determinants of 
worker’s position in the labor market. Segmentation models based on transition 
rates across sectors (formal versus informal) should be modified if these 
statements are verified empirically. These modifications should include at least 
the differentiation of informal workers and the inclusion of neighborhood effects 
into these models.
As panel data surveys are still missing for the labor market of Fortaleza, 
the modeling of transition rates is left for future work. However, the set of 
evidences suggested in this essay is suitable for investigation with a sector 
choice framework based on the estimation of multinomial logit models. The 
multinomial logit model has been widely used for this purpose by the informal 
sector literature (Hill (1989), Gingdling (1991), Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), 
Maloney (1999)) and is also referred to by Brock and Durlauf (2002) for the 
analysis of social interaction perspectives. Its unrestricted character does not
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assume any ex ante qualitative ordering for the different types of workers18, 
which is actually the object of the analysis. In addition, its non-linearity is an 
important characteristic for the identification of neighborhood effects as shown by 
Brock and Durlauf (2002). One condition for this identification is that there should 
be no colinearity between worker’s characteristics and the neighborhood effect 
indicators19. The authors argue that in linear and contemporaneous models20 this 
condition may not be satisfied, as the aggregation of workers’ characteristics at 
the neighborhood levels may coincide with the expected value for the social 
interaction variable. In this essay, the multinomial logit model not only brings non- 
linearity to the analysis but also the neighborhood effect variables (Csn(t-i) and 
Yn(t-i)) are based on non-contemporaneous values.
The graphing strategy for multinomial logit coefficients proposed by Long 
(1997) also facilitates ordering perspectives for the different types of workers 
proposed in this essay. This strategy consists of plotting the corresponding log- 
odds (and odds ratio or marginal effects) of workers’ characteristics on the same 
axis (with the same unit of measurement), allowing magnitude comparisons for 
the different working positions. That is, it is possible to visualize and identify the
18 Ordered probit models, for example, already assume a pre-determined ordering for each type 
of worker. See Pradham and Van Soest (1995) as an example.
19 The other conditions for identification are that the data must contain: i) sufficient intra­
neighborhoods variation for each type of worker, and ii) sufficient inter-neighborhoods variation 
for the neighborhood effect variables. Both conditions are satisfied in the data set used in this 
essay. There are 101 neighborhoods each one receiving a different value for each year. The 
accumulation of two (lagged) years to calculate the participation of each type of worker in the 
neighborhoods also guaranteed the intra-neighborhood variation of the workers.
20 Contemporaneous models in this case refer to a social interaction model where the individual 
decision as well as the aggregated decision of his/her group of reference are taken at the same 
time (survey) period.
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significant differences in the likelihoods of workers’ allocation when one particular 
variable of interest changes.
Therefore, the multinomial logit model serves well for the purpose of 
analyzing workers’ characteristics and the possibility of neighborhood effects. It 
represents a methodological intersection for the two types of literature cited in 
this essay (literature on informal economy and social interactions).
4.1. Worker Differentiation and Qualification
In order to verify formally significant differences between workers this 
essay compares individually the log-odds of different variables and also uses a 
test proposed by Long (1997) for combining two categories of workers in the 
multinomial logit model. This is a general Wald test which is based on log- 
likelihood comparisons of restricted (imposing equal coefficients for two 
categories of workers) and unrestricted models. The restricted model assumes 
that all the multinomial logit coefficients (with the exception of the constant) of 
two types of workers are equal. Long (1997) evidences that this test is 
statistically more powerful than the likelihood ratio test for multiple binomial logit 
(or probit) models.
In addition to differentiating workers this essay also qualifies them. The 
main objective is to observe an ordering that could identify those workers who 
look more like a segmented under-employed worker. This is done by 
investigating not only what types of workers are highly represented by less 
educated workers, but also examining how this representation compares to that
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of unemployed workers. Education is considered to be the most important filter 
for formal positions (Telles, 1992). It affects not only potential earnings but it is 
also an important reference for ordering preferences (Pradhan and Van Soest 
(1995)). The under-employed character of one position may be evident if more 
educated workers choose to stay unemployed instead of taking the available 
(informal) position. This comparison is in particular addressed to those small firm- 
covered and firm uncovered workers for which no prior expectation can be made 
with respect to the comparative group of unemployed workers.
Besides education, the other workers’ characteristics analyzed are those 
usually included in traditional labor supply models: age, migration condition, and 
family characteristics. The main idea is to verify what types of workers also follow 
regularities associated with informal positions by the segmentation literature. A 
higher likelihood of informality for rural migrants, for example, is one usual 
assumption of segmentation models (Fields, 1975). Also following the staging 
hypothesis of Fields (1975), young workers should be more likely to be part of 
the informal sector as they lack labor market experience.
In addition, informal positions are also said to be compatible with home 
activities for females (Maloney, 1999). In this case the presence of children 
would not represent an almost prohibitive opportunity cost to participate in the 
labor market as is usually observed in traditional labor supply models. Finally, 
others’ family income is also a common variable present in labor supply models. 
It is usually expected that the reservation wage for an individual would increase 
with a higher income for other family members. This variable, therefore, would
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represent a great indicator of quality for each working position in the labor 
market. It is, however, subjected to significant measurement errors as informal 
workers tend to report profits of small business rather than labor earnings. In 
addition, formal workers do not usually report other types of benefits not included 
in wages. In these cases, informal wages are overestimated and aggregation at 
the family income level only amplifies the measurement errors for this variable. 
Some precaution, therefore, is devoted to the results of this variable.
4.2. Neighborhood Effects and Spatial Segmentation
This essay investigates whether worker’s interactions can be important in 
influencing their working positions. The empirical verification of the importance of 
social interactions, however, is not as simple as the analysis of a’s in theoretical 
model 1. As stated in the literature review section, three usual problems have to 
be addressed in order to isolate social interaction perspectives: neighborhood 
sorting, simultaneity, and contextual effects.
This essay makes use of time-lagged values for the social interaction 
variables as a solution to avoid the simultaneity (endogeneity) problem when 
individuals’ decisions are at the same time affecting and being affected by others’ 
decisions. The time lag suggests that individuals at the time of their decision are 
aware of the given social context and act upon it. This solution is only possible as 
the data set is rich enough to track neighborhoods (but not people) across time, 
which is not usual in traditional labor market surveys.
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With respect to the contextual (local) effect of the neighborhoods, this 
essay follows Carman (2004) by including fixed effect controls for areas broader 
than the neighborhood size in order to capture local conditions. At a different 
level of aggregation, fixed effects do not overcome the interaction effect and yet 
capture specific local conditions within an urban labor market. The broader areas 
in this study refer to the six areas covered by the six regional offices of the 
municipal administration. These areas are proxies for identifying local conditions 
in the labor market as their populations have common public demands met (or 
not) by the same office. Although this common characteristic does not 
necessarily relate to local labor market conditions it can generate spontaneous 
interactions among their populations.
The sorting problem occurs when the formation of the worker’s group of 
reference (neighborhoods) is not random. In this case, a significant value for a’s 
in model 1 can be reflecting the tendency to workers of the same type cluster 
themselves into neighborhoods rather than capture interaction perspectives. In 
order to control for this possibility, this essay assumes that most of the sorting 
across neighborhoods in the labor market of Fortaleza is induced by income 
determinants. This is because ethnicity is considered to be of less relevance than 
it is in developed countries with relatively high inflows of foreign workers forming 
ethnic neighborhoods. Therefore, the median value of neighborhoods’ family 
income lagged one period is included in the model to capture the sorting effect 
and isolate the interaction effect.
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The final multinomial logit model of labor supply and sector choice is 
therefore defined as:
Pr(Cint=y) =
e x p (^ Z )
(2) m‘ 2 > x p ( < Z )
with K’Z = 5’Xjnt + I sasCsn(t-i) + 0Yn(t-i) + A’Rn
Where Yn(t-i) is the median value for neighborhood’s family income, Rn are 
fixed effects dummy variables for the six administrative regions, and the other 
variables are defined as before. The vector of worker’s characteristics (Xjnt) 
includes: education variables, age, age squared, rural migration indicators, family 
characteristics, family income, and year dummy variables. The definition of each 
variable included in the model is shown in Table 4.
The inclusion of Yn(n) and Rn in the model is an attempt to control the 
sorting and contextual problems discussed above, and consequently extract a 
“clean” interaction effect from as. However, this essay recognizes in accordance 
with the literature, that this task may not be accomplished completely. This is 
because the process of sorting into neighborhoods of one type of worker is not 
random, and its modeling alone deserves further examinations. In this case, the 
empirical findings are interpreted as suggestive rather than confirmatory of the 
existence of interaction effects in the labor market. In addition, as this essay aims 
to provide insights to expand labor market segmentation models, it is important to 
evidence that neighborhood effects in general are significant factors explaining 
worker’s position in the labor market. If this is the case, their exclusion in 
segmentation models may compromise the findings of these. In addition, it is
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possible that neighborhood sorting and interactions reinforce each other, driving 
a segmentation process that occurs at the spatial level.
In order to investigate if neighborhood effects in general are important in 
defining workers’ position in the labor market and if social interactions are part of 
such effects, this essay compares the estimations of a in theoretical models 1 
and 2. In model 1, a captures neighborhood effects in general as there are no 
controls for sorting or local effects. That is, a is the mixed effect of workers’ 
sorting, interactions, and local constraints, which form the general (or net) 
neighborhood effect. If a is significant in models 1 and 2, this is an indication that 
neighborhood effects are important in influencing workers’ position in the labor 
market, and that social interactions are probably an important influential factor.
The existence of four different types of workers plus those unemployed in 
the multinomial logit model allows a very interesting analysis of interactions 
between workers of the same and different types. Although the interpretation of 
multinomial logit coefficients is not straightforward for this purpose, their 
corresponding marginal effects for an average worker help to clarify their 
meanings (Long, 1997). There are sixteen corresponding marginal effects of 
interest (n*), each one capturing the effect that the relative prevalence of one 
type of worker j over those unemployed (omitted category) in the neighborhood 
has on the likelihood of the worker be of type s. Table 5 shows the p* for which 
significant values suggests neighborhood effects (model 1) or interactions (model 
2) between the same and different types of workers. In the main diagonal the
1 3 4
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effects occur between the same types of workers, and off diagonal they occur 
between different types of workers.
Therefore, it is possible to analyze if different types of workers tend to 
segment or integrate themselves into neighborhoods. Spatial segmentation or 
spatial integration depends on the sign and value of the marginal effects. When 
the estimates of the main diagonal have a positive sign and the elements off 
diagonal are negative and significant there is a trend for spatial segmentation. 
When the marginal effects off diagonal have a positive sign also the 
neighborhoods tend to become more diversified and consequently there is more 
spatial integration between the different types of workers (Table 5).
Although the multinomial logit model provides good reference for 
comparing working positions and testing neighborhood effects, it relies on the 
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This assumption 
says that the comparative odds of any two alternatives are independent of the 
existence or not of other alternative choices. With some degree of controversy, 
the hypothesis of IIA is said to be used only in cases where the choices are 
plausible differentiated by the researcher (McFadden, 1984). Given this is 
actually what has to be tested; it is thus recommendable to estimate alternative 
approaches to providing robustness to the findings of the multinomial logit model.
This essay offers two approaches to reinforce the findings of the 
multinomial logit model with five types of workers. In the first, the multinomial logit 
model is used but only for four types of workers. Unemployed workers are 
excluded from the sample. The objective is to observe if the ordering found with
1 3 5
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five types of workers is preserved if one type is excluded. Also, restricting the 
sample to workers, this essay also uses the bivariate probit model as a 
complementary specification model to compare the different definitions of 
workers. The main advantage of this specification is that it provides a basic test 
to compare if the two most important definition criteria for informal workers (firm 
size versus social security contributions) can be used separately as they have 
been used in the literature. The test consists of verifying if the residuals of each 
set of working choices (small versus firm workers and covered versus uncovered 
workers) are significantly correlated. In positive cases, it is inadequate to 
estimate the model using one or other definition. Consequently, aggregations 
should be avoided in segmentation models. The bivariate probit model with 
neighborhood effects is also an innovation with respect to Devaney and Chien 
(2000) which confront participation in retirement plans for self-employed and 
wage workers using a bivariate probit model. In this respect, he finds that 
unobservables that affect the self-employment choice also affect participation in 
retirement plans. This essay verifies if the same can be said to the labor market 
of Fortaleza, Brazil.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical analysis that follows is divided into two parts. The first is 
more descriptive and identifies in isolation the characteristics of the different 
types of workers in the labor market and their evolution during the 1990’s. The 
second part identifies if the results found in the descriptive analysis persist in a 
multivariate framework. Each part is also divided between the analyses of 
workers’ differentiation and interactions.
5.1. Descriptive Analysis
5.1.1. Worker’s differentiation and qualification
The reduction in the share of firm covered workers21 during the 1990s 
(Graphs 1 and 2) was compensated by the increase in the share of unemployed 
and small-firm uncovered workers. This is to say that the informalization process 
in the 1990s was induced by one type of informal worker that looks like an under­
employed worker. This conclusion comes from the definition of under­
employment suggested in this essay which involves those workers with 
education achievements lower than those of unemployed workers. This is verified
21 It is important to re-emphasize that this is the only type of worker considered formal according 
to local differentiation of formal and informal workers. Therefore, small-firm uncovered, small-firm 
covered, and firm uncovered workers are all considered informal.
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in Graphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 where those less (more) educated workers are relatively 
more (less) represented by those small-firm uncovered workers. A closer 
analysis of these graphs also shows two interesting results.
First, the percentage of workers with secondary education (no education) 
increased (reduced) for all types of workers and for both genders. This is an 
indication that a comparative reduction in the “quality” of informal workers in the 
labor market was not responsible for inducing its informalization during the 
1990’s.
Second, male and female workers present different comparative orderings 
when small-firm covered and firm uncovered workers are considered. That is, for 
males, small-firm covered workers should not be considered an under­
employment position according to the definition used here. And following the 
same definition, firm covered workers should be considered in general an under­
employment position. For females, it is the reverse. While small-firm covered 
workers should be considered under-employed, firm uncovered workers should 
not be considered under-employed. This gender difference may suggest that 
whereas females may have higher preferences for employment opportunities in 
traditional firms, males may be more willing to work in positions contributing to 
the social security system independent of the size of the firm. That is, if one 
should aggregate workers in two sectors (formal versus informal), the firm size 
definition would work better for females and the social security contribution would 
be more precise for males. However, this essay suggests that more types of
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workers’ should be differentiated to provide more precise and/or reliable 
evidence of labor market segmentations.
The aggregation of workers in only two categories would not be referred if 
there were significant differences between them. This is what is shown in Tables 
6 and 7. Almost all workers’ characteristics representing human capital and 
behavioral variables present significantly different mean values across all types 
of workers. The three categories of informal workers according to the local 
definition (SF-UCOV, SF-COV and F-COV) also present significant differences 
for most of their characteristics. In addition, focusing only on the educational 
variables, Tables 6 and 7 reinforce that male and female workers differ with 
respect to the “under-employed” character of their middle positions (SF-COV and 
F-UCOV). That is, for male workers with no education, the participation of SF- 
COV workers in this educational category (50%) is lower than those of 
unemployed workers (53%), which is lower than those of F-UCOV workers 
(62%). For female workers this ordering is inverted (SF-COV (48.1%), 
unemployed (37.0%) and F-UCOV (36.5%)).
Other patterns of worker characteristics are worthy of mention. When 
compared to the unemployed, those firm covered workers follow traditional 
patterns of labor supply. That is, the comparative likelihood of having work (and 
consequently not looking for a job) is higher if one is the main provider of the 
family and if he/she is older. The presence of children reduces the likelihood of 
labor supply as a firm covered worker for females and increase for males. With 
respect to the worker’s migration conditions there is no clear pattern that makes
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labor supply more likely if the worker is in any specific stage of adaptation in the 
labor market.
Significant differences for the average value of the income of other family 
members can also be observed in Tables 6 and 7. This result is also an 
indication that labor supply decisions within the family are different for the 
different types of workers.
Both genders had a similar pattern of labor supply with respect to age and 
being the main provider of the family. That is, on average, there are more older 
and household head workers working as SF-COV, SF-UCOV, or F-UCOV, than 
being unemployed. However, their differences in likelihood under the descriptive 
analysis are not sufficient to assert that these types of (informal) workers have to 
be treated differently. Therefore, a confirmatory analysis using a multivariate set 
up is needed to reinforce such a conclusion.
5.1.2. Neighborhood effects and spatial segmentation
In order to investigate spatial aspects of the distribution of workers in this 
descriptive analysis, the shares of workers for the neighborhoods were used as 
units of analysis, and spatial correlation tests were performed with the use of 
Moran’s I index. In the present context, this index measures the degree to which 
neighborhood areas present similarities in the prevalence of each type of worker. 
That is, it is a proxy for the clustering of the different types of workers into areas
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formed by contiguous neighborhoods. Higher and significant values for the 
Moran’s I index mean higher levels of clustering22.
When the shares of each type of worker are calculated for the whole 
period for each neighborhood, a significant level of spatial correlation was 
observed (Table 8)23. This is an indication that the same types of workers tend to 
live in nearby neighborhoods. In order to observe how the prevalence of informal 
workers (or part of it) relates to their spatial concentration this essay compares 
the evolution of the Moran’s I and the evolution of the share of informal workers 
for the whole city during the 1990’s24.
It is interesting to note that the prevalence of informality (share of SF-COV 
and SF-UCOV and F-UCOV workers) and its spatial concentration had similar 
time trends over the period (Graph 7). That is, when the share of informal 
workers increased they became more spatially concentrated. The same can be 
said when only the share of SF-UCOV workers is considered (Graph 8)25. 
Although this evidence occurs at the neighborhood level, it can also be an 
indication that neighborhood effects (clustering and/or interactions) play a role in 
workers’ decisions in the labor market.
22 The Moran’s I index range in values from -1 (negative perfect spatial correlation) to 0 (no 
spatial correlation) to 1 (positive perfect spatial correlation).
It is important to emphasize that some conditions were imposed in constructing the spatial 
matrix of neighborhoods. It was not possible to identify the exact positions of each of the 101 
neighborhoods in the city. But it was possible to identify the barrios in which the neighborhoods 
were located, and these geographical areas (barrios) can be identified in maps. In this case 
neighborhoods were treated as barrios to generate a simple contiguity spatial matrix. The 
worker’s share by neighborhood for the whole period goes from 1993 to 2002.
24 It is important to re-emphasize here that the use of the concept of informal workers at this stage 
follows the local definition which is based on the aggregation of small-firm covered, small-firm 
uncovered, and firm uncovered workers. The neighborhood shares and the workers shares were 
calculated using a three year moving average for each one. The three year accumulation was 
used to avoid great variations in the shares of workers for small neighborhoods.
25 The share of SF-UCO V workers alone was analyzed because it is the most dynamic part of the 
informal sector as it was seen in Graphs 1 and 2.
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In this descriptive analysis, therefore, it was observed that: (1) there are 
significant differences in the characteristics of the different types of (informal) 
workers, (2) males and females present differences in terms of “under­
employment” conditions regarding the SF-COV and the F-UCOV positions in the 
labor market, and (3) at the neighborhood level, there is evidence of spatial 
segmentation as the level of clustering increases with higher prevalence of 
informal workers. The next section investigates if such conclusions stand up in a 
multivariate approach.
5.2. Multivariate Analysis
5.2.1. Worker’s differentiation and qualification
The multinomial logit model produces multiple coefficients representing 
many relative comparisons between the log odds of two different categories of 
workers. One base category serves as standardized reference for these 
comparisons, for parameters identification, and also for expositional purposes. 
As this essay qualifies workers by comparing their educational achievements 
with those of unemployed workers, it is very convenient therefore to use these 
last types of workers as the reference base. This way it is possible not only to 
qualify workers with respect to their under-employment situation, but also the 
logit coefficients can be interpreted as a labor supply likelihood which is 
traditionally referred in the literature (Pradhan and Van Soest, A. (1995), Magnac 
(1991), Gallaway and Bersanek (2002)).
142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In order to provide ordering references and marginal effects for the 
different types of workers this essay uses Long (1997) graphing strategy for 
multinomial logit models26. The graphs compare significant differences between 
any two categories of workers by linking the labeled categories if their 
coefficients are not significantly different.
The log odds coefficients and their corresponding marginal effects are 
shown in Tables 9 and 10 for males and females respectively. There are two 
models specifications in each table. Models with and without neighborhood 
effects are estimated in order to analyze if there are significant differences in the 
coefficients of workers’ characteristics27.
The general differentiation of workers is analyzed with the Wald test 
shown at the end of the Tables 9 and 10. The significant values show that the 
differences in the characteristics of the workers are such that would not be 
adequate to join any two pair of workers’ categories in only one. In this case, 
neither the size of the firm nor the contribution to the social security system is a 
complete criterion to separate formal and informal workers as it has been done in 
the literature (Marcoullier et al (1997), Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), Gong and 
Van Soest (2002)).
The differences between workers’ characteristics are clear when analyzed 
separately. Figures 1 to 12 present Long’s strategy of plotting odds ratio 
estimates related to those of Tables 9 and 10. Each row in the figures represents
26 The “ado” command “mlogplot” prepared by Long (1997) was used for this graphing strategy. 
This “ado” command is public available for Stata users.
27 The coefficients for the social interaction variables in the model with neighborhood effects are 
analyzed separately in Tables 11 (males) and 12 (females) respectively.
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the factor change in the comparative odds of unemployment with respect to any 
other particular working position, when the selected (row) variable changes by 
one unit (or by one category in case of dummy). The comparative odds are 
negative (positive) for the positions located to the left (right) of the unemployment 
state of reference (0). In this way, when a male worker gets primary education 
(as compared to those with no education -  the omitted category) his odds to be a 
small-firm uncovered (SF-UCOV = 1) or a firm uncovered worker (F-UCOV = 2) 
reduce significantly by a factor of 0.742 and 0.738 respectively, when compared 
to the possibility to stay unemployed (Figure 1). The line linking those two 
categories of workers (SF-UCOV =1 and F-UCOV = 2) show that having a 
primary education does not make their own comparative odds significantly 
different. In the opposite side, the comparative odds to get a position as a small- 
firm covered or firm covered worker increases by a factor 1.36 or 1.28 
respectively when the worker gets primary education.
From the analysis of educational variable for males and females (Figures 
1 to 4) three important findings arise. First, there are no significant differences in 
the estimates for models with or without neighborhood effects. This analysis is 
the same for males (Figures 1 and 2) and females (Figures 3 and 4), implying 
that neighborhood effects are complementary explanations for the allocation of 
workers in different working positions.
Second, as the level of education increases it is possible to observe 
bigger disparities between the comparative odds for the different types of 
workers. The impact of education on the comparative odds can be visualized by
1 4 4
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the distance between each position given the figures present the same scale in 
terms of factor changes in odds ratio for all variables. As the workers acquire 
primary, secondary and college education, the distance between the positions, 
and especially between F-COV (4) and SF-UCOV (1), increases. This means 
that the education is a clear differentiator of workers, in accordance with the 
qualitative criterion proposed in this essay.
Finally, the ordering and the qualification of workers differ for males and 
females with respect to the intermediate positions (F-UCOV (2) e SF-COV (3)). 
For males, small-firm uncovered (1) or firm uncovered (2) workers can be 
considered under-employed positions as more education makes workers more 
likely to stay unemployed than to consider one of these working positions28. 
Small-firm covered workers have a positive likelihood of labor supply when their 
educational level increases. This is to say that not all types of informal workers 
according to the local definition have matching characteristics with segmented 
involuntary workers. The aggregation of different types of workers under one 
definition/premise in this case is not adequate when the size of the informal 
economy is a proxy for the distortions in the labor market (segmentation theory).
For females, aggregation is also inappropriate but the ordering of positions 
with respect to education is different when compared to male workers. Education 
is positively correlated to labor supply for firm workers (covered (4) or uncovered 
(3)) and negatively correlated with respect to small firm workers (covered (3) or 
uncovered (1)). This different ordering for females also suggests that education
28 The exception occurs when male workers get college degree. In this case, a positive likelihood 
of labor supply also applies to firm uncovered workers.
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improves comparatively the chances of getting positions in traditional firms more 
than working positions, which contribute to the social security system. If this 
comparative restriction is driven by stigma and/or discrimination is an analysis 
that goes beyond the objective of this essay and is left for future works.
With respect to the analyses of family characteristics for males (Figures 5 
and 6) and females (Figures 7 and 8) workers, they present usual features. That 
is, labor supply in any position (with exception of Small-Firm Covered (3)) is more 
likely to occur for males and less likely to occur for females when there are 
children at home. This is a usual regularity in labor supply models (Pradhan and 
Van Soest (1995) or Gallaway and Bersanek (2002)). There is however, a 
positive significant likelihood of labor supply for small-firm uncovered female 
workers in the presence of young children. This is consistent with the view that 
this type of informality may be desirable for females as it allows working schedule 
flexibility to be compatible with home activities.
Labor supply for males is very likely to occur for any type of working 
activity when the male is the household head. Females have the same qualitative 
result with the exception that labor supply as firm covered workers is not likely to 
occur for females heading their homes. This may also be an indication of 
preference for informal positions (SF-COV, SF-UCOV, or F-UCOV) as they can 
generate a comparative lower opportunity cost for family care.
No definite pattern could be extracted from the analysis of migration. 
Neither males (Figures 9 and 10) nor females (Figures 11 and 12) presented a 
consistent pattern where working positions would be more likely to occur than
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unemployment for recent migrants. This result is not in accordance with the 
staging hypothesis of Fields (1975) where the transition from informal to formal 
jobs comes with a better knowledge of the labor market.
It is common to assume that the income of other family members has a 
negative and significant impact on the likelihood of becoming a worker especially 
for females29. This result, however, may vary with the level of the income and the 
role play by the females in the family. Pradhan and Van Soest (1997) shows that 
labor supply probabilities for females can be higher for low and high levels of 
family income as their willingness to work can represent respectively a necessary 
income complement or a personal matching of couples’ characteristics30. 
Interesting to notice (Table 10) that only small-firm uncovered female worker had 
a significant and negative likelihood of labor supply when the family income 
increases. This unexpected result may also be caused by error measurements in 
the income variables for informal workers as they may report revenues rather 
than wages for their services/activities. A relatively higher informal wage may 
increase the reservation wage for females to work, reducing the likelihood of 
labor supply. Due to this possibility of error measurement in income, however, 
this essay skips further interpretations for these related coefficients and focuses 
attention only on the differentiated effects among the different types of workers, 
which is consistent with the plea for a more expansive classification of workers.
29 Traditional here refers to models where the distinction between formal and informal jobs is not 
considered, and only the first type is included in the sample.
30 High educated workers tend to married themselves, which makes the likelihood of labor supply 
for females positive and significant.
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In sum, the suggestive findings of the descriptive analysis of workers’ 
characteristics also stand in a multivariate framework. First, there are substantial 
differences between workers considered to be informal by local definition, or by 
general classifications in the literature. Secondly, males and female workers 
differ with respect to how education affects ranking positions and their under­
employed character. These findings should be taken into consideration in order 
to lend more robustness to the analysis of labor market segmentation.
5.2.2. Neighborhood effects and spatial segmentation
The analyses of neighborhood effect indicators in worker allocation are 
based on theoretical models 1 and 2 shown in Tables 11 and 12 for males and 
females respectively. The coefficients show the comparative likelihood that a 
worker will be in a particular working position if the prevalence of workers of 
determined type increases in his/her neighborhood. In theoretical model 1 this 
neighborhood effect is unspecified and is driven by the possibilities of social 
interactions, sorting of workers, and local conditions. Theoretical model 2 is an 
attempt to isolate the social interaction effect by including controls for sorting and 
local effects. Although this essay shares Manski’s (1993) skepticism about this 
possibility, the comparison of models at least provides evidence favoring (or not) 
the existence of interaction effects, and also serves as a robustness check for 
this traditional (variable) indicator of social interaction.
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The coefficients for the social interaction variables are shown in Tables 11 
and 12 with own and crossed interaction effects31. The elements in the main 
diagonal (in bold) represent own effects. In models without controls for sorting 
and local effect (model 1), all types of effects between workers of the same type 
are significant with the exception of firm covered male workers. The same pattern 
is also observed for females meaning that the comparative likelihood of leaving 
unemployment in favor of any working position increases if the prevalence of 
workers of the same type expands in the neighborhood.
Looking at the marginal effects (in brackets) it is clear that small-firm 
uncovered workers have the highest own neighborhood effect. If the percentage 
of small-firm uncovered workers in the neighborhood increased by 1 point in the 
last two years32 the probability of finding a worker of the same type (SF-UCOV) 
this year increases by 0.0035. The smallest effect for theoretical model 1 occurs 
for firm workers (-0.0009) which is consistent with Granovetter (1995) who 
observed that interactions are usually stronger among less educated workers.
Most of the crossed neighborhood effects are positive when the logit 
coefficients are considered. This indicates that workers prefer to work in any 
position than staying unemployed when the general neighborhood level of 
occupation rate increases. When the marginal effects are the reference guide, 
however, it is possible to identify a negative relationship between small-firm
31 The other coefficients and marginal effects for theoretical model 1 are shown in the following 
tables 12 and 13 for males and females respectively. The other coefficients and marginal effects 
for theoretical model 2  are those corresponding to the model with neighborhood effects of tables 
1 and 2 .
32 The marginal effect for each variable is calculated holding all other variables at their mean 
value.
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uncovered workers and firm covered workers33. This spatial pattern seems to be 
following the informalization trend of the 1990’s (Graphs 1 and 2) where these 
two types of working positions are negatively correlated. That is, segmentation 
rather than integration at the spatial dimension is occurring for these two types of 
workers.
With respect to the relationship between the other types of workers, it is 
more likely that spatial integration rather than segmentation be the norm, 
especially between small firm covered and uncovered workers. This is easier to 
observe in Figures 13 and 14, which show the change in predicted marginal 
effects for each type of worker when the prevalence of workers change by one 
unit. To the right (left) of the division line (at zero value) we have positive 
(negative) marginal effects for each row variable. Small firm uncovered workers, 
firm uncovered workers, and small firm covered workers are on the same 
(positive) side of the figure for each of their respective neighborhood effect 
variables. This suggests that more workers of these types tend to cluster 
themselves into neighborhoods.
When theoretical model 2 is considered, two important results arise. First, 
many (own and crossed) coefficients considerably reduce their magnitude or 
even become insignificant. This is an indication that most of the neighborhood
33 It is important to reinforce here the difference between the logit coefficients and the predicted 
marginal effects. The log-odds indicate how the likelihood of each working position with respect to 
unemployment change when each explanatory variable change. This effect hides the direct 
relationship between each type of worker and their prevalence in the neighborhoods. In this case, 
the marginal effects seem to be appropriate for this task as they provide this direct relationship. 
Their computation however depends on all individual characteristics (taken at their mean values) 
and the magnitude of the change for the explanatory variables (assumed to be 1 unit). Because 
of this dependence the marginal effects do not necessarily have the same sign of the logit 
coefficients (Long, 1997).
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effects are more related to the contextual effects of sorting and local conditions 
than to the possibility of social interactions. The marginal effects are also smaller 
for model specification 2. Figures 15 and 16, for example, show that the 
predicted marginal effects are comparatively closer to 0 for this modeling 
perspective, attesting to the reduced effect of social interaction variables after 
controlling for characteristics of neighborhoods.
Secondly, with respect to own effects, it is observed that those related to 
small-firm uncovered and covered workers continue to be significant after 
contextual control, which is an indication that social interactions may be 
important for these types of workers. Their crossed relationship also confirms 
spatial integration between these two types of workers. This result applies to 
males and females.
In sum, the analysis of neighborhood effects in the labor market of 
Fortaleza showed that: i) neighborhood effects are important determinants of 
workers’ allocation in the labor market, ii) spatial segmentation is more likely to 
occur between small-firm uncovered and firm covered workers, and iii) spatial 
integration as well as social interactions are more likely to occur between small 
firm workers (covered or uncovered).
Thus, labor market segmentation models based on transition probabilities 
should not only disaggregate formal or informal workers at different levels, but 
should also consider the possibility that neighborhood effects are important 
determinants of such transitions.
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5.3. Robustness Tests
The findings of workers’ differentiation and significant neighborhood 
effects can be subjected to the particular definition of workers used so far and to 
modeling perspectives. This section, therefore, provides some robustness tests 
against some of these possibilities.
5.3.1. Workers’ Definition
Small firm workers have been defined here as the union of those self- 
employed workers, employees and employers in firms with 1 or 2 workers, and 
domestic workers. On the other hand, firm workers are those employees and 
employers working for firms with 3 or more workers, plus those liberal 
professionals. This section analyzes whether or not the results found based on 
these definitions are sustained if only self-employed workers are considered 
small-firm workers. Liberal professionals, domestic workers and firms with less 
than three workers are left out of the sample in order to provide a direct 
comparison between self-employed and traditional wage workers.
Aggregation is still inadequate for this restrictive definition of small-firm 
workers as can be seen at the bottom of Tables 15 and 16. With respect to 
ordering, small-firm covered workers increased their comparative log-odds as 
educational level increases (Figures 17 and 18). This is even more evident for 
females. This could be expected as most of the excluded domestic workers are 
females and have low educational levels. Thus, there is even stronger evidence
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that not all informal positions as locally defined can be considered under­
employment.
The results regarding significant neighborhood effects are also 
maintained, with spatial segmentation perspectives occurring especially between 
small-firm uncovered and firm covered workers (Tables 15 and 16). Figures 19 
and 20 confirm that the marginal effects for the social interaction variables do not 
change significantly when compared to the models with all types of workers 
(Figures 15 and 16). Therefore, by comparing only self-employed workers to 
traditional wage workers this essay reaches the same demanding conclusions 
that more differentiations for formal and informal workers and inclusion of 
neighborhood effects are necessary actions for one to test labor market 
segmentation.
5.3.2. Modeling perspectives
In this section two different modeling perspectives are used for robustness 
tests. In the first, a multinomial logit model is estimated excluding unemployed 
workers from the sample. As the multinomial logit model assumes that the 
comparative odds of two options are independent of the existence of other 
options (IIA assumption) it is expected that the results will hold. The second 
modeling perspective is a bivariate probit model where the decisions regarding 
the type of worker (small-firm or firm worker) and the contribution to the social 
security system (covered or uncovered workers) are estimated as simultaneous 
and correlated decisions.
1 5 3
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The ordering and qualitative analysis for male workers remains 
approximately the same when unemployed workers are taken out of the sample 
(Figure 21). The same can be said with respect to females (Figure 22). As the 
values of the log-odds are approximately the same for models excluding (Panels 
B) or not (Panels A) unemployed workers, this is also an evidence in favor of the 
IIA assumption and the respective use of the multinomial logit model34. The 
possibility of social interactions and the kind of relationship between the workers 
at spatial level are also consistent with the previous findings. As can be seen in 
Tables 17 and 18, as well as on Figures 23 and 24, spatial segmentation 
perspectives are more likely to occur between firm covered workers and small 
firm uncovered workers.
The results for the bivariate probit model are shown in Tables 19 and 20 
for males and females respectively. Two important tests were performed and 
shown at the end of each table. The first tests if the two decisions (worker’s type 
and social security contributions) can be taken separately. In other terms, this is 
a test to verify if the two usual conceptualizations of (informal) workers can be 
used separately. The significant value for p means that there are correlated and 
unobservable characteristics for the workers, which makes the two decisions 
inseparable. In this case, a dichotomy of workers (formal versus informal) is not 
appropriate.
34 It is important to mention that the results for two tests performed to verify if the IIA assumption 
holds for model specification 2 were contradictory. One based on Hausman and McFadden 
(1984) was for the IIA and the other based on Small and Hsiao (1985) was against the IIA 
assumption. The tests were performed on Stata 8  with command “mlogtest”.
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The qualitative analysis for the four types of worker cannot be performed 
with the bivariate probit model. However, it is possible to test if education 
represents a similar constraint for being a firm worker or for contributing to the 
social security system. That is, it is possible to verify if the comparative log-odds 
for being a firm worker (versus a small firm worker) are the same for being a 
worker contributing to the social security system (versus a non-contributor) when 
the educational level changes. The significant and progressive coefficients for the 
educational variables in Tables 19 and 20 confirm that education is an important 
factor for finding positions as firm workers and also for finding positions which 
pays social security contributions. Comparing the educational coefficients for 
each position and gender it is interesting to note that males and females have 
different results. The tests at the end of the tables show that education for males 
improves comparatively more the odds for being a social security contributor than 
the odds for working in traditional firms. The exception is for a college graduated 
worker for which both comparative likelihoods of finding positions are equivalent. 
For females, the reverse occurs. With more education, it is comparatively easier 
to find a traditional firm worker female, than to find a female worker contributing 
to the social security system. This result also confirms the anterior findings 
related to the multinomial logit model.
Some social interaction indicators are also significant in the bivariate 
probit model. Their negative coefficients sustain the evidences in favor of spatial 
segmentation between small firm and traditional firm workers, and for higher 
possibilities of social interactions among neighbor workers with low level of
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human capital. This is again consistent with the earlier findings of theoretical 
model 2, and reinforces the necessity for further investigations on the 
transmission mechanisms of the neighborhood effects.
In sum, worker’s differentiation and neighborhood effects are important 
pre-requisites for any attempt to test labor market segmentation between formal 
and informal workers in Fortaleza City. In addition, the local definition of informal 
sector has aggregated different types of workers who do not necessarily fit the 
concept of under-employed worker. Erroneous generalization of workers may 
also distort policy perspectives when the labor market looks worse than it is.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
The rise of the informal economy worldwide has intensified discussions 
about the possibility and consequences of labor market segmentation. Although 
new methodologies and data sets have improved the empirical debate on testing 
segmentation in different labor markets, some old and new concerns have 
passed almost unattended. First, the differentiation between formal and informal 
workers has always been controversial. Although different approaches have 
been used, the dichotomy on the definition of workers is still present in many 
studies.
This essay showed that the dual definition of workers (either formal or 
informal) may not be appropriate as those consider formal or informal present 
significant differentiations among themselves. For the labor market of Fortaleza, 
the combination of dual definitions based on firm size or social security 
contributions produced four types of workers (small-firm uncovered, small-firm 
covered, firm-uncovered and firm-uncovered) for which allocation likelihoods 
varied significantly with respect to their own, family and local characteristics.
In addition, when unemployed workers were taken as reference it was 
observed that not all types of informal workers according to the local definition 
can be considered under-employed, as they have comparatively higher allocation
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likelihoods with higher levels of education. This is the case for small-firm covered 
males and firm uncovered females. Consequently, segmentation studies, 
especially using transition likelihoods between formal and informal working 
positions, should consider additional qualitative differentiators for those positions, 
which can be linked to different sources of segmentation.
This essay provided evidences that the size of workers’ firm and their 
social security contributions represent two different but correlated criteria of 
differentiations. Their separate use to qualify workers as have been done in the 
literature (Marcouiller et al (1997), Funkenhourser (1997), Gong and Van Soest 
(2002)) showed to be inappropriate for the labor market of Fortaleza City in 
Brazil.
Finally, worker’s allocation and transition by extension may also be 
affected by the clustering and interactions of workers into neighborhoods. This 
essay raised this possibility by finding that the likelihood of a worker being of a 
certain type is significantly affected by a higher prevalence of workers of the 
same type in his/her neighborhood. This effect, however, was more prominent 
and positive among informal workers with the lowest educational level, which is 
consistent with Granovetter (1995) who observed that networking is usually 
stronger for low quality jobs.
A negative correlation was also observed between the prevalence of 
informal workers (small-firm uncovered workers) and the likelihood of finding 
traditional formal workers (firm covered workers) in neighborhoods. This result 
favors the possibility of segmentation at least at the spatial (neighborhood) level.
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The type and existence of a relationship between spatial segmentation and labor 
market segmentation is an analysis left for futures studies as it goes beyond the 
possibilities of this essay. However, as the basic objective of this essay was to 
provide additional methodological subsidies to labor market segmentation studies 
some concerns can be advanced here. It is important re-emphasize, for example, 
that social interaction effects are difficult to identify when the interactive group of 
reference (neighbors) is not randomly formed. This essay used neighborhood 
aggregated variables (family per capita income for each neighborhood) and local 
fixed effect proxies to control for the sorting of workers of the same type into 
neighborhoods. Making the sorting process endogenous is another possibility 
that has been suggested by the social interaction literature (Brock and Durlauf 
(2002)), in order to allow the identification of social interaction effects among 
other neighborhood effects.
In segmentation studies based on transition probabilities between formal 
and informal workers it may be interesting to construct interaction variables also 
based on the other’s transitions rather than on the prevalence of determined type 
of worker. That is, the interaction variable may be constructed based on the 
percentage of workers changing positions rather than on the percentage of 
workers in a determined position. This type of segmentation study however 
demands panel or at least retrospective data35 sets which are not available so far 
for the labor market of Fortaleza City, Brazil.
35 Retrospective data set are those where at time t the individual answer questions about his/her 
condition on period t -  1 .
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The presence of social interactions among workers at the neighborhood 
level also demands investigation about the mechanism through which the 
interaction may occur. If it is informational, for example, it is important to verify if 
this interaction is a substitute or a complement for imperfect information about 
opening positions across the whole city. When the main vehicle of information 
about job openings for an informal worker is another informal worker in the 
neighborhood then one can expect informality to become contagious. The 
consequences of this proliferation of informality depend on the role that informal 
workers have in the labor market for which qualification comes with the 
segmentation analysis. If the segmentation of the labor market occurs together 
with a spatial segmentation then it is important that corrective policies also 
include local (or spatial) perspectives.
Finally, the interesting finding of spatial segmentation of informal workers 
also opens possibilities for further investigations into its relationship with other 
social outcomes such as criminality, corruption, and other deviations from social 
norms.












Table 1 - Segmentation Studies Using Earnin<gs Comparison Methodology





Hill (1989) 3sls for earnings and 
hours of work with self­
selection correction from 
labor supply and sector 
choice model
- Informal: Family workers.
- Formal: Employees.
- Not working.
Married women (with 
spouse present)/ 20 to 59 
years old/ N.S./Cross- 
Section /  Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area (Japan)
“...this analysis clearly confirms 
the importance of treating 
separately ( ...)  the two market 
sectors for countries (...)  
characterized by large informal 
sectors.”
Tannen (1991) Earnings equation with 
dummy for formal 
workers. Self-selection 
correction from sector 
choice model
-Informal: Self-employed + 
employees without social-seourity 
contributions.
-Formal: Employees with social 
security contributions.
All workers with positive 
earnings /1 5 -6 5  years old/ 
N.S./Cross Section / 
Northeast States of Brazil.
“But contrary to the dual market 
model, controlling for the skills 
of workers serves to eliminate 
completely de difference in 
earnings between the formal 
and informal sectors of the 
private nonfarm urban 
economy.”
Magnac (1991) Potential wage 




- Formal: W age workers.
- Non-participants.
- Unemployed.
Married women (with 
spouse present)/18-60 
years old/Employers and 
family worker/Cross- 
section/ 7 Urban Areas of 
Colombia.
“...the assumption of competitive 
markets seems to be an 














Gingdling (1991) Earning equation 
comparisons. Chow test 
for expected wage 
decomposition with 
sector selectivity control.
- Informal private: worker not in 
formal private or public sectors, 
working for a nonservice firm with 
manual or no-machinery, working 
in a house or street, or is a 
domestic worker.
- Formal private: Professionals in 
occupations associated with 
government sponsorship or not + 
workers belonging to 
cooperatives, unions or any 
professional organization.
- Public: workers directly 
employed by the central 
government or working for 
semiautonomous enterprises.
Workers with positive 
monthly income/N.S./N.S./ 
Cross-section/ Metropolitan 
Area of San Jose (Costa 
Rica).
“All the results presented in this 
article are consistent with the 
hypothesis of labor market 
segmentation between the 
public and private-formal sector 
(,..).The evidence in this article 
also supports the conclusion of 
labor market segmentation 
between the private-formal and 
informal sectors (...) .”
Telles (1993) Earnings differences 
without self-selection 
control from choice 
models
-Informal protected self- 
employed: the self-employed who 
contributed to social security 
system.
- Informal unprotected: employee 
or self-employed without 
contributions to the social security 
system.
- Informal domestic employees.
- Formal employees.
Workers w/ positive 
incom e/10-64 years old/ 
Employers and liberal 
professional/
Cross Section/ 9 largest 
Metropolitan Areas of 
Brazil.
“Formal sector workers earn 
monthly incomes that are 
substantially lower than those of 
the protected self-employed. 
With rare exceptions, they also 
earn incomes that are 
somewhat higher than those of 
unprotected workers, the extent 
of which varies by occupation.”
Funkenhouser
(1996)
Sector choice and 
earnings equations 
(focus on human capital 
returns in the informal 
sector)
- Informal: Self-employed + 
Domestic + Family + Small Firm 








El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
“...the finding of high returns to 
human capital provides 
evidence in favor of the 

















Mobility between sectors 
with predicted wages 
from transition
- Informal: Self-employed + 
Domestic + Family + Small Firm 









“Segmentation within the labor 
market may be the result of 




Earnings structures for 
mobility constrain 
hypotheses
- Informal: Self-employed + 
Domestic + Family + Small Firm 




All workers/10 years or 
older/N.S./
Cross-section / Guatemala 
(urban centers).
“...show the Guatemalan labor 
market to have different reward 
structures across sectors.... 
Demand side rigidities...do not 
explain all of the earnings 
patterns across sectors”.
Marcoullier et al 
(1997)






- Informal*: (1) Self-employed + 
small size firm employee or 
employer (< 5 workers) or (2) 
workers not-paying for social 
security protection (independent 
of occupation).
- Formal*: (1) Professionals + 
non-small size firm employee or 
employer (5 or more workers) or 
(2 ) workers w/ social security 
contributions.
Workers w/ positive 
income/N.S./ Domestic and 
family worker/Cross- 
section/ Urban areas of El 
Salvador, Mexico and Peru.
“Substantial returns to schooling 
in the informal sector do not fit 
the image of a secondary sector 
as sketched by Dickens and 
Lang. ( ...)  Our research (...)  
casts doubt on the received 
wisdom that the informal sector, 
always and everywhere, is a 
poorly paid but easily entered 
refuge for those who have no 
other option."
Meng (2001) Earning equations 
comparisons.
- Informal wage-earners: worked 
on construction sites + worked for 
private firms + worked for 
collective-owned service sector.
- Formal wage-eamer: worked for 
public + joint venture + foreign- 






“...among all migrants those 
who worked in the self- 
employed group are the ones 
who felt the most satisfied with 
their current situation while the 
wage earners in the informal 
sector and migrants who worked 
in the formal sector felt less 
satisfied than the self- 
employed.”
ONU>





















Covered le le le le le
Uncovered II II, le II II, le II II, le II, le II, le
II -  Informal worker according to the legalist definition.
le -  Informal worker according to the entrepreneurial definition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
Table 3 -  Worker Definition and Examples
Position on Occupation Definition Examples
Self-Employed Those who work for their own account 
offering services to one or more firms or 
consumers without an employment 
contract. The eventuality of the services 








Liberal Professional Those self-employed workers with 
college degree, registered as a 




Employees/employers Salaried or wage workers who have a 
formal or informal contract to work 
regularly for a particular firm.
Secretary, janitor, 
professors, etc.
Domestic Employees who work for families rather 
than firms.
Maids, car drivers, 
gardeners, etc.
Small-Firm Worker Self-Employed + employees/employers 
of firms with one or two workers + 
Domestic
-
Firm Worker Employees/employers of firms with three 
or more workers + liberal professional -
Small-Firm Uncovered Worker 
(SF-UCOV)
Small-Firm Worker not contributing to the 
Social Security System -
Firm Uncovered Worker 
(F-UCOV)
Firm Worker not contributing to the 
Social Security System -
Small-Firm Covered 
Worker (SF-COV)
Small-Firm Worker contributing to the 
Social Security System -
Firm Covered Worker 
(F-COV)
Firm Worker contributing to the Social 
Security System -
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Graph 1 - Labor Force Participation by Type of Worker -  Males
Per capita GSP g row th  = 1.53% Per capita GSP grow th  = 2.93%Per capita GSP g row th  = 5.21%
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Graph 2 - Labor Force Participation by Type of Worker -  Females
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Up to 2 years 
Migrantes 
2 to 5 years 
Migrantes 























Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has no education or incomplete 
primary level, 0  otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has complete primary level or 
incomplete secondary level, 0  otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has complete secondary level or 
incomplete college level, 0  otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual has complete college level or more, 
0  otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is the household head, 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable equal to 1 if the individual migrated from other municipalities 
within the state and has up to two years of residency, 0  otherwise.
Dummy Variable equal to 1 if the individual migrated from other municipalities 
within the state and has between 2 and 5 years of residency, 0 otherwise 
Dummy Variable equal to 1 if the individual migrated from other municipalities 
within the state and has more than 5 years of residency, 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable equal to 1 if the individual migrated from outside of the state. 
Individuals’ age
Number of children less than 5 years old.
Real Per capita family income excluding the reported income of the individual of 
reference (R$ 2000).
Percentage of individuals in the neighborhood who were firm covered workers 
in the last two years.
Percentage of individuals in the neighborhood who were small-firm uncovered 
workers in the last two years.
Percentage of individuals in the neighborhood who were firm uncovered 
workers in the last two years.
Percentage of individuals in the neighborhood who were small-firm covered 
workers in the last two years.
Median of the per capita family income in the neighborhood in the last year 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in municipal administrative 
area 1 , 0  otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in municipal administrative 
area 3, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in municipal administrative 
area 4, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in municipal administrative 
area 5, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in municipal administrative 
area 6 , 0  otherwise
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fable 5 -  Spatial Segmentation versus Spatial Integration
S F - UCOV F - UCOV SF -  COV F - C O V
% SF -  UCOV u V u
Mj% F - UCOV iA u
% SF -  COV iiJ M sf-c
% F -C O V Ms mV c
Spatial segmentation: p'j (+), p* (-) Spatial integration: p'j (+), p* (+)
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Graph 5 - Percentage of Workers with Secondary Education -  Males
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Table 6 - Mean Values by Labor Force State - Males
Unemployed Small Firm - Firm - Small Firm - Firm -
Uncovered Uncovered Covered Covered
Individual
Characteristics
Age 28.64 37.18**/** 30.16**/** 40.15**/** 33.80
No Educ. 0.53 0  67**/** 0.62**/** 0.50**/** 0.47
Primary Educ. 0.25 0.17**/** 0 .2 0 **/** 0 .2 0 **/** 0 .2 1
Second. Educ. 0 .2 1 0.15**/** 0.16**/** 0.26**/** 0.28
College Educ. 0 .0 1 0 .0 1  */** 0 .0 2 **/** 0.04**/+ 0.04
Household
head 0.31 0.67**/** 0.45**/** 0.73**/** 0.61
Migrantes 
Up to 2 years 0.04 0.03**/** 0.05**/** 0 .0 2 **/** 0.03
Migrantes 
2 to 5 years 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 **/** 0 .0 1 **/** 0 . 0 1  /** 0 .0 1
Migrantes 
> 5 years 0.17 0.29**/** 0 .2 0 **/** 0.30**/** 0.24
Migrants 
outside state 0.08 0.08 /** 0.07**/ 0 .1 0 **/** 0.07
#  Children 
under 5 0.51 0.56**/** 0.59**/** 0.43**/** 0.56
Per capita




% F-COV 42.37 42.22**/+ 42.41 > * 42.96**/** 42.84
%SF-UCOV 28.21 28.60**/** 28.33 */ 27.85**/** 28.03
%F-UCOV 12.36 12.38 /** 12.39 /** 12.24**/* 12.30
%SF-COV 3.87 3.90**/** 3.92**/ 4.16**/** 3.93
INCNEIGH 93.52 92.21 / 92.37 / 96.52**/** 92.87
Region 1 0.19 0.16**/** 0.17**/** 0.16**/** 0.17
Region 3 0.16 0.15*/** 0.15+/** 0.14**/** 0.16
Region 4 0.16 0.17**/** 0.18**/** 0 .2 0 **/** 0.18
Region 5 0.18 0.19**/** 0.19**/** 0.16**/** 0.18
Region 6 0.14 0.14**/** 0.14**/** 0 .1 2 **/** 0.13
Observations 20,854 39,443 23,046 6,147 73,270
(12.81%) (24.23%) (14.16%) (3.78% ) (45.32%)
**/**  (p -value < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
* /**  (p -value <  0.05) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0.01) com paring to form al covered  
** /*  (p -value < 0.05) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0.05) com paring to form al covered  
* * I*  (p -value < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue < 0 .1 0 )  com paring to form al covered  
*1**  (p -value <  0 .1 0 ) com paring to  unem ployed /  (p -va lue < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
/* *  (p -value >  0 .1 0 ) com paring to  unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
* * /  (p -value <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to form al covered  
* /  (p -value <  0.05) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue >0.10) com paring to form al covered  
/  (p -value > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to form al covered
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Table 7 - Mean Values by Labor Force State - Females
Unemployed Small Firm - Firm - Small Firm - Firm -
Uncovered Uncovered Covered Covered
Individual
Characteristics
Age 26.62 37.08**/** 29.62**/* 38.07**/** 33.39
No Educ. 0.37 0 .6 6 **/** 0.37+/** 0.48**/** 0.27
Primary Educ. 0.28 0.17**/** 0.24**/** 0 .19**/** 0.18
Second. Educ. 0.33 0.16**/** 0.34**/** 0.30**/** 0.45
College Educ. 0 . 0 2 0 .0 1 **/** 0.05**/** 0.03**/** 0 . 1 0
Household
head 0.09 0.25**/** 0.13**/** 0.25**/** 0.16
Migrantes 
Up to 2 years 0.04 0.03**/** 0.03**/** 0 .0 2 **/ 0 . 0 2
Migrantes 
2 to 5 years 0 .0 1 0 .0 1  /** 0 .0 1  /* 0 .0 1  /* 0 .0 1
Migrantes 
> 5 years 0.16 0.34**/** 0.19**/** 0.33**/** 0.23
Migrants 
outside state 0.08 0.08 /** 0.07**/** 0.09**/** 0.06
# Children 
under 5 0.55 0.53 /** 0.45**/** 0.38**/ 0.39
Per capita




%F-COV 42.57 42.24**/ 42.76**/ 42.59**/** 43.53
%SF-UCOV 27.88 28.62**/** 28.03*/ 28.05**/** 27.45
%F-UCOV 12.32 12.33 /** 12 .29 /** 12.18**/ 12.14
%SF-COV 3.88 3.98**/** 3.99**/** 4.27**/* 4.06
INCNEIGH 96.01 93.83 /** 95.82*/** 99.15**/ 99.66
Region 1 0 .2 1 0.15**/** 0.16**/** 0.15**/** 0.18
Region 3 0.16 0 .1 6 /** 0 .1 6 /** 0.14**/** 0.17
Region 4 0.17 0.18**/** 0 .2 0 **/** 0.18**/** 0 . 2 2
Region 5 0.15 0.18**/** 0.17**/** 0.14**/ 0.14
Region 6 0.13 0.14**/** 0 .1 2 **/** 0 .1 2 “ /** 0 .1 1
Observations 17429 39228 11740 5133 44024
(14.83%) (33.37%) (9.99%) (4.37% ) (37.45%)
** /* *  (p -value < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
* /**  (p -value < 0 .0 5 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
** /*  (p -value < 0 .0 5 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 5 ) com paring to form al covered  
* * ! *  (p -value <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .1 0 ) com paring to form al covered  
* /**  (p -value < 0 .1 0 )  com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
/* *  (p -value >  0 .1 0 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue <  0 .0 1 ) com paring to form al covered  
* * / (p -value < 0 .0 1 ) com paring to  unem ployed /  (p -va lue > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to form al covered  
* /  (p -value < 0 .0 5 ) com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue >  0 .1 0 ) com paring to form al covered  
/  (p -value > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to unem ployed /  (p -va lue > 0 .1 0 )  com paring to form al covered
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Table 8 - Spatial Correlation for Workers’ Share in Neighborhoods








Moran’s 1 0.305 0.195 0.180 0.531 0.231(7.75) (5.85) (4.62) (13.11) (5.85)
Z  statistics in parentheses.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Graph 7- Percentage of Informal Workers versus Moran’s I for the Share of Informal
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Table 9 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  Workers’ Types - Males
Variables Small Firm - Firm - Uncovered Small Firm - Firm - Covered
Uncovered Covered
Without With Without With Without With Without With
Neigh. Neigh. Neigh. Neigh. Neigh. Neigh. Neigh. Neigh.
Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect
age 0.1049** 0.1049** -0.0628** -0.0634“ 0 .1 2 0 1 “ 0.1195“ 0.1162“ 0.1158“
(15.43) (15.53) (9.37) (9.46) (13.49) (13.45) (23.49) (23.14)
[0.0071] [0.0072] [-0.0194] [-0.0194] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0193] [0.0193]
age2 -0.0008** -0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008“ -0.0008“ -0.0008“ -0.0013“ -0.0013“
(9.40) (9.47) (10.09) (10.08) (7.00) (7.13) (19.58) (19.40)
[0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [-0.0003] [-0.0003]
Primary -0.2990** -0.3028** -0.2782“ -0.2883“ 0.3104“ 0.2916“ 0.2516“ 0.2478“
Educ. (10.39) (10.82) (9.28) (9.81) (5.45) (5.13) ( 1 0 .0 0 ) (9.91)
[-0.0732] [-0.0729] [-0.0402] [-0.0409] [0.0099] [0.0093] [0.1076] [0.1082]
Second. -0.2601** -0.2796** -0.1783“ -0.2034“ 0.6653“ 0.6136“ 0.6988“ 0.6926**
Educ. (7.25) (8 .1 2 ) (4.99) (5.96) (11.82) (11.32) (25.22) (25.16)
[-0.1181] [-0.1193] [-0.0602] [-0.0617] [0.0127] [0 .0 1 1 0 ] [0.1981] [0.2014]
College -0.2667** -0.3237** 0.9221“ 0.8649“ 1.1837“ 1.0480“ 1.5359“ 1.5216“
Educ. (2.60) (3-10) (10.63) (9.88) (10.46) (9.16) (18.18) (18.31)
[-0.1828] [-0.1848] [-0.0193] [-0.0231] [0.0040] [0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0.2744] [0.2829]
#  Children 0.0502** 0.0517** 0.0715“ 0.0744** -0.0917“ -0.0811“ 0.0336“ 0.0349**
under 5 (3.35) (3.47) (4.59) (4.83) (3.59) (3.12) (2.75) (2 .8 6 )
[0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0051] [0.0053] [-0.0042] [-0.0039] [-0.0006] [-0.0008]
Household 0.8451** 0.8528** 0.6341“ 0.6435“ 1.0296“ 1.0634“ 0.9255“ 0.9305“
head (30.00) (29.94) (22.17) (22.78) (26.93) (27.81) (41.33) (41.47)
[0 .0 2 1 2 ] [0.0215] [-0.0170] [-0.0166] [0.0089] [0.0097] [0.0785] [0.0779]
Migrantes -0.0175 -0.0114 0.1434“ 0.1489“ -0.1310 -0.0945 0.0415 0.0477
Up to 2 (0.31) (0 .2 0 ) (2.78) (2.92) (1.05) (0.75) (0 .8 6 ) (0.98)
years [-0.0118] [-0.0119] [0.0164] [0.0163] [-0.0051] [-0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0041]
Migrantes 0.4564** 0.4609** 0.4943“ 0.4987“ 0.3838* 0.4214* 0.5180“ 0.5246**
2 to 5 (4.25) (4.27) (4.66) (4.72) (2.06) (2.26) (5.04) (5.11)
years [0 .0 0 2 1 ] [0.0017] [0.0067] [0.0064] [-0 .0 0 2 1 ] [-0 .0 0 1 1 ] [0.0344] [0.0346]
Migrantes 0.1741** 0.1814** 0.0677* 0.0748“ 0.2478“ 0.2796“ 0.1519“ 0.1572“
> 5 years (6.32) (6.83) (2.42) (2.75) (5.88) (6.60) (5.92) (6.14)
[0 .0 1 0 2 ] [0.0104] [-0.0089] [-0.0088] [0.0040] [0.0049] [0.0093] [0.0088]
Migrants -0.0619 -0.0580 -0.1337“ -0.1327“ 0.0123 0.0125 -0.3177“ -0.3146“
outside (1.64) (1.53) (3.27) (3.25) (0.19) (0 .2 0 ) (8 .0 0 ) (7.98)
state [0.0288] [0.0291] [0.0060] [0.0058] [0.0068] [0.0067] [-0.0631] [-0.0628]
Per capita -0 .0 0 0 1 ** -0 .0 0 0 1 ** -0 .0 0 0 1 “ -0 .0 0 0 1 “ 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 “ -0 .0 0 0 1 “
family inc. (3.32) (3.45) (3.20) (3.35) (0.51) (0 .1 1 ) (6.96) (6.97)
(others) [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ]
D1994 0.4169** 0.4339** 0.2894** 0.2924“ 0.0378 0.0581 0.1948“ 0.2030“
(6.30) (6.17) (3.86) (3.76) (0.43) (0.63) (3.35) (3.40)
[0.0456] [0.0477] [0.0069] [0.0060] [-0.0063] [-0.0059] [-0.0214] [-0 .0 2 2 0 ]
D1995 0.5524** 0.5369** 0.4124“ 0.4009“ 0.3774“ 0.3654“ 0.3364“ 0.3496“
(7.80) (7.03) (5.04) (4.60) (3.47) (3.32) (5.79) (5.71)
[0.0469] [0.0426] [0.0058] [0.0042] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0.0164] [-0 .0 1 0 2 ]
D1996 0.3096** 0.1979** 0.2291“ 0.1691* -0.0717 -0.1824+ 0.1451“ 0.1815“
(5.29) (3.07) (3.58) (2.30) (0.77) (1.78) (2.67) (3.05)
[0.0337] [0.0108] [0.0075] [0 .0 0 2 2 ] [-0.0076] [-0.0098] [-0.0148] [0.0133]
D1997 0.3210** 0.1871** 0.1937“ 0 . 1 2 2 1 -0.2685“ -0.4026“ 0.0507 0.0975+
(5.24) (2.73) (2.78) (1.55) (3.38) (4.44) (0.91) ( 1 .6 8 )
[0.05041 ro.02201 [0.00961 [0.00331 [-0.01141 [-0.01381 [-0.0349] [-0.0006]
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Cont. Table 9
D1998 0.1333* 0 . 0 0 2 0 -0.0369 -0.0960 -0.6154** -0.7318** -0.1515“ -0.1032+
(2 .0 2 ) (0.03) (0.53) (1 .2 0 ) (7.61) (8.34) (2.76) (1.81)
[0.0492] [0.0205] [0.0027] [-0 .0 0 2 2 ] [-0.0152] [-0.0170] [-0.0433] [-0.0107]
D1999 0.0459 -0.0776 0.0397 -0.0000 -0.6925** -0.7789** -0.2245“ -0.1808“
(0.73) (1 .1 1 ) (0 .6 8 ) (0 .0 0 ) (8.49) (8.82) (4.51) (3.46)
[0.0378] [0 .0 1 1 1 ] [0 .0 2 1 0 ] [0.0181] [-0.0159] [-0.0171] [-0.0550] [-0.0268]
D2000 0.1481* 0.0361 0.1552* 0.1206 -0.3993** -0.4611** -0.1274* -0.0740
(2 .2 1 ) (0.52) (2.08) (1.43) (4.31) (4.41) (2.25) (1.28)
[0.0399] [0.0139] [0.0244] [0 .0 2 1 0 ] [-0.0113] [-0.0124] [-0.0539] [-0.0248]
D2001 -0.0498 -0.1513* -0 .1 2 0 2 + -0.1661* -0.4185** -0.4851** -0.3813“ -0.3125“
(0.83) (2.27) (1.85) (2 .0 2 ) (5.66) (5.58) (7.55) (5.71)
[0.0416] [0.0165] [0.0133] [0.0074] [-0.0064] [-0.0080] [-0.0747] [-0.0430]
D2002 0.0372 -0.0520 -0.0144 -0.0612 -0.4440** -0.5049** -0.3051“ -0.2355“
(0.62) (0.81) (0 .2 0 ) (0.72) (5.53) (5.25) (5.66) (3.90)
[0.0460] [0.0229] [0.0186] [0 .0 1 2 0 ] [-0.0090] [-0.0104] [-0.0726] [-0.0418]





(0 .6 8 )










[0 .0 1 0 1 ]
0.1015
(0 .1 0 )
[0.0061]

































IN C NEIG H
(0.72)
[0.0079]
0 .0 0 2 1 **
( 1 .0 2 )
[0.0005]
0 .0 0 1 1 *
(3.20)
[-0.0089]







Wald Test for Combining 
9362** 12154** 1095**
(2.20) (3.06) 
[0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 1 ] 








H0:(BSf.UCov - 5863** 6715** 1 1 0 1 ** 1430“ 8466“ 11215“
— P column
HO.pp-ucov - - - 1938** 2330“ 2568“ 3088“
P column
H 0 . Psf-cov - - - - 1236“ 1571“
P column
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
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Table 10 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  Workers* Types - Females
Variables Small Firm - 
Uncovered

























age 0.1615** 0.1631“ -0.0123 -0.0114 0.1610“ 0.1652“ 0.1598“ 0.1600“
(22.82) (23.13) (1.56) (1.46) (16.74) (16.79) (20.73) (20.78)
[0.0129] [0.0131] [-0.0144] [-0.0144] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0154] [0.0151]
age2 -0 .0 0 1 0 ** -0 .0 0 1 0 “ 0.0006“ 0.0006“ -0.0009“ -0.0009** -0.0013“ -0.0013“
(9.86) (10.14) (5.45) (5.46) (6.49) (6.89) (10.96) (11.03)
[-0 .0 0 0 1 ] [-0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ]
Primary -0.5600** -0.5567“ 0.0179 0.0195 -0.0999+ -0.1053* 0.2304“ 0.2242“
Educ. (19.28) (2 0 .0 0 ) (0.50) (0.54) (17 9 ) (2.03) (7.20) (7.09)
[-0.1383] [-0.1369] [0.0083] [0.0087] [-0.0019] [-0 .0 0 2 0 ] [0.1243] [0.1224]
Second. -0.9730** -0.9797“ 0.1497“ 0.1460“ -0.0234 -0.0485 0.8253“ 0.8119“
Educ. (25.35) (27.10) (3.59) (3.37) (0.37) (0.90) (22.24) (22.48)
[-0.2848] [-0.2842] [0.0024] [0.0030] [-0.0062] [-0.0068] [0.3037] [0.3021]
College -1.5989** -1.6456“ 0.8245“ 0.8098“ -0.3549“ -0.4648“ 1.5798“ 1.5527“
Educ. (19.16) (2 0 .1 0 ) (9.86) (9.38) (3-17) (4.36) (22.77) (21.98)
[-0.3172] [-0.3179] [0.0005] [0.0016] [-0.0322] [-0.0329] [0.4220] [0.4208]
#  Children 0.0348** 0.0355“ -0.1158“ -0.1155“ -0.1383“ -0.1330“ -0.1266“ -0.1246“
under 5 (2.77) (2.89) (5.90) (5.91) (5.30) (5.04) (9.62) (9.45)
[0.0296] [0.0294] [-0.0062] [-0.0063] [-0.0037] [-0.0034] [-0.0273] [-0.0270]
Household 0.1228** 0.1241“ 0.0917* 0.0904* 0.1711“ 0.1768“ 0.0240 0.0238
head (3.25) (3.29) (2.24) (2 .2 2 ) (3.76) (3.85) (0.71) (0.70)
[0.0180] [0.0183] [0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0049] [0.0051] [-0.0170] [-0.0173]
Migrantes 0.2667“ 0.2597“ -0.1332+ -0.1450* -0.1094 -0.0781 -0.3827“ -0.3852“
Up to 2 (4.29) (4.36) (1.89) (2 .1 0 ) (0.79) (0.55) (6.73) (6.79)
years [0.1180] [0.1165] [-0.0086] [-0.0094] [-0.0026] [-0 .0 0 1 1 ] [-0.1134] [-0.1132]
Migrantes 0.3685“ 0.3570“ -0.0133 -0.0252 0.4974* 0.5243* 0.0650 0.0684
2 to 5 (3.32) (3.27) (0 .1 1 ) (0 .2 1 ) (2.39) (2-49) (0 .6 6 ) (0.70)
years [0.0664] [0.0631] [-0.0189] [-0.0197] [0.0170] [0.0185] [-0.0431] [-0.0409]
Migrantes 0.3578“ 0.3537“ -0.0044 -0.0138 0.3569“ 0.3846“ 0.0352 0.0357
> 5 years (11.07) (11.79) (0.13) (0.40) (7.93) (8.56) (1.46) (1.46)
[0.0696] [0.0685] [-0.0160] [-0.0169] [0.0099] [0 .0 1 1 1 ] [-0.0446] [-0.0440]
Migrants 0.0308 0.0263 -0.2559“ -0.2579“ 0.0557 0.0488 -0.4932“ -0.4890“
outside (0.75) (0.67) (4.74) (4.85) (0.79) (0.73) (11.94) (11.91)
state [0.0761] [0.0749] [-0.0073] [-0.0073] [0 .0 1 2 2 ] [0.0117] [-0.1072] [-0.1057]
Per capita -0 .0 0 0 1 “ -0 .0 0 0 1 “ 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 * 0 .0 0 0 0 + -0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 0 0
family inc. (2.71) (2.79) (0.07) (0.06) (2.27) (1 9 1 ) (1.04) (1.16)
(others) [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ]
D1994 0.1370* 0.1460* 0.1923* 0.1932* 0.0611 0.0945 0.0827 0.0908
(2.05) (2 .0 1 ) (2.45) (2.38) (0.51) (0.74) (1.23) (1.31)
[0.0116] [0 .0 1 2 0 ] [0 .0 1 0 2 ] [0.0094] [-0.0018] [-0.0006] [-0.0073] [-0.0072]
D1995 0.2897“ 0.2591“ 0.3403“ 0.3256“ 0.3832** 0.3785“ 0.2030“ 0.2172“
(4.23) (3.44) (4.06) (3.76) ' (2.81) (2 .6 8 ) (2.96) (3.02)
[0.0190] [0 .0 1 1 1 ] [0 .0 1 2 2 ] [0.0113] [0.0073] [0.0073] [-0 .0 1 1 2 ] [-0.0031]
D1996 0.2150“ 0.1099+ 0.2063“ 0.1845* 0.0411 -0.0343 0.0978+ 0.1295*
(3.61) (1.73) (2.95) (2.43) (0.41) (0.35) (1.71) (2.19)
[0.0267] [0 .0 0 1 2 ] [0.0080] [0.0087] [-0.0041] [-0.0060] [-0.0142] [0.0093]
D1997 0.1036 -0.0070 0.0189 0.0138 -0.1627 -0.2291* -0.0375 0.0036
(1.50) (0 .1 0 ) (0 .2 1 ) (0.15) (1.46) (2-04) (0.53) (0.05)
[0.02941 ro.ooo5i [0.0004] [0.00251 [-0.00751 r-0.00911 [-0.02041 [0.0049]
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Cont. Table 10
D1998 -0.0217 -0.1235+ -0.1431 + -0.1323 -0.3213** -0.3479** -0.2117“ -0.1607*
(0.33) (1.74) (1.77) (1.45) (3.12) (3.20) (3.28) (2.24)
[0.0317] [0.0025] [-0.0028] [-0 .0 0 0 1 ] [-0.0086] [-0.0089] [-0.0362] [-0.0115]
D1999 -0.0566 -0.1521* -0.0558 -0.0410 -0.2299* -0.2348* -0.3154“ -0.2594**
(0.95) (2.26) (0 .8 6 ) (0.57) (2.26) (2 .2 1 ) (6.17) (4.48)
[0.0320] [0.0036] [0.0109] [0.0138] [-0.0034] [-0.0031] [-0.0606] [-0.0369]
D2000 -0.0750 -0.1516* 0.0702 0.1045 -0.0799 -0.0430 -0.2299“ -0.1545*
(1.26) (2 .2 1 ) (0.92) (1.19) (0.75) (0.39) (4.09) (2.55)
[0.0104] [-0.0170] [0.0204] [0.0236] [0 .0 0 1 2 ] [0.0025] [-0.0465] [-0 .0 2 2 2 ]
D2001 -0.3548** -0.4138** -0.3247** -0.2744** -0.2579* -0.2094+ -0.6387“ -0.5538“
(6.09) (6 .0 2 ) (4.08) (3.20) (2.42) (1.84) (10.83) (8 .0 2 )
[0.0134] [-0 .0 1 1 2 ] [0.0079] [0.0116] [0.0066] [0.0080] [-0.0879] [-0.0654]
D2002 -0.3004** -0.3340** -0.2945** -0.2270* -0.1385 -0.0772 -0.5939“ -0.5034“
(4.83) (4.55) (3.65) (2.46) (1.28) (0.65) (8 .8 6 ) (6.52)
[0.0173] [-0.0035] [0.0065] [0.0107] [0.0106] [0 .0 1 2 1 ] [-0.0871] [-0.0670]







































0 . 0 2 0 2
Region 6




























Wald Test for 
9362** 12154**
(1.56) (0.07) 
[-0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] 
Combining Labor Force States (Chi-Square value] 
1095** 1331** 3617** 4387**
I
6308“
(1 3 8 )
[-0 .0 0 0 2 ]
7647**
— P column
H 0 .P s f.UCOv - - 5863** 6715** 1 1 0 1 ** 1430“ 8466“ 11215“
— P column
H O -P f-ucov - - - - 1938** 2330“ 2568“ 3088“
~  P  column
HO.Psf-cov - - - - - - 1236“ 1571“
— P column
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
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Figure 1 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -  Model Without
________________________ Neighborhood Effects -  Males________________________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0
.2 .3 .45 .67 .99 1.47 2.19 3.26 4.85
Primary
Educ. 0 0 = UNEMP
1 = SF-U CO V
2  = F-UCO V
3  =  S F-C O V








-1.6 -1.2 -.8 -.41 -.01 
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
.39 .79 1.18 1.58
Figure 2 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables 
Neighborhood Effects -  Males
-  Model With
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.2 .3 .45 .87 .99 1.47 2.19 3.26 4.85
Primary
Educ. I  0
%
0 = UNEMP 
1 =  SF-UCOV
2  = F-UCO V
3  =  SF-C O V








-1.6 -1.2 -.8 -.41 -.01 
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
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Figure 3 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -
__________ Model Without Neighborhood Effects -  Females__________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.2 .3 .45 .67 .99 1.47 2.19 3.28 4.85
Primary
Educ.







Educ. 3 0 2
-1.6 -1.2 -.8 -.41 -.01 .39 .79 1.18 1.58
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
0 = I
1 = SF-U C O V
2  = F-UCO V
3  = S F-C O V
4  =  F -C O V
Figure 4 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 





0  = UNEMP
1
1 -  S F-U C O V
Secondary
Educ.
3  2 4 2  = F-U C O V
3  = S F-C O V  
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Figure 5 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Family Characteristics -
___________ Model Without Neighborhood Effects -  Males___________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
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Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
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Figure 6 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Family Characteristics -  
_________  Model With Neighborhood Effects -  Males_____________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.87 1.01 1.17 1.37 1.59 1.84 2.14 2.49 2.9
#  Children 
under 5










4 =  F-COV
-.14 .01 .16 .31 .46 
Log it Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
.61 .76 .91 1.06
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Figure 7 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Family Characteristics -
______________Model Without Neighborhood -  Females______________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.87 1.01 1.17 1.36 1.58 1.84 2.14 2.48 2.89
#  Children 
under 5 1 ° i
0 = UNEMP
1 = S F-U C O V
2  = F-UCO V
Household
head
%  2 ^ X 3 3  = S F-C O V4  =  F-C O V
-.14 .01 .18 .31 .48 .81 .78 .91 
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
1.06
Figure 8 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Family Characteristics -  
Model With Neighborhood Effects -  Females
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0  
.87 1.01 1.17 1.38 1.58 1.84 2.14 2.48 2.89
#  Children 
under 5
° i 0  = UNEMP
1 = SF-U CO V
2  = F-UCO V
3  = S F-C O V
4  = F-C O VHousehold
head
^ 4
-.14 .01 .16 .31 .46 .61 .76 .91 
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
1.06
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Figure 9 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Migration Variables -
__________ Model Without Neighborhood Effects -  Males__________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0
.61 .7 .79 .89 1.02
Migrantes 
Up to 2  years
Migrantes 
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Figure 10 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Migration Variables -  
____________ Model With Neighborhood Effects -  Males_____________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.61 .7 .79 .9 1.02 1.16 1.31 1.49 1.69
Migrantes 
U p to 2  years
Migrants 
outside state
Migrantes ® 0  = UNEMP
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Figure 11 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Migration Variables -
__________ Model Without Neighborhood Effects -  Females__________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0
.61 .69 .79 .89 1.01 1.15 1.31 1.48 1.68
Migrantes 4  
Up to 2  years
1
Migrantes 
2 to 5 years V*.
Migrantes 
> 5 years K f
Migrants 4 2 &outside state
-.49 -.37 -.24 -.11 .01
Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
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0  = UNEMP
1 = S F-U C O V
2  = F-UCO V
3 = S F-C O V
4  = F -C O V
Figure 12 - Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Migration Variables -  
___________ Model With Neighborhood Effects -  Females___________
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
.61 .7 .79 .9 1.02 1.15 1.31 1.49 1.69
Migrantes ^  
Up to 2  years
1
Migrantes 





Migrants 4  
outside state
(M
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Logit Coefficient Scale Relative to Category 0
0 = UNEMP 
1 =  S F-U C O V  
2 =  F-UCO V
3  = S F-C O V
4  =  F -C O V
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Table 11 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  
Social Interaction Variables - Males
Variables Small Firm Firm Small Firm Firm
Uncovered Uncovered Covered Covered
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
%SF-UCOV 0.0257** 0.0201** 0.0129* 0.0070 0.0235** 0.0197* 0.0053 0.0038
(neigh) (4.32) (3.24) (2.31) ( 1 .1 0 ) (2.84) (2.29) (1.07) (0.77)
[0.0035] [0.0028] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0.0004] [0.0004] [-0.0028] [-0 .0 0 2 1 ]
%F-UCOV 0.0040 -0.0061 0.0164* 0.0058 0.0113 0.0017 -0 . 0 0 2 0 -0.0048
(neigh) (0.51) (0.80) (1.97) (0.72) (0.94) (0.15) (0.33) (0.83)
[0.0003] [-0.0008] [0.0019] [0.0012] [0.0003] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0 .0 0 2 2 ] [-0.0009]
%SF-COV 0.0358** 0.0135 0.0346** 0.0179+ 0.0845** 0.0298+ 0.0106 0.0077
(neigh) (3.72) (1.36) (3.41) (1.69) (6.51) (1.91) (1.41) (0 .8 8 )
[0.0035] [0.0007] [0.0019] [0 .0 0 1 1 ] [0.0021] [0.0006] [-0.0051] [-0.0013]
% F-COV 0.0126* -0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0130** 0.0018 0.0189* 0.0062 0.0067 0.0060
(neigh) (2.45) (0.16) (2.74) (0.30) (2.44) (0.75) (1.36) (1.12)
[0.0009] [-0 .0 0 1 0 ] [0.0006] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0.00031 [0 . 0 0 0 1 1 [-0.0009] [0.0014]
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
Table 12 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  
Social Interaction Variables - Females
Variables Small Firm Firm Small Firm Firm
Uncovered Uncovered Covered Covered
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
%SF-UCOV 0.0493** 0.0292“ 0.0328“ 0.0196“ 0.0474“ 0.0362“ 0 .0 1 2 1 * 0.0078
(neigh) (6.09) (3.92) (4.50) (2.72) (4.13) (3.41) (2.09) (1 .2 2 )
[0.0074] [0.0042] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0 .0 0 1 0 ] [0.0009] [-0.0056] [-0.0033]
%F-UCOV 0.0240** 0.0044 0.0248* 0.0096 0.0151 0.0081 0.0039 -0 . 0 0 1 1
(neigh) (2 .6 6 ) (0.52) (2.45) (0.95) (1.09) (0.60) (0.47) (0.13)
[0.0037] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0008] [0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0.0003] [-0.0035] [-0.0014]
%SF-COV 0.0659“ 0.0308“ 0.0382“ 0.0306* 0.1334** 0.0753“ 0.0133 0.0158
(neigh) (7.03) (3.17) (4.06) (2.51) (9.39) (5.28) (1.49) (1.60)
[0.0094] [0.0026] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0.0008] [0.0044] [0.0023] [-0.0092] [-0.0028]
%F-COV 0 .0 2 0 1 “ 0.0054 0.0205“ 0.0137+ 0.0213+ 0.0170 0.0159* 0.0120+
(neigh) (2.67) (0.73) (3.10) (1.78) (1.89) (1.62) (2.49) (1.66)
[0.0013] [-0 .0 0 1 1 ] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0.0004] [0.0000] [0.0013]
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
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Table 13 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  Males (Model 1)
Variables Small Firm - Firm - Uncovered Small Firm - Firm - Covered
Uncovered Covered
age 0.1054“ -0.0630“ 0 .1 2 0 0 “ 0.1159“
(15.59) (9.41) (13.46) (23.21)
[0.0073] [-0.0194] [0.0015] [0.0192]
age2 -0.0008“ 0.0008“ -0.0008“ -0.0013“
(9.46) (10.08) (7.06) (19.46)
[0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [-0.0003]
Primary -0.2941“ -0.2822“ 0.2994“ 0.2474“
Educ. (10.47) (9.59) (5.19) (9.87)
[-0.0718] [-0.0405] [0.0095] [0.1066]
Second. -0.2569“ -0.1883“ 0.6380“ 0.6908“
Educ. (7.28) (5.48) (11.62) (24.72)
[-0.1164] [-0.0606] [0.0118] [0.1972]
College -0.2795“ 0.8942“ 1.1123“ 1.5201“
Educ. (2.71) (10.53) (9.62) (18.28)
[-0.1823] [-0.0205] [0 .0 0 2 1 ] [0.2763]
#  Children 0.0495“ 0.0726“ -0.0872“ 0.0345**
under 5 (3.33) (4.70) (3.35) (2.84)
[0.0034] [0.0052] [-0.0041] [-0.0005]
Household 0.8457“ 0.6390“ 1.0452“ 0.9294“
head (29.88) (22.56) (27.20) (41.09)
[0.0206] [-0.0168] [0.0093] [0.0789]
Migrantes -0.0140 0.1477“ -0.1131 0.0445
Up to 2 (0.25) (2.87) (0.90) (0.92)
years [-0.0118] [0.0165] [-0.0047] [0.0040]
Migrantes 0.4575“ 0.4969“ 0.4002* 0.5206“
2 to 5 (4.21) (4.68) (2.13) (5.06)
years [0.0018] [0.0067] [-0.0016] [0.0344]
Migrantes 0.1747“ 0.0709* 0.2592“ 0.1544“
> 5 years (6.53) (2.55) (6.09) (6.08)
[0.0098] [-0.0088] [0.0043] [0.0094]
Migrants -0.0580 -0.1331“ 0.0154 -0.3162“
outside (1.54) (3.26) (0.24) (7.90)
state [0.0293] [0.0058] [0.0068] [-0.0632]
Per capita -0 .0 0 0 1 “ -0 .0 0 0 1 “ 0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 “
family inc. (3.37) (3.32) (0.23) (7.06)
(others) [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ]
D1994 0.4335“ 0.2939** 0.0631 0.2057“
(6 .1 2 ) (3-70) (0-67) (3-43)
[0.0471] [0.0060] [-0.0058] [-0.0214]
D1995 0.5380“ 0.3992“ 0.3767“ 0.3486“
(6.87) (4.47) (3.21) (5.59)
[0.0429] [0.0040] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [-0.0106]
D1996 0.2477“ 0.1874“ -0.1248 0.1501*
(3.79) (2.61) (1.26) (2.47)
[0.0230] [0.0045] [-0.0084] [-0.0025]
D1997 0.2639“ 0.1563* -0.3120“ 0.0557
(4.02) (2 .1 0 ) (3.83) (0.95)
[0.0402] [0.0071] [-0 .0 1 2 0 1 [-0.02371
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Cont Table 13
D1998 0.0959 -0.0471 -0.6019** -0.1397*
(1.38) (0.64) (7.26) (2.47)
[0.0406] [0 .0 0 2 2 ] [-0.0147] [-0.0353]
D1999 0.0170 0.0557 -0.6380** -0.2058**
(0.25) (0.91) (7.58) (3.90)
[0.0289] [0.0229] [-0.0147] [-0.0487]
D2000 0.1454* 0.1888* -0.3075** -0.0974
(2.09) (2.39) (3.20) (1.63)
[0.0338] [0.0266] [-0.0094] [-0.0496]
D2001 -0.0358 -0.0988 -0.3416** -0.3478**
(0.57) (1.38) (4.32) (6.34)
[0.0391] [0.0131] [-0.0048] [-0.0705]
D2002 0.0686 0.0132 -0.3789** -0.2705**
(1.14) (0.17) (4.11) (4.71)
rO.0467] [0.0184] [-0.00801 [-0.0703]
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
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Table 14 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -  Females (Model 1)
Variables Small Firm - 
Uncovered
Firm - Uncovered Small Firm - 
Covered
Firm - Covered
age 0.1626** -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0116
(22.97) (1.49) (1.49) (1.49)
[0.0131] [-0.0144] [0.0019] [0.0152]
age2 -0 .0 0 1 0 ** 0.0006“ 0.0006“ 0.0006**
(1 0 .0 0 ) (5.44) (5.44) (5.44)
[-0 .0 0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 2 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [-0 .0 0 0 2 ]
Primary -0.5496** 0.0209 0.0209 0.0209
Educ. (19.40) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58)
[-0.1357] [0.0087] [-0 .0 0 2 0 ] [0.1213]
Second. -0.9603** 0.1500“ 0.1500“ 0.1500“
Educ. (26.14) (3.55) (3.55) (3.55)
[-0.2812] [0.0029] [-0.0066] [0.2995]
College -1.6100** 0.8093“ 0.8093“ 0.8093“
Educ. (19.39) (9.46) (9.46) (9.46)
[-0.3166] [0.0013] [-0.0327] [0.4197]
#  Children 0.0329** -0.1161“ -0.1161“ -0.1161“
under 5 (2.65) (5.94) (5.94) (5.94)
[0.0290] [-0.0063] [-0.0035] [-0.0267]
Household 0.1236** 0.0923* 0.0923* 0.0923*
head (3.28) (2.27) (2.27) (2.27)
[0.0180] [0.0026] [0.0049] [-0.0169]
Migrantes 0.2664** -0.1354+ -0.1354+ -0.1354+
Up to 2 (4.39) (1.94) (1.94) (1.94)
years [0.1177] [-0.0089] [-0.0019] [-0.1135]
Migrantes 0.3635** -0.0162 -0.0162 -0.0162
2 to 5 (3.32) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
years [0.0646] [-0.0192] [0.0183] [-0.0423]
Migrantes 0.3563** -0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0055
> 5 years (11.82) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
[0.0687] [-0.0163] [0.0104] [-0.0439]
Migrants 0.0300 -0.2576** -0.2576“ -0.2576“
outside (0.75) (4.80) (4.80) (4.80)
state [0.0760] [-0.0074] [0 .0 1 2 0 ] [-0.1068]
Per capita -0 .0 0 0 1 ** -0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 . 0 0 0 0
family inc. (2.73) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 ) (0 .0 1 )
(others) [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 0 ]
D1994 0.1503+ 0.1993* 0.1993* 0.1993*
(1.95) (2.41) (2.41). (2.41)
[0.0119] [0.0096] [-0.0005] [-0.0069]
D1995 0.2282“ 0.3005“ 0.3005“ 0.3005“
(2.84) (3.44) (3.44) (3.44)
[0.0061] [0 .0 1 0 2 ] [0.0073] [0.0013]
D1996 0.0598 0.1057 0.1057 0.1057
(0.87) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48)
[-0.0017] [0.0044] [-0.0064] [0.0119]
D1997 -0.0425 -0.0747 -0.0747 -0.0747
(0.56) (0 .8 6 ) (0 .8 6 ) (0 .8 6 )
[0 .0 0 2 1 ] [-0.00281 [-0.00931 ro.00351
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D1998 -0.1294+ -0.2082* -0.3511** -0.1995**
(1.81) (2.47) (3.24) (3.01)
[0.0088] [-0.0055] [-0.0081] [-0.0168]
D1999 -0.1460* -0.0990 -0.2175* -0.2871**
(2.32) (1.52) (2.16) (5.53)
[0 .0 1 0 2 ] [0.0087] [-0.0018] [-0.0418]
D2000 -0.1246+ 0.0574 -0.0151 -0.1769**
(1.85) (0.73) (0.14) (3.05)
[-0.0072] [0.0183] [0.0040] [-0.0290]
D2001 -0.3853** -0.3326** -0.1975+ -0.5831**
(5.83) (4.16) (1.77) (9.15)
[0 .0 0 0 0 ] [0.0058] [0.0091] [-0.0730]
D2002 -0.2850** -0.2626** -0.0817 -0.5240**
(3.90) (3.22) (0 .6 6 ) (7.37)
[0.01081 [0.00611 [0.01171 [-0.07551
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
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Figure 13 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables •
Model 1 - Males
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Figure 14 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -  
Model 1 - Females
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Figure 15 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -













-.01 -.01 o o
Change in Predicted Probability
.01 .01 .01
0 -U M E M P
1 = SF-U C O V
2  = F-U C O V
3  = S F-C O V
4  = F -C O V
Figure 16 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -  
Model 2 -  Females
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Table 15 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -
Self-Employed as Small Firm Workers - Males (Model 2)
Variables Small Firm - 
Uncovered
Firm - Uncovered Small Firm - 
Covered
Firm - Covered
age 0.1628** -0.0612“ 0.2337“ 0.1213“
(22.02) (9.10) (20.58) (24.34)
[0.0153] [-0.0223] [0.0023] [0.0157]
age2 -0.0015** 0.0008“ -0.0019“ -0.0014“
(15.90) (9.74) (14.16) (20.68)
[-0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0000] [-0.0002]
Primary -0.2721** -0.2868“ 0.4848“ 0.2581“
Educ. (8.85) (9.76) (7.25) (10.19)
[-0.0629] [-0.0458] [0.0077] [0.1077]
Second. -0.2079** -0.2040“ 0.9108“ 0.7062“
Educ. (5.95) (5.97) (15.33) (25.53)
[-0.1003] [-0.0697] [0.0103] [0.1974]
College -0.2913** 0.6093“ 1.2893“ 1.4923“
Educ. (2.74) (6.93) (10.19) (18.00)
[-0.1593] [-0.0516] [0.0045] [0.2858]
#  Children 0.0608** 0.0739“ -0.1853“ 0.0348“
under 5 (4.11) (4.78) (5.71) (2.84)
[0.0047] [0.0052] [-0.0035] [-0.0018]
Household 0.9404“ 0.6345“ 1.2679“ 0.9299“
head (33.46) (22.69) (24.26) (41.89)
[0.0346] [-0.0203] [0.0075] [0.0778]
Migrantes -0.1103+ 0.1476“ -0.3439* 0.0311
Up to 2 (1.92) . (2.92) (2.19) (0.65)
years [-0.0245] [0.0212] [-0.0048] [0.0095]
Migrantes 0.4690“ 0.4991“ 0.5376* 0.5361“
2 to 5 (4.19) (4.72) (2.21) (5.19)
years [0.0010] [0.0052] [0.0012] [0.0375]
Migrantes 0.1890“ 0.0780“ 0.3539“ 0.1586“
> 5 years (6.77) (2.86) (6.87) (6.20)
[0.0108] [-0.0087] [0.0036] [0.0104]
Migrants -0.0422 -0.1354“ 0.1469* -0.3102“
outside (1.07) (3.34) (2.04) (7.83)
state [0.0297] [0.0060] [0.0058] [-0.0644]
Per capita -0.0001“ -0.0001“ 0.0000+ -0.0001“
family inc. (3.43) (3.38) (1.88) (7.00)
(others) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
D1994 0.4594“ 0.2904“ 0.1180 0.2077“
(6.45) (3.75) (1.22) (3.49)
[0.0472] [0.0054] [-0.0020] [-0.0230]
D1995 0.5350“ 0.4019“ 0.4586“ 0.3458“
(6.86) (4.61) (3.77) (5.69)
[0.0389] [0.0058] [0.0016] [-0.0085]
D1996 0.2203** 0.1688* -0.1475 0.1814“
(3.32) (2.29) (1.29) (3.04)
[0.0124] [0.0009] [-0.0044] [0.0095]
D1997 0.1989“ 0.1229 -0.5268“ 0.0973+
(2.80) (1.56) (5.25) (1.68)
[0.0207] [0.0028] [-0.00791 [-0.00351
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D1998 -0.0260 -0.0919 -0.9065** -0.1064+
(0.36) (1.15) (10.41) (1.88)
[0.0123] [-0.0013] [-0.0096] [-0.0117]
D1999 -0.1231 + -0.0007 -0.9885** -0.1840**
(1.76) (0.01) (8.63) (3.55)
[0.0012] [0.0199] [-0.0099] [-0.0274]
D2000 0.0082 0.1145 -0.6970** -0.0765
(0.11) (1.36) (5.44) (1.32)
[0.0075] [0.0221] [-0.0082] [-0.0246]
D2001 -0.2059** -0.1676* -0.7862** -0.3194**
(3.01) (2.04) (7.29) (5.85)
[0.0064] [0.0103] [-0.0071] [-0.0408]
D2002 -0.0667 -0.0649 -0.7024** -0.2371**
(1.02) (0.77) (6.35) (3.95)
[0.0180] [0.0129] [-0.0071] [-0.0429]
Region 1 -0.0071 -0.0435 -0.0951 -0.0660+
(0.10) (0.69) (0.90) (1.66)
[0.0076] [-0.0001] [-0.0008] [-0.0118]
Region 3 0.0191 0.0052 -0.2796** -0.0540
(0.30) (0.08) (3.05) (1.44)
[0.0097] [0.0047] [-0.0037] [-0.0139]
Region 4 0.0931 0.1190* -0.0570 0.0557
(1.47) (2.01) (0.70) (1.28)
[0.0060] [0.0081] [-0.0018] [-0.0046]
Region 5 -0.0051 0.0165 -0.2675** -0.0381
(0.08) (0.25) (3.12) (0.98)
[0.0035] [0.0057] [-0.0036] [-0.0083]
Region 6 -0.0625 -0.0770 -0.3677* -0.0977**
(0.97) (1.03) (2.43) (2.60)
[0.0035] [0.0003] [-0.0041] [-0.0094]
INCNEIGH 0.0018** 0.0011* 0.0019* -0.0009+
(3.56) (2.24) (2.38) (1.93)
[0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0000] [-0.0005]
%SF- 0.0208** 0.0068 0.0148 0.0039
UCOV (3.24) (1.06) (1.30) (0.78)
(neigh)
[0.0028] [-0.0001] [0.0001] [-0.0019]
% F-UCOV -0.0031 0.0053 0.0081 -0.0041
(neigh) (0.40) (0.66) (0.61) (0.71)
[-0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0002] [-0.0012]
% SF-COV 0.0153 0.0170 0.0327+ 0.0075
(neigh) (1.55) (1.60) (1.80) (0.86)
[0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0004] [-0.0013]
%F-COV 0.0014 0.0014 0.0106 0.0064
(neigh) (0.21) (0.24) (0.95) (1.20)
[0.0004] [0.00011 ro.ooooi r-o.ooo5i
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Wald Test for Combining Labor Force States (Chi-Square value)
HO.Punemp —
(3 column 9 1 5 2 * *  1 6 1 1 * *  6 8 6 6 * *
HO.Psf-UCOV —
P column 6 9 2 7 * *  2 5 6 3 * *
H0:pF.,ucov
A column
P column 5 0 3 2
H0.psf.cov
Robust t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
9 9 7 4 * *
8 3 2 2 * *
7 5 2 5 * *
3 4 2 8 * *
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Table 16 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients and Marginal Effects -
Self-Employed as Small Firm Workers - Females (Model 2)
Variables Small Firm - Firm - Uncovered Small Firm - Firm - Covered
Uncovered Covered
age 0.2885** -0.0024 0.3547** 0.1764“
(40.12) (0.32) (21.79) (23.46)
[0.0305] [-0.0198] [0.0030] [0.0095]
age2 -0.0024** 0.0005** -0.0027** -0.0015“
(23.84) (4.47) (13.50) (13.25)
[-0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0000] [-0.0001]
Primary -0.2322** 0.0425 0.3634** 0.2935“
Educ. (7.80) (1.14) (4.97) (8.87)
[-0.0719] [-0.0084] [0.0041] [0.0921]
Second. -0.5451** 0.1690** 0.4036** 0.8781“
Educ. (13.67) (3.79) (6.59) (23.14)
[-0.1835] [-0.0235] [0.0005] [0.2568]
College -1.3444** 0.6948** 0.0806 1.5735“
Educ. (15.47) (7.92) (0.60) (22.27)
[-0.2304] [-0.0308] [-0.0092] [0.3657]
# Children 0.0274* -0.1190** -0.1595** -0.1288“
under 5 (1.98) (5.94) (4.43) (9.50)
[0.0232] [-0.0057] [-0.0013] [-0.0269]
Household 0.1771** 0.0949* 0.3011** 0.0378
head (4.53) (2.34) (5.19) (1.10)
[0.0239] [0.0022] [0.0036] [-0.0186]
Migrantes -0.1174 -0.1583* -0.5725* -0.4406“
Up to 2 (1.59) (2.28) (2.43) (7.44)
years [0.0331] [0.0121] [-0.0042] [-0.0832]
Migrantes 0.2858* -0.0389 -0.2627 0.0371
2 to 5 (2.16) (0.33) (0.65) (0.37)
years [0.0519] [-0.0143] [-0.0044] [-0.0215]
Migrantes 0.3876** -0.0178 0.4646** 0.0298
> 5 years (11.27) (0.50) (7.37) (1.14)
[0.0672] [-0.0160] [0.0058] [-0.0403]
Migrants 0.0772+ -0.2649** 0.1817* -0.4795“
outside (1.88) (4.94) (2.26) (11.63)
state [0.0769] [-0.0059] [0.0072] [-0.1133]
Per capita -0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000
family inc. (2.75) (0.00) (1.99) (1.32)
(others) [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
D1994 0.1340+ 0.1938* 0.0650 0.0852
(1.83) (2.39) (0.44) (1.25)
[0.0084] [0.0124] [-0.0005] [-0.0063]
D1995 0.2645** 0.3341** 0.4592** 0.2294“
(3.62) (3.91) (2.83) (3.26)
[0.0095] [0.0143] [0.0039] [0.0026]
D1996 0.0817 0.1871* -0.2081 0.1293*
(1.22) (2.45) (1-58) (2.15)
[-0.0049] [0.0108] [-0.0042] [0.0129]
D1997 -0.0744 0.0191 -0.6092** -0.0017
(0.96) (0.20) (4.15) (0.02)
[-0.01171 [0.00531 [-0.0072] [0.0102]
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D1998 -0.2688** -0.1290 -0.8104** -0.1834*
(3.50) (1.42) (5.44) (2.50)
[-0.0211] [0.0057] [-0.0076] [-0.0046]
D1999 -0.3458** -0.0443 -0.9334** -0.2872**
(4.51) (0.62) (6.27) (5.03)
[-0.0259] [0.0246] [-0.0082] [-0.0276]
D2000 -0.3858** 0.0975 -0.7718** -0.1818**
(5.30) (1.10) (5.05) (3.06)
[-0.0469] [0.0362] [-0.0073] [-0.0081]
D2001 -0.6678** -0.2827** -0.9134** -0.5930**
(8.76) (3.31) (6.57) (8.59)
[-0.0432] [0.0243] [-0.0057] [-0.0583]
D2002 -0.6198** -0.2338* -0.7640** -0.5375**
(7.95) (2.52) (6.07) (7.05)
[-0.0422] [0.0252] [-0.0045] [-0.0528]
Region 1 -0.2948** -0.1846** -0.1030 -0.0083
(4.86) (2.98) (0.95) (0.15)
[-0.0440] [-0.0112] [-0.0002] [0.0413]
Region 3 -0.0525 -0.0037 -0.2047 0.0548
(0.77) (0.05) (1.57) (0.84)
[-0.0145] [-0.0019] [-0.0030] [0.0211]
Region 4 0.0417 0.1002 0.0019 0.1539**
(0.69) (1.61) (0.02) (2.59)
[-0.0126] [0.0004] [-0.0014] [0.0277]
Region 5 0.0381 0.1504* -0.2710* 0.0219
(0.59) (2.53) (2.15) (0.36)
[0.0007] [0.0149] [-0.0042] [-0.0063]
Region 6 -0.0626 -0.0756 -0.1797 -0.0037
(1.03) (1.33) (1.32) (0.06)
[-0.0079] [-0.0058] [-0.0022] [0.0117]
INCNEIGH 0.0010* -0.0009 0.0012 -0.0006
(2.16) (1.61) (1.48) (1.19)
[0.0003] [-0.0001] [0.0000] [-0.0002]
%SF- 0.0261** 0.0193** 0.0354** 0.0069
UCOV (3.38) (2.69) (3.08) (1.07)
(neigh) [0.0032] [0.0009] [0.0003] [-0.0026]
%F-UCOV 0.0070 0.0107 0.0243 0.0004
(neigh) (0.76) (1.05) (1.59) (0.04)
[0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0003] [-0.0015]
%SF-COV 0.0253* 0.0322** 0.0742** 0.0152
(neigh) (2.35) (2.61) (4.14) (1.53)
[0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0008] [-0.0015]
%F-COV 0.0059 0.0137+ 0.0208+ 0.0117
(neigh) (0.72) (1.77) (1.91) (1.58)
[-0.0007] [0.0006] [0.00021 [0.0013]
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Cont. Table 16
Wald Test for Combining Labor Force States (Chi-Square value)
HO. Punemp —
P column 1 3 9 8 5 **  1 3 0 0 **  5 7 3 5 **
HO-Psf-ucov =
P column 9 9 7 8 **  1 0 9 9 **
H O .P f-ucOV
P column 2 6 2 5 *
H 0 .P s f .c o y
1 column
Robust t statistics in parentheses +  significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Marginal evaluated at population m eans are given in square brackets.
Unemployed is the base category.
7 3 5 6 **
1 3 0 8 9 **
3 2 7 7 **
2 0 0 9 **
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Figure 17 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -
Self-Employed as Small Firm Worker -
Model 2 -  Males
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0 
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Figure 18 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -  
Self-Employed as Small Firm Worker - 
Model 2 -  Females
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 0
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Figure 19 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -  
Self-Employed as Small Firm Worker - 
Model 2 -  Males
%  S F - U C O V
(neighborhood)
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(neighborhood)
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(neighborhood)
4 0 3 1
« 3 2
3 4
-.01 -.01 0 0 
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3 = S F-C O V
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Figure 20 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -  
Self-Employed as Small Firm Worker - 
Model 2 -  Females
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4  = F-C O V
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Figure 21 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -
Models With (Panel A) and Without (Panel B) Unemployed Workers -  Males
Panel A  -  Model 2  Incluoing unemployed w o rkers  
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 1
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Panel B - Model 2 Excluding Unemployed Workers 
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 1 
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Figure 22 -  Logit Coefficients and Odds Ratio for Educational Variables -
Models With (Panel A) and Without (Panel B) Unemployed Workers -  Females
Pane) A  -  Model 2  Including Unemployed W orkers  
Factor Change Scale Relative to Category 1
1 1.49 2 .22 3.32 4.95 7.38 11.01 16.42 24.49
0  = UNEMP
1 = S F-U C O V
2  =  F-U CO V
3  =  S F-C O V
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Table 17 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients -
Excluding Unemployed Workers -  Males (Model 2)
Firm - Uncovered Small Firm -  
Covered
Firm - Covered
age -0.1703** 0.0143+ 0.0088
(28.75) (1.76) (1.50)
age2 0.0017** 0.0001 -0.0004**
(23.44) (0.58) (6.07)
Primary Educ. 0.0223 0.5917** 0.5490**
(1.07) (10.99) (23.97)
Second. Educ. 0.0854** 0.8918** 0.9704**
(2.94) (19.41) (42.34)
College Educ. 1.1967** 1.3716** 1.8420**
(14.26) (14.90) (28.61)
#  Children under 5 0.0221 + -0.1325** -0.0180+
(1.77) (5.66) (1.67)
Household head -0.2138** 0.2092** 0.0733**
(7.92) (6.00) (3.28)
Migrantes Up to 2 years 0.1458** -0.0797 0.0580
(2.95) (0.75) (1.26)
Migrantes 2 to 5 years 0.0293 -0.0404 0.0600
(0.36) (0.26) (0.95)
Migrantes > 5 years -0.1100** 0.1020* -0.0236
(4.38) (2.51) (1.03)
Migrants outside state -0.0778* 0.0729 -0.2558**
(2.10) (1.21) (6.94)
Per capita family inc. (others) -0.0000 0.0001** -0.0000*
(0.39) (2.85) (2.08)
D1994 -0.1424** -0.3719** -0.2275**
(2.66) (4.64) (4.41)
D1995 -0.1361* -0.1688+ -0.1844**
(2.49) (1.65) (3.78)
D1996 -0.0276 -0.3772** -0.0116
(0.51) (4.45) (0.25)
D1997 -0.0692 -0.5865** -0.0871 +
(1.17) (7.51) (1.77)
D1998 -0.1041 + -0.7306** -0.1029+
(1.72) (8.77) (1.96)
D1999 0.0719 -0.6982** -0.1032+
(1.18) (8.16) (1.85)
D2000 0.0847 -0.4919** -0.1063+
(1.31) (4.83) (1.91)
D2001 -0.0154 -0.3300** -0.1604**
(0.26) (3.43) (2.85)
D2002 -0.0046 -0.4441** -0.1737**
(0.07) (5.00) (3.55)
Region 1 -0.0301 -0.2354** -0.0508
(0.51) (3.07) (0.82)
Region 3 0.0015 -0.3716** -0.0641
(0.03) (5.42) (1.28)
Region 4 0.0163 -0.2062** -0.0450
(0.36) (3.41) (0.88)
Region 5 0.0238 -0.3105** -0.0296
(0.52) (5.02) (0.56)
Region 6 -0.0343 -0.3333** -0.0564
(0.66) (3.10) (1.03)
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Cont. Table 17
INCNEIGH -0.0010+ 0.0001 -0.0029**
(1.83) (0.18) (6.35)
% SF-UCOV (neigh) -0.0134** 0.0002 -0.0159**
(2.58) (0.02) (3.74)
% F-UCOV (neigh) 0.0120 0.0084 0.0017
(1.64) (0.81) (0.31)
% SF-COV (neigh) 0.0049 0.0162 -0.0056
(0.69) (1.19) (0.90)
% F-COV (neigh) 0.0027 0.0074 0.0071 +
(0.58) (1.00) (1.79)
Robust z  statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Small-firm uncovered worker is the base category.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
Table 18 - Multinomial Logit Coefficients -
Excluding Unemployed Workers -  Females (Modei 2)
Firm - Uncovered Small Firm -  
Covered
Firm - Covered
age -0.1797** 0.0009 -0.0074
(24.24) (0.09) (1.17)
age2 0.0017** 0.0001 -0.0002*
(17.49) (0.92) (2.27)
Primary Educ. 0.5899** 0.4479** 0.7815**
(17.54) (9.13) (27.28)
Second. Educ. 1.1387** 0.9298** 1.7927**
(27.97) (18.38) (47.34)
College Educ. 2.4685** 1.1801** 3.2033**
(37.48) (11.63) (46.13)
#  Children under 5 -0.1531** -0.1693** -0.1636**
(8.56) (6.46) (12.08)
Household head -0.0456 0.0482 -0.1110**
(1.36) (1.23) (3.70)
Migrantes Up to 2 years -0.4268** -0.3379* -0.6487**
(5.92) (2.43) (12.38)
Migrantes 2 to 5 years -0.3886** 0.1613 -0.2928**
(3.09) (0.79) (3.15)
Migrantes > 5 years -0.3766** 0.0295 -0.3246**
(12.57) (0.65) (14.76)
Migrants outside state -0.3008** 0.0170 -0.5241**
(5.66) (0.25) (13.40)
Per capita family inc. (others) 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000*
(2.68) (4.61) (1.98)
D1994 0.0484 -0.0513 -0.0540
(0.78) (0.48) (1.07)
D1995 0.0574 0.1183 -0.0459
(0.89) (0.93) (0.97)
D1996 0.0650 -0.1435 0.0209
(0.95) (1.45) (0.48)
D1997 0.0120 -0.2235* 0.0139
(0.16) (2.11) (0.28)
D1998 -0.0267 -0.2236* -0.0367
(0.41) (2.18) (0.83)
D1999 0.0890 -0.0836 -0.1095*
(1.36) (0.82) (2.11)
D2000 0.2443** 0.1100 -0.0026
(3-42) (1.05) (0.05)
D2001 0.1133+ 0.2042+ -0.1415**
(1.66) (1.81) (2.65)
D2002 0.0974 0.2576* -0.1626**
(13 4 ) (2.46) (3.10)
Region 1 0.1908** -0.1541* 0.3510**
(3.05) (2.09) (5.83)
Region 3 0.0881 + -0.3667** 0.1471**
(1.70) (4.75) (2.99)
Region 4 0.1030+ -0.2788** 0.1521**
(1.84) (4.00) (34 2 )
Region 5 0.1561** -0.3996** 0.0271
(2.65) (5.79) (0.51)
Region 6 -0.0122 -0.3147** 0.0548
(0.20) (3.14) (0.88)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Cont. Table 18
INCNEIGH -0.0016** -0.0008 -0.0015**
(2.68) (1.24) (3.32)
%SF-UCOV (neigh) -0.0094 0.0070 -0.0216**
(1.48) (0.84) (3.83)
%F-UCOV (neigh) 0.0049 0.0036 -0.0064
(0.63) (0.36) (0.99)
%SF-COV (neigh) -0.0008 0.0441** -0.0160+
(0.07) (3.30) (1.87)
%F-COV (neigh) 0.0080 0.0114 0.0062
(1.31) (1.40) (1.29)
Robust z  statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Small-firm uncovered worker is the base category.
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Figure 23 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -  
Models With (Panel A) and Without (Panel B) Unemployed Workers -  Males (Model 2) 
Panel A  -  Model 2  In ducing unem ployed worsens
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% F-U C O V
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Figure 24 -  Marginal Effects for Social Interaction Variables -
Models With (Panel A) and Without (Panel B) Unemployed Workers -  Females (Model 2)
Panel A  -  Model 2  inducing unempioyeo woncers
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Table 19 -  Bivariate Probit Coefficients
(Firm x Small Firm Workers) and (Contributors x Non-Contributors) - Males





Primary Educ. 0.2194** 0.3412**
(21.36) (26.89)
Second. Educ. 0.4040** 0.5804**
(34.27) (49.85)
College Educ. 0.7918** 0.7877**
(27.46) (31.37)
#  Children under 5 0.0058 -0.0173**
(0.92) (3.17)
Household head -0.0142 0.1033**
(1.16) (9.51)
Migrantes Up to 2 years 0.0549* -0.0096
(2.26) (0.42)
Migrantes 2 to 5 years 0.0361 0.0329
(1.04) (1.06)
Migrantes > 5 years -0.0366** 0.0129
(3.16) (1.04)
Migrants outside state -0.1412** -0.1228**
(7.30) (6.42)




















Region 1 -0.0009 -0.0359
(0.03) (1.17)
Region 3 0.0067 -0.0568*
(0.25) (2.15)
Region 4 0.0003 -0.0418
(0.01) (1.52)
Region 5 0.0160 -0.0404
(0.59) (1.45)
Region 6 0.0014 -0.0444
(0.05) (1.49)







HO : p = 0 
Primary Educ.
H O  . pFirm workers — Psocial Sec. Contributers
Secondary Educ.
HO . pFirm workers — Psocial Sec. Contributers
College Educ.


























Robust z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 20 -  Bivariate Probit Coefficients
(Firm x Small Firm Workers) and (Contributors x Non-Contributors) - Females





Primary Educ. 0.4255** 0.3962**
(27.17) (26.73)
Second. Educ. 0.9305** 0.8761**
(43.33) (47.39)
College Educ. 1.6353** 1.3091**
(49.56) (44.15)
#  Children under 5 -0.0826** -0.0732**
(11.37) (10.01)
Household head -0.0649** -0.0482**
(4.08) (3.00)
Migrantes Up to 2 years -0.3155** -0.2936**
(11.38) (9.72)
Migrantes 2 to 5 years -0.1954** -0.0638
(3.92) (1.25)
Migrantes > 5 years -0.2023** -0.1144**
(17.28) (9.32)
Migrants outside state -0.2820** -0.2186**
(13.77) (10.32)




















Region 1 0.2071** 0.1350**
(7.04) (4.42)
Region 3 0.1109** 0.0271
(4.33) (1.13)
Region 4 0.1107** 0.0330
(4.66) (1.49)
Region 5 0.0669* -0.0525*
(2.15) (2.16)
Region 6 0.0531 -0.0081
(1.54) (0.28)




% SF-UCOV (neigh) -0.0119** -0.0093“
(4.00) (3.44)
% F-UCOV (neigh) -0.0033 -0.0044
(0.97) (1.25)
%SF-COV (neigh) -0.0116* -0.0044
(2.51) (1.01)
% F-COV (neigh) 0.0024 0.0026
(0.95) (1.07)
Wald Tests (Chi-Square Values) 
HO : p = 0 6527.37**
Primary Educ.
HO . pFirm workers — Psocial Sec. 8.58
Contributers
Secondary Educ.
HO PFirm workers — Psocial Sec. 19.17
Contributers
College Educ.
HO . PFirm workers “ Psocial Sec. 198.69
Contributers___________________________________________________________________________________________
Robust z  statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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CONCLUSION
Two important indicators of development for less developed countries are 
the infant mortality rate and the level of informality in the labor market. During the 
1990s these two indicators presented different trends in Ceara State, Brazil. 
Whereas infant mortality rate (IMR) presented a downward trend during this 
period, the share of informal workers in the labor market increased. This thesis 
contributed to explain these results by investigating particular aspects of these 
two indicators.
Both essays of this thesis improved upon traditional modeling of infant 
mortality rate and informality decisions by including spatial considerations into 
the analyses. Essay I included spillover effects of health policies in reduced form 
models of infant mortality for municipalities, and essay II included neighborhood 
effects in worker’s allocation models for urban areas.
Spillover effects occur when improving a health care policy in one 
municipality affects not only the IMR of this municipality but also the IMR of 
neighboring municipalities. To capture this spillover effect of policies essay I 
suggested the adaptation of spatial analysis to traditional reduced form models of 
infant mortality rate (Corman and Grossman, 1985). By comparing models with 
and without spillover effects for a policy program known as Community Health 
Worker Program (CHWP) essay I evidenced that spillover effects were 
significant, and their exclusion in traditional models would compromise the full
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effectiveness of this program. Under certain conditions and based on 
simulations, for example, essay I showed a difference of up to 39% in the 
effectiveness of the program when spillover effects were included in traditional 
reduced form models. This result has very important policy implications. If the 
benefits of the program are underestimated in traditional analyses (models 
without spillovers), it is possible that governments will under-invest in improving 
this program. The possible side effects of under-investment in this case are fewer 
infant survivors, which is a tremendous burden borne by the suffering families 
and by the society as a whole.
The second essay investigated two hypotheses usually neglected by labor 
market segmentation theories: i) formal versus informal dichotomies may not be 
adequate to classify workers in the labor market, and ii) workers’ positions in the 
labor market may also be influenced by their interactions in urban 
neighborhoods. The empirical analysis from an expanded sector allocation model 
provided evidence in favor of both hypotheses for the urban labor market of 
Fortaleza city, Brazil. Thus, as segmentation models are the reference guide for 
diagnostic inefficiencies in the labor market, it is important to take into 
consideration in future studies these two pieces of evidence in order to avoid 
misspecification problems.
The interaction between individuals and their social context has been 
promulgated in many study cases such as smoking, negligent behavior of youths, 
public insurance take-up, etc. Social interaction among workers is mostly 
understood as informational channels (networking) which improve the chances of
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unemployed individuals finding a job (Topa, 2001). Although interactions may 
occur for formal or informal workers, this essay found stronger interaction effects 
among informal workers (small-firm uncovered workers), which is consistent with 
Granovetter (1995) and may also have contributed to explaining the rise of the 
informal sector during the 1990s. Although the identification of interaction effects 
in the form of networking is difficult to do when the interacting agents (workers) 
are not randomly formed, essay II provided a modeling strategy to identify 
general neighborhood effects (net effect of interactions, sorting and local fixed 
effects) which indicated possibility of spatial segmentation between formal (firm 
workers covered by social security) and informal (small firm workers uncovered 
by social security) workers. That is, at the neighborhood levels, the formal and 
informal workers tend to cluster themselves where the other type is less 
prevalent. The effect of this spatial segmentation on the possibility of labor 
market segmentation is left for future studies involving natural (social) 
experiments and/or panel data.
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